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st  On 21 December 1973 "the Commission issued a Press 
Statement the text of which was as follows : 
"Investigations "by the Commission in the oil sector 
In the present circumstances of the oil products market, 
the Commission is disturbed about the supply position of oil products 
distributing firms independent of the integrated groups which have 
their own refining facilities. These independent firms often encounter 
grave supply difficulties in connection with the common market 
refineries and some are in an alarming situation. 
The Commission considers that arrangements should be made 
to ensure that the present circumstances do not give rise to the 
elimination of independent trading or its absorption by the big companies. 
Refusal by the big companies to supply the independent 
distributors in an equitable manner may give rise to an application of 
the competition rules of the Treaty and in particular Article 86 
thereof. 
The same holds good for practices which consist in the big 
companies applying to their trading partners different conditions for 
the provision of equivalent services or subjecting the signature of 
contracts to the acceptance by their partners of extra services. 
The Commission has decided to make the requisite investi-
gations with the firms ". 
The circumstances to which the Commission referred were 
those which resulted from the events following the war between Israel 
and Arab countries of 6 to 16 Octob« 
disrupted the international oil market. 
+ Vi +Vi 
and Arab countries of 6 to 16 October, 1973 and which completely 
1) Information for Press (IP 226/73 of 21.12.1973) This report contains the results of the enquiry undertaken 
by the Commission and provides at the same time information 
requested by the European Parliament. 
In no way does the report replace any procedures' which 
the Commission has commenced, or may commence,in application of 
the rules of competition of the Treaty, after having pursued enquiries 
into the behaviour of companies in the market for certain oil products. PART PART I 
THE ENQUIRY BY THE COMMISSION 
A. SCOPE AND OBJECTS OF THE ENQUIRY 
The Commission's intention to commence investigations 
was widely reported particularly since public interest in the oil 
companies had, since before the crisis, been whetted by several 
enquiries pursued in other countries. Particular mention may be 
made of the hearings before a Senate Committee in the United 
States on the market performance and competition in the petroleum 
industry, the enquiry by a French parliamentary committee into oil 
companies operating in France and enquiries undertaken by the 
Swiss Commission on Cartels. However, the only enquiry which 
was concerned directly with events during the oil crisis was that 
undertaken in Germany by the Bundeskartellamt, which conducted 
public hearings on the activities of oil companies in Germany. 
Even before December 1973 however, the Commission had 
observed in the Second Report on Competition Policy ^ when dealing 
with the price trends of crude oil and petroleum products and the 
competitive situation in that market, that is was watching carefully 
(2) 
a very unstable situation. In the Third Report on Competition Policy , 
the Commission referred to its decision to open necessary investigations 
into producer companies and dealers in the oil industry and expressed 
its concern that the price trends would give rise to circumstances 
in which anti-competitive practices might develop. It mentioned 
particularly the danger of the application by member states of national 
regulations concerning prices of oil products. Although effective in 
slowing down the tendency of prices for such products to rise, these 
regulations might nevertheless open up possibilities of some national 
markets becoming more profitable, thus making it attractive for 
operators of refining capacity to treat these markets advantageously 
at the expense of controlled markets. The Commission drew attention 
to the difficulties facing independent dealers and stressed that 
(1) Second Report on Competition Policy : April 1973ï Sec 62. 
(2) Third Report on Competition Policy : May 1974; Sec 2. it would be able, in particular, to apply Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty of Rome, in any cases of distortion of competition or 
anticompetitive practices. 
The aims of the general series of investigations 
initiated by the Commission in December 1973 were to allow it 
to obtain data and other information concerning a number of 
companies within the oil industry which would enable the Commission 
to determine whether the comportment of companies was compatible or 
not with the provisions of Article 85 or 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Because of the special circumstances of, and its concern for 
the position of independent dealers, the Commission ensured 
that such firms were included in the planning and conducting of 
the enquiries. 
So far as Article 85 is concerned, the enquiries were 
to seek evidence of the existence of agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
which might affect, or had affected, trade between member states 
and which had as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the common market during the 
period of the crisis. Particularly in mind was the possible existence 
of agreements or concerted practices between oil companies concerning 
the sharing of markets or the fixing of prices or other conditions 
for transactions concluded by the parties concerned. 
The enquiries by the Commission were also aimed at 
examining the compatibility of the comportment of oil companies 
with Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome which forbids abuses of a 
dominant position. The general reliance of the Community on oil 
products for the supply of a considerable proportion of its 
energy needs contributed to the view that during the oil crisis, 
the position of oil companies was reinforced in respect of individual 
customers, for example, the smaller independent distributors, who had 
been accustomed to relying on one major oil company for their supplies, 
or in respect of a national market or other significant part of the 
common market whose supplies of oil products were largely dependent 
upon a few of the major oil companies. It was therefore possible to 
conceive the existence of dominant positions occupied by oil companies 
collectively or individually in specific markets. The Commission was concerned at the possibility that 
major oil companies ivhich occupied a dominant position in respect 
of a customer might have either restricted their deliveries or 
imposed prices for continued supplies of oil products which were 
unfair, even taking into account the spiralling costs of crude 
oil, or might have been able to make xhe conclusion of supply 
contracts subject to the acceptance by the customer of supplementary 
obligations which were unconnected with the object of the contracts. 
Where oil companies were likely to occupy a dominant position collective-
ly, the Commission was anxious to ensure that markets, production or 
prices had not been manipulated in a way which would prejudice the 
interests of consumers. 
The various possibilities of abuse of a dominant position 
arising out of the structure and economics of the oil markets during 
the crisis period were given special attention by the Commission. The 
first one concerned the survival of the independent distributors. In 
most cases, these independent distributors obtained, and indeed relied 
on, supplies from major oil companies who themselves opera/ted distri-
bution or retail networks in competition with the independents. It was 
therefore possible that because of shortage of supplies these major 
companies might have restricted supplies to independent companies, 
either by direct refusal to. supply or by the imposition of purchase 
prices whichjbecause of the maximum retail prices imposed by the 
governments of the countries concerned,did not allow a viable margin 
for the independents. Although the oil companies might have been able 
to act in this way to ensure the maintenance of adequate supplies to 
their own networks, this would have been done at the expense of 
independent enterprises whose continued existence was threatened. 
Another aspect which drew the attention of the Commission 
was the fact that during the crisis, certain member states had 
introduced various forms of price control, whilst others,such as 
Germany, had not. This meant that the possibility of higher profit 
margins from sales in a member state without maximum price control 
might have attracted oil companies (and, in this case, perhaps not 
only the major oil companies) to direct supplies to such markets 
to the detriment of other member states. Β. ORGANISATION OF THE ENQUIRY 
a) Choice of countries and companies 
The Commission decided to commence its enquiries in those 
countries which had excess refining capacity and which accordingly 
were sources of supply to countries with insufficient refining capacity. 
In the years 1972 and 19731 the Netherlands, Italy and to a lesser 
extent Belgium and France showed positive export balances. Exports 
from the Netherlands for example went mainly to other countries of the 
Community and especially to Germany. According to the energy statistics 
in Eurostat 2/75 » pages 61 and 63, Germany imported in 1973 about 30$ 
of its domestic consumption of oil products and the quantity involved 
was equivalent to the total exports of such products from the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands besides member companies of the large 
international groups such ás EXXON, SHELL, B..P. and CHEVRON (which 
belongs to the group of enterprises of the Standard Oil Company of 
California), independent oil companies who were leading exporters 
of light fuel oil to Germany were included in the investigations. 
In Belgium the investigations covered two refineries : 
Albatros and the Société Industrielle Belge des Pétroles (SIBP), 
both of which undertook process refining of crude oil made available 
to them by other companies, who were either shareholders of these 
refineries or hirers of refining capacity. Other Belgian companies 
were investigated, among them Elf (Belgique). 
In Italy and France besides the large international 
companies, enquiries were undertaken at the national companies 
Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (Aon
3) and Compagnie Française 
des Pétroles (C.F.P.) whose operations, although international, are 
less so than those of the former companies. Esso Italiana and two 
independent Italian refineries were also investigated. 
(* ) Eurostat = Statistical Office of the Communities : Luxembourg. 
10 In France, besides C.F.P., the Société Française des 
Pétroles Β. P. and several independent companies were included 
in the investigations. 
In the United Kingdom, B.P. Trading Ltd. which handles 
the international commercial interests of the B.P. Group was 
investigated. 
Investigations were not pursued at that time in Germany 
in view of the enquiries and public hearings which were then being 
carried out üj the Bundeskartellamt into "siispicions of abusive 
advantage of dominant positions in prices sought for petrol, diesel 
fuel and light fuel oil". 
The main oil companies operating in Germany were invited 
to these hearings which took place in the period 22 March to 
4 April 1974· In. view of the special situation concerning the 
market for oil products in Germany and considering particularly 
the shortage of refinery capacity in that country, the Commission 
estimated that their appraisal of the position in Germany should be 
based principally on information obtained in other member states 
where oil products were produced for export to Germany. Information 
in respect of refining operations carried out in Germany was supplied 
by the companies or groups who operated those refineries. 
The investigations, and the discussions which took place 
with the companies were generally conducted in an atmosphere of 
cooperation, and considerable efforts were made to produce promptly 
the various documents and information requested by the Commission's 
inve st igat ors. 
Il b) Choice of period 
The enquiries were concerned with the activities 
of the companies from October 1972. 
The first investigations took place in January 1974 
at which time the average F.O.B. price for crude oil from 
the Persian Gulf had reached its highest point. 
The period from 1
s
t October 1973 "to 31
s
t March 1974 
was more precisely analysed by comparison with the corresponding 
period of the previous year. 
c) Choice of products 
The following products were covered by the enquiries 
- crude oil 
- petrol - normal 
- petrol - super 
- naphtha 
- middle distillates : diesel oil, gas-oil, light fuel oils. 
- residual fuel oils. 
The enquiry was extended to cover aviation jet fuel 
by the supplementary questionnaire referred to below. This 
enquiry therefore covered the principal mineral oil products 
(other than those in gaseous form ), which constitute a 
significant percentage of the products derived per tonne of 
crude oil in an average refinery in Europe. 
12 The information received in the course of the enquiry 
suggested the need to focus further attention on some particular 
aspects of the activities of the oil companies. It was 
decided that this supplementary information should be requested 
from companies under the provisions of Article 11 of Regulation 17· 
The questionnaire was aimed at covering the movements of 
crude oil and oil products between refineries and affiliates of 
each company on the one hand and, on the other, between these 
and third-companies. It contained a section on sales prices 
practised by that company on the German market. This information 
was obtained from companies established within the Community as 
well as from parent companies in third countries. 
This is the first time that an enquiry of this magnitude 
has been undertaken by the Commission in respect of oil companies 
in connection with the rules of competition of the Treaty of Rome. 
It is also the first time that a report has been published 
following suoh an enquiry. The Commission considered that it would 
be useful to recall some background information concerning the 
European oil industry and accordingly one part of the report 
examines the structure and organization of the oil industry in the 
Community and outlines the events leading up to the oil crisis. 
13 PART  I I PART II 
A. STRUCTURE OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 
1. Classification of oil companies 
The oil industry in Europe is made up of oil companies of 
varying sizes whose structures are often very different but which 
can be grouped into various categories. 
Traditionally the oil industry is divided into two parts: 
the seven international companies - often referred to as the seven 
majors — with their subsidiary companies throughout the world,on the 
one part, and, on the other part, those companies which are not 
attached to these and which might therefore be described generally 
as independents. 
However this division is arbitrary and no longer reflects 
the present structure of the oil industry, especially in Europe. 
Ir a communication to the Council dated 18 December 1968, 
entitled "The First Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy" from 
the Commission, "the Commission attempted to develop a classification 
which might correspond more closely with the actual situation of the 
oil industry in Europe. Under this classification, the enterprises which 
operate en the European oil market fall into three principal categories 
as follows : 
(a) The large international integrated companies operating worldwide · 
In this category are placed seven fully integrated companies ; 
five American - Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Esso or Exxon), 
Texaco Inc. (Texaco), Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf), Standard Oil 
Company of California (Chevron) and Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) 
- and two European : Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) and British 
Petroleum Company (B.P.) 
(b) The integrated oil companies of which the activities are to a 
greater or lesser degree concentrated in one or several member 
states. There are in this category two French companies : Compagnie 
Française des Pétroles (CFp/ïotal) which is often included among 
the large international companies and the Enterprise de Recherches 
et d'Activités Pétrolières (Elf/ERAP); one Italian company : Ente 
Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI); one German company : Veba Aktiengesell-
schaft and one Belgian company : Petrofina S.A. (Fina). 
17 With the exception of the last-named, all these companies 
belong totally or partly to the corresponding member state. 
(c) Smaller companies which import and distribute oil products and 
of which some have their own refineries . Oil companies of 
this type may be further divided into three groups from the 
point of view of size and the extent of their operations. 
In the first group one could place certain international 
companies most of which are of United States origin and which 
operate refineries and distribution networks, such as the 
Marathon Oil Company (U.S.), CONOCO (U.S.), the Burmah Oil 
Company Ltd. (U.K.) and Philips Petroleum Company (U.S.). 
Besides these international companies one^ finds European 
companies whose activities axe largely limited to one country 
in the EEC. In this group is Anonima Petroli Italiana - API (Italy) 
which has a refinery and distribution network. 
The third group might include a very large number of small 
or medium-sized oil companies which specialise in the wholesale 
or retail distribution of oil products and which have no refineries 
(Commission of the European Communities : " Small and medium-sized 
oil companies in the European Communities ", XVIl/415/74 -
19 December, 1974)· 
In each country of the EEC,about ten of the large oil 
companies from the above three categories (a) , (b) and (c) are active, 
each possessing one or more refineries and/or a dense distribution 
network. Alongside these larger companies the majority of the small 
or medium-sized oil companies are concentrated at the level of distribution. 
Their importance is usually regional or even more local. Altogether, 
however, they hold about 20 fo of the market for oil products in the 
ECC (See Part V ). 
Vihat has just been said points to the heterogeneous nature 
of the structure of the oil companies operating on the market in the EEC. 
This heterogeneity is primarily a function of the extent to which the 
various oil companies have access to supplies of crude oil but also 
stems from the degree of integration which is extensive in certain 
undertakings but minimal in others. 
The following table (Table l) shows the principal financial 
and operational statistics in rospect of the companies in the first 
category of enterprise mentioned above : 
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1* This report is not concerned with the financial results 
of the large oil groups and will limit itself here to some comments 
relevant to the results given in the table. 
It must first be stressed that these are consolidated results 
which include all the operations of the companies in the various 
industrial sectors and in the different parts of the world where 
they are active. 
In 1973. the economic expansion and the resulting pressure 
on the market for oil products gave rise to increased demand and an 
increase in the companies' profit margins. After four years of 
stagnation, the increase in the net revenue of the large international 
companies of American origin from 1972 to 1973 was 66.6 $. This 
improvement was due to their operations outside the U.S.A. and, in 
particular, in Europe. The large European companies enjoyed spectacular 
increases in their revenues but reduced the sums distributed to permit 
investments without unduly increasing their long term debt. 
In I974, the net revenues increased on average by 25.4 % 
compared with 1973 for the five American majors and by 59 $ and 48 % 
respectively for Shell and B.P. The results are all the more 
striking because, in the same period, the sales of products of all 
these companies diminished; in the case of the two European majors 
the regression was more pronounced, 11.8 fo and 10.9 7>* This increase, 
unlike that in 1973, stemmed mainly from operations in the U.S.A. 
and from very favotirable results in the chemical sector. 
Nevertheless, despite the increase in net revenues, the 
long term debt of companies of which the grovrth had been generally 
halted in 1973, again swelled significantly. 
According to company reports, the situation reversed during 
the third quarter of 1974 and in the fourth quarter the losses were 
replaced by profits. 
The development of profits in 1973 was therefore not 
continued in 1974: the margin of profit on concession oil (see Page 63) 
was reduced. The considerable increase in the prices of products 
curbed consumption. The weather was favorable to fuel economy. 
The under-employment of transport and refining capacity increased 
costs. 
20 2. The role of companies in oil production 
Until the middle of the 1950's practically all the 
production of crude oil in the world, less China, the USSR and 
Eastern Europe, was produced by the large international companies 
which were accordingly in a position to determine prices. Since 
about 1955 however, the structure of the oil industry has been 
modified slightly. Attracted by the considerable increase in the 
demand for oil, and by the advantageous conditions of concession 
agreements granted by new producing countries ^ ', several newcomers 
have entered the business at the production stage, particularly in 
the Middle East and in Africa: Occidental Oil, Continental Oil, 
Phillips Petroleum, Marathon and ENI are examples of such enterprises. 
Advantageous conditions of access to production agreed by producing 
countries for light crude oil, giving a higher yield, allowed these 
companies to break into the European market for the sale of light 
products - petrol and gas oil - without big investments. 
Ten years after the creation in September i960 of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a. collection 
of circumstances brought an end to a long period of abundance of cheap 
oil and permitted the producing countries to join together in 
controlling production and prices. Among these circumstances were 
an exceptionally high and maintained increase in the demand for oil 
in Europe and in Japan and the factors which arose, in the sectors 
concerned, from the future energy supply in the United States,and, 
from the aspect of supply, the temporary withdrawal from service 
of Tapline (the trans-Arabian pipeline from the Persian Gulf to 
Sidon on the Mediterranean) and the reductions of production in Libya 
and in Nigeria. 
The pressure on the oil market at this period v/as temporary. 
Nevertheless it was sufficient to change the balance of power in favour 
of the oil producing countries. Since then the oil companies have had 
to concede to the oil producing countries on several issues in the 
course of the series of conferences called by these countries concerning 
proposals for increasing their revenues as well as their participation 
in concessions : among these conferences were thoso held at Caracas, 
December 1970; Teheran, February 1971; Tripoli,.March 1971; 
(l) Libya, particularly, had granted concessions on very 
advantageous terms in order to break into markets. For several years, 
taxes were calculated on the actual pries instead of the postea 
price (see Page·82) and rebates ware granted which were parüiaiiy 
subsidized by the state. 
21 Algiers, June I97I and Geneva, 1972. However, until 1973 this 
process of evolution of power had been somewhat slow "because of 
the differences in the economic situation of the oil producing 
countries. The further turmoil between Israel and the Arab countries 
had injected a fresh political solidarity into the relationship 
between the oil-producing countries in the Kiddle East which served 
to accelerate this process of change and which attempts by the oil 
companies and consumers were unable to curb. 
Nevertheless, in 1973 the large oil companies still 
controlled 60 % of the oil production in the world, less China, the 
USSR and Eastern Europe. This percentage was greater - reaching as 
much as 100 fo in some instances - in most of the Middle East 
countries, and in Africa, which areas were of particular importance 
for the supplies to Europe (see Table 2). 
22 TOTAL PRODUCTICM OF CRUDE OIL DY THE SEVEN f.AJOR OIL COMPANIES 
1973 
a) 
Tabel 2 
Country of origin 
Column 
Western Europe 
Kolland 
No-vav 
Fed. Rep. of Germany 
Africa 
jab on 
Nigeria 
.
v.id-!le East 
Abu Dhabi 
Sut il 
Cr.an 
'.Tu rice y 
Oceania 
Australia 
3-un»i 
Malaysia 
Latin America/ 
Caribbean 
Ecuador 
Venezuela 
North Anerica 
World total (a) 
Total production 
of crude oil 
(1) 
15.042 
2.578 
1.255 
1.494 
1.579 
111 
93 
6.711 
276.795 
8.112 
8.389 
101.496 
100.767 
1.029.958 
61.708 
3.396 
5.608 
293.908 
92.586 
119.053 
14.421 
27.491 
364.392 
3.553 
113.152 
13.380 
11.183 
69.934 
4.335 
262.934 
21.961 
9.539 
10.626 
4.178 
7.656 
174.769 
613.043 
2.310.924 
Cru^: 
Esso 
(2) 
2.204 
-
520 
747 
-
-
-
937 
10.921 
_ 
_ 
10.921 
-
109.389 
4.461 
-
-
18.845 
3.036 
-
-
1.059 
81.983 
-
9.729 
8.143 
-
1.586 
-
82.029 
891 
-
- _ 
81.138 
70.291 
284.563 
e oil production of th 
Chevron 
(3) 
28 
-
-
-
-
28 
-
-
202 
_ 
_ 
-
202 
102.531 
1.698 
-
18.845 
-
-
-
81.988 
-
23.990 
-
-
23.990 
-
3.242 
992 
-
- -
2.250 
31.222 
161.215 
Gulf 
Í4) 
151 
-
151 
-
-
-
-
-
25.462 
7.276 
_ 
-
18.186 
71.598 
-
- 18.845 
-
52.753 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
10.944 
-
-
- -
10.944 
33.651 
141.806 
e seven ma' 
Mobil 
(5) 
I.O35 
183 
-
-
-
-
-
852 
14.664 
-
-
3.814 
10.850 
55.073 
4.461 
-
- 18.845 
3.036 
-
-
1.059 
27.329 
343 
1.586 
-
-
1.586 
-
5.890 
-
-
-
5.890 
24.822 
103.070 
or oil companies 
Texaco 
(6) 
1.417 
-
-
-
-
28 
-
1.389 
259 
57 
-
-
202 
103.092 
1.698 
561 
18.845 
-
-
-
-
81.988 
-
24.540 
550 
-
23.990 
-
2.860 
5.241 
9 
2.259 
6.296 
52.292 
198.265 
Shell 
(7) 
1.836 
183 
19 
747 
-
-
-
937 
45.847 
-
2.590 
10.463 
32.794 
81.565 
8.922 
-
- 37.690 
6.072 
-
12.258 
14.605 
-
2.018 
16.068 
550 
11.183 
-
4.335 
90 
889 
-
- 371 
44.824 
40. 6 37 
232.177 
B.P. 
(8) 
81_ 
-
-
-
-
-
80 
1 
32.794 
-
-
-
32.794 
199.952 
17.775 
-
- 107.687 
6.072 
66.3OO 
-
2.118 
-
~ 
-
-
-
-
-
127 
-
- -
-
1.600 
231.554 
Total 
(2) (3' 
(9) 
6.802 
366 
690 
1.494 
-
56 
80 
4.116 
130.149 
7.333 
2.590 
25.198 
95.028 
723.200 
35.619 
3-396 
561 
239.6O2 
18.216 
119.053 
12.2S8 
18.841 
273.293 
2.361 
75.913 
9.243 
11.183 
51.152 
4.335 
90 
5.759 
5.241 
9 
2.630 
151.342 
254.515 
1.355.650 
(9) as a 
% of (1) 
(10) 
45,2 
14,2 
55,0 
100,0 
-
50,5 
86,0 
61,3 
47,0 
90,4 
29,1 
24,8 
94,3 
70,2 
57,7 
100,0 
10,0 
Bl,5 
19,7 
100,0 
85,0 
68,5 
75,0 
66,5 
67,1 
50,3 
100,0 
73,1 
100,0 
62.6 
0,4 
61,7 
49,3 
0.2 
34,4 
86,6 
41 ,_5_ 
58,7 
(a) Excluding China, the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. The total production of this group is approximately 
500 million tonnes. 
Source: Petroleum Times, July 26, 1974. 
to 
CO 3· Structure of refining and distribution in the Community 
It will oe seen from Table 3 that the oil companies 
belonging to the first two categories mentioned in Paragraph 1 
above control a large share of the refining capacity of the Community. 
Table 4 sets out the refining capacities in Western Europe 
of various categories of enterprises. 
Two characteristics which are noticeable in respect of the 
refining capacity of the EEC are the geographical concentration of 
the refineries and the existence of a number of refineries which are 
shared by several oil groups. The refineries of the oil companies are 
situated in particular regions of the Community which are advantageous 
for the rec'eipt of crude oil and the onward flow inland of oil products, 
such, as the areas of Rotterdam, Antwerp, the valley of the Seine and 
the region of Berre,near Marseilles. At the same time, other regions, 
such as Ireland, Denmark and the south of Germany have insufficient 
refining capacity.tó meet their domestic needs. 
The ownership of some refineries is shared by several oil 
groups: for example, the refinery operated by S.I.B.P. at Antwerp is 
owned by B.P. and Petrofina and the Caltex refinery at Rotterdam is 
owned jointly by Texaco and Chevron. In addition, extensive arrangements 
exist between oil companies for the exchange of refining capacity. 
This joint operation of refineries by some oil companies and the 
exchange of refining capacity cannot be without effect on the solidaritj
r 
of the oil companies concerned. 
The exchanges of refining capacity between companies occur 
particularly between regions where excess refining capacity exists in 
large facilities (10 million tonnes and above)$ they allow economies 
of scale in refining costs and avoid the costs of cross-transporting 
oil products. 
24 So far as exchanges of products are concerned, which 
also illustrate the solidarity between companies, these are usually 
complementary to exchanges of refining capacity. They allow companies, 
particularly those which have no refineries in a particular region,; 
to avoid the burden of transport in making available products from 
their own refineries. Petrofina, for example, has developed 
particularly such a network of exchange agreements in respect of its 
share of the products of SIBP at Antwerp and of other refineries in 
the common market. 
25 r>f re 11 neries 
Company 
GERMANy 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Deutsche Texaco A.G. 
Occidental Oel G.m.b.H. 
Homburq 
B.P. Benzin und Petroleum A.G. 
Deutsche Shell A.G. 
Esso A.G. 
Olwerke Julius Schindler 
Bremen Mobil Oil A.G. 
Niedersachsen 
Gew. Erdöl-Raff. Deurag-Nerag 
Mineralölwerke Peine 
Wintershall A.G. 
Wintershall A.G. 
Erdölwerke Frisia A.G. 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Gelsenberg Aktiengesellsch. 
Union Kraftstoff 
Deutsche Shell A.G. 
Occidental Oel G.m.b.H. 
Fina Bitumenwerke G.m.b.H. 
VEBA-Chemie A.G. 
Esso A.G. 
Erdöl Raff. Duisburg G.m.b.H. 
B.P. Benzin und Petroleum A.G. 
Deutsche Shell A.G. 
Hessen Caltex Deutschi. G.m.b.H. 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Elf Mineralöl G.m.b.H. 
Mobil Oil Raff. Worth G.m.b.H. 
Baden-Württemberg 
Esso A.G. 
Oberrh. Mineralölwerke G.m.b.H. 
Erdölraffinerie Mannheim 
Bayern 
Deutsche Shell A.G. 
Esso A.G. 
Erdölraffinerie Ingolstadt A.G. 
Erdölraff. Neustadt G.m.b.H. a Co. 
B.P. Benzin und Petroleum A.G. 
Deutsche Marathon Petr. G.m.b.H. 
Saarland Saarland-Raff. G.m.b.H. 
NETHERLANDS 
West (Noord- en Zuid-Holland) 
Asphalt- en chemische fabrieken 
Mobil Oil N.v. 
Chevron Petroleum (Caltex) 
Esso Noderland 
Shell Nederland 
Gulf 
British Petroleum 
Location 
Helde/Holstein 
Brunsbiittel 
Haraburg-Finkenwerder 
Hamburg-Harburg 
Hamburg-Harburg 
Hamburg 
Bremen 
Misburg /Hannover 
Peine 
Salzbergen 
Llngen/Ems 
Emden 
Gelsenkirchen 
Wesseling/Köln 
Monheira/Rhoin 
Essen 
r.ülhelm/Ruhr 
Gelsenkirchen-Buer 
Köln 
Duisburg 
Dinslaken 
Godorf 
Raunheim 
Speyer 
Wörth/Rhein 
Karlsruhe 
Karlsruhe 
Mannhelm 
Ingolstadt 
Ingolstadt 
Ingolstadt 
Neustadt/Bayern 
Vohburg/Donau 
Burghnusen 
Klarenthai 
Amsterdam 
Amsterdam 
Pernis-Rotterdam 
Rotterdam Botlek 
Perni, s-Rotterdam 
Rotterdam Europoort 
Rotterdam F.uropoort 
Theoretics: 
1970 
120.263 
3.550 
5.000 
550 
12.560 
4.3O0 
4.300 
3.600 
360 
1.800 
9.053 
2.SSO 
18 
335 
3.750 
2.400 
39.550 
7.000 
5.600 
400 
750 
500 
4.400 
5.600 
2.000 
5.000 
8.300 
4.500 
5.800 
2.500 
3.500 
19.2SO 
8.90O 
6.750 
3.600 
21.900 
3.000 
4.800 
3.200 
5.500 
4.400 
5.000 
2.5OO 
68.472 
68.472 
300 
4.000 
12.900 
16.000 
24.500 
4.972 
5.800 
crude oil 
1971 
1Γ6.50Π 
3.550 
3.000 
550 
13.380 
5.100 
4.300 
5.600 
380 
1.800 
9. 078 
2.550 
18 
360 
3.750 
2.400 
45.850 
7.000 
6.000 
500 
750 
500 
7.400 
5.700 
2.000 
5.000 
9.OO0 
4.500 
6.050 
2.550 
3.500 
19.6O0 
9.000 
7.00O 
3.600 
22.400 
3.000 
4. 9O0 
3.200 
3.500 
4.800 
3.000 
2.30O 
77.697 
77.697 
300 
6.000 
12.900 
16.000 
21.725 
4.972 
15.800 
processing 
1972 
135.160 
3.550 
3.000 
550 
15.300 
5.100 
4.300 
5.500 
400 
1.800 
10.060 
2.550 
- 360 
4.750 
2.400 
43-850 
7.000 
6.O00 
500 
750 
500 
7.400 
5.700 
2.000 
5.000 
9.000 
4.500 
6.300 
2.800 
5.500 
21.600 
9.000 
7.0O0 
5.600 
23.800 
3.000 
5.OCO 
5.000 
5.000 
4.800 
5.000 
2.400 
99.130 
99.130 
200 
6.500 
15.900 
16.000 
30.000 
4. 7 JO 
25.800 
capacity (at the end 
1973 
145.610 
6.000 
5.600 
400 
15.300 
5.100 
4.3OO 
5.500 
400 
1.800 
10.060 
2.550 
- 360 
4.750 
2.400 
51.550 
7.000 
6.000 
500 
750 
500 
10.000 
5.700 
2.0OO 
9.900 
9.000 
4.500 
6.50O 
2.800 
5.500 
21.6O0 
9.000 
7.000 
5.600 
26.300 
3.000 
5.000 
3.000 
7.000 
5.1O0 
3.200 
2.400 
99.130 
99.130 
200 
6.500 
15.900 
16.O00 
50.000 
4.730 
2S.Í100 
yChani^s 
1973/1972 
. Λ?.Α·;Ο 
» 2.4 50 
♦ 2.60O 
150 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
♦ 7.500 
-
-
-
- . 
. 2.600 
-
- » 4.900 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4 2.500 
-
-
- ♦ 2.000 
* 300 
♦ 200 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
~ 
1 
of the yeac 
% 
* 69,0 
♦ 86,7 
- 27,3 
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
* 17,1 
-
-
-
-
♦ 35,1 
-
- . 80,0 
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
* 10,5 
-
-
- ♦ 40,0 
♦ 6,5 
4 6,7 
-
-
-
-
) 
-
-
-
-
-
26 Table 3 h. 
List of refineries 
1000 t. 
Company  Theoretical crude oil processing capacity (at the end of the year) 
1970  1971  1972  1973  échanges 
1973/1972 
U.G.P. et U.I.Ρ 
Elf-Union 
Haute-Normandle 
Compagnie Française de Raffinage 
Esso standard S.A.F. 
Compagnie de Raffinage Shell Berre 
Mobil Oil Française S.A. 
Société Française des Pétroles B.P. 
Nord 
Société Française des Pétroles B.P. 
Antar 
Bretagne Antar 
Loire Antar 
Lorraine 
Société de la Raffinerie de Lorraine 
Compagnie Rhénane de Raffinage 
Société de Raffinage de Strasbourg 
Aquitaine 
Compagnie de Raffinage Shell Berre 
Union Industrielle des Pétroles 
Esso Standard S.A.F. 
Rhone-Al pea 
Union pour le Raffinage et la 
Pétrochim. 
Languedoc Mobil Oil Française S.A. 
Provence 
Compagnie Française de Raffinage 
Compagnie de Raffinage Shell Berre 
Société Française des Pétroles B.P. 
Esso Standard S.A.F. 
Grandpults 
Gargenville 
Gonfreville 
Port-Jérôme 
Petit-Couronne 
Gravenchon 
Vernon 
Dunkerque 
Valenciennes 
Vern s/Seiche 
Donges 
Haueoncourt 
Relchstett 
Herrlishein 
Pauillac 
Ambès 
Bordeaux 
Feyzin 
Frontignan 
La Mède 
3erre-l'Etang 
Lavera 
Fos s/Mer 
3.600 
3.700 
37.500 
14.500 
7.200 
9.200 
5-600 
3.000 
9.000 
5.500 
5.500 
7.300 
3.600 
3.700 
37.500 
14.300 
7.200 
9.200 
3.600 
3.000 
9.000 
5.500 
3.500 
3.600 
6.000 
46.300 
25-500 
7.200 
9.200 
5.600 
3.000 
9.000 
5.500 
3.500 
153.1RS 
3.600 
6.000 
46.300 
23.300 
7.200 
9.200 
3.600 
3.000 
9.000 
5.500 
3.500 
3.70O 
4.400 
9.400 
4.5O0 
2.100 
2.800 
5.700 
4.400 
9.400 
4.500 
2.100 
2.8O0 
6.250 
4.000 
25.135 
10.255 
7.500 
4.400 
3.000 
6.960 
4.000 
25.135 
10.235 
7.500 
4.400 
3.000 
3.700 
4.500 
9.500 
4.500 
2.100 
2.900 
4.000 
37.755 
10.255 
13.500 
11.000 
3.000 
3.700 
4.500 
4.000 
2.100 
2.900 
42.735 
10.255 
13.500 
ll.OOO 
8.000 
500 
500 
1.575 
2.000 
5.000 
3,8 
2,3 
5,3 
11,1 
♦ 21,8 
♦ 50,0 
» 13.5 
♦ 166,7 
BELiGIUM 
North 
Albatros 
International Oil Refinery (Albatros) 
Esso Belgium S.A. 
Raffinerie Belge des Pétroles 
Société Industrielle Belge des 
Pétroles 
S.A. Anglo-Belge des Pétroles 
Belgian Shell S.A. 
Texaco Belgium S.A. 
South 
Chevron Oil Belgium S.A. 
Antwerpen-Noord 
Antwerpen-Zuid 
Antwerpen-Noord 
Antweroen-Noord 
Antweroen-Noord 
Antweroen-Zuld 
Gent 
Gent 
Pe luy 
55.B8S 
35.885 
2.700 
1.750 
4.730 
5.000 
15.500 
40 
540 
5.625 
36.700 
200 
750 
730 
000 
15.500 
40 
540 
5.940 
37.2R4 
3.500 
4.73O 
5.000 
544 
7.270 
43-0°4 
38.084 
3.500 
4.730 
5.000 
17.000 
40 
544 
7.270 
2,1 
27 List of refineries 
1000 t. 
Tahi» 3 c. 
Company 
ITALY 
Piemonte 
Sarpora S.p.A.. 
Rol 
B.P. Italiana 
Liguria 
Garrone Raff. Petroli 
San Quirico S.p.A. 
Fina Italiana S.p.A. 
Iplom 
Shell It. 
SPI S.p.A. 
Delle T.lane 
Lombardia 
AGI? S.p.A. 
Amoco Italia S.p.A.. 
Ante S.p.A. 
Shell It. 
Gulf Italiana S.p.A. 
Fina Italiana S.p.A -
I.C.I.P. S.p.A. 
Lisca S.p.A. 
Lombarda Petroli S.p.A. 
Veneto Irom S.p.A. 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia Aquila S.p.A. 
Emilia-Romagna 
Sarom 
Montecatini Edison 
Toscana Stanic S.p.A. 
Marche Api 
Lazio 
Raffineria di Roma 
Getty Oli Italiana 
Campania Mobil Oli Italiana 
Puglia 
Stanic S.p.A, 
Montecatini Edison 
Shell It. 
Sicilia 
Mediterranea S.p.A. 
A.B.C.D. S.p.A. 
Anic Gela Mineraria S.p.A. 
Esso Rasiom 
Sincat S.p.A. 
. Sardegna 
Saras 
Sardoil 
Location 
Trecate 
Viguzzolo 
Volpiano 
Genova 
Genova 
Genova 
Busalla 
La Spezia 
Areola 
Genova 
Cortemaggiore 
Cremona 
Sannazzaro 
Rho 
Bertonico 
Milano 
Mantova 
Valmadrera 
Villasanta 
Venezia 
Trieste 
Ravenna 
Ferrara 
Livorno 
Falconara 
Pantano di Grano 
Gaeta 
Napoli 
Bari 
Brindisi 
Taranto 
Milazzo 
Ragusa 
Gela 
Augusta 
Priolo 
Sarroch 
Porto Torres 
Theoretical crude oli 
1970  1971 
169.880 
12.050 
7.800 
■ SO 
5.000 
16.650 
6.700 
1.700 
1.600 
5.700 
850 
100 
21.820 
140 
5.000 
6.500 
5.700 
330 
2.600 
450 
1.100 
5.300 
3.000 
7.960 
7.700 
260 
4.600 
3.300 
6.000 
4.000 
2.O00 
7.300 
10.360 
3.800 
1.560 
5.000 
47.010 
10.000 
200 
5.040 
10.770 
13.000 
23.730 
18.000 
5.730 
processing 
1972 
173.7110 
12.850 
7.800 
50 
5.000 
16.650 
6.700 
1.700 
1.600 
5.7O0 
850 
100 
25.720 
140 
5.000 
6.500 
5.700 
3.900 
330 
2.600 
450 
1.100 
5.300 
3.000 
7.960 
7.700 
260 
4.600 
3.300 
6.000 
4.000 
2.000 
7.300 
10.360 
3.800 
1.560 
5.000 
47.010 
1Í.000 
200 
5.040 
10.770 
13.000 
25.730 
10.000 
5.730 
capacity /at the end 
1973a) 
170.G5O 
12.850 
7.800 
50 
5.OO0 
16.7O0 
6.750 
1.700 
1.600 
5.700 
850 
100 
28.390 
140 
5.000 
6.500 
5.700 
5.800 
3.!-00 
450 
1.300 
5.3OO 
3.000 
7.960 
7.700 
260 
7.400 
3.300 
6.450 
4.000 
2.450 
7.3OO 
9.260 
3.800 
1.560 
3.900 
47.010 
18.000 
2O0 
S.040 
10.770 
13.000 
23.730 
18.000 
5.750 
changes 
1973/1972 
• 4.870 
; 
4 50 
4 50 
* 2.670 
♦ 1.900 
330 
4 900 
« 200 
-
-
-
4 2.800 
-
4 450 
4 450 
-
- 1.100 
- 1.100 
-
-
-
~ 
1 
of the yea 
% 
2,0 
~ 
0,3 
0,7 
4 10,4 
4 40,7 
- 100,0 
4 34,6 
4 18,2 
_ 
. 
-
4 60,9 
-
4 7,5 
4 22, S 
-
10,6 
22,0 
-
-
-
" 
(a) 1 July 1973 
28 Table 3 d. 
List of refineries 
Company 
UNITED KINGDOM 
England 
British Petroleum Co. Ltd. 
Shall U.K. Ltd. 
Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. 
Lindsey Oil Refinery Ltd. 
Mobil Oil Co. Ltd. 
Philips-Imperial Petroleum Ltd. 
Continental Oil Co. Ltd. 
Burma Oil Trading Ltd. 
Berry Wiggins and Co. Ltd. 
Philmac Oils Ltd. 
Wales 
British Petroleum Co. Ltd. 
Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. 
Texaco Refining Co. Ltd. 
Gulf Oil Refining Co. Ltd. 
AMOCO (U.K.) Ltd. 
Scotland 
British Petroleum Co. Ltd. 
Shell U.K. Ltd. 
Win. Briggs and Sons Ltd. 
Ulster British Petroleum Co. Ltd. 
IRELAND 
Irish Refining Co. Ltd. 
DENMARK 
Dansk Esso A/S 
Gulf Oil A/S 
A/S Shell Raffinaderiet 
Location 
Kent 
Stanlow 
Shellhaven 
Teesport-
Heysham 
Fawley 
South Killingholme 
Coryton 
Nonth Tees 
KlUlngholme 
Ellesmere Port 
Barton 
Kingsnorth 
Weaste 
Eastham 
Liandarcy 
Mllford Haven 
Pembroke 
Milford Haven 
Milford Haven 
Grangemouth 
Ardrossan 
Dundee (Campendown 
Belfast 
White Gate (Cork) 
Kalundborg 
Gulf Havn(Stiqsn£s 
Fredericia 
Theoretical crude oil 
1970 
114.809 
79.192 
10.160 
10,700 
10.200 
5.400 
2.000 
16.400 
7.000 
6.750 
5.080 
4.064 
300 
173 
320 
188 
457 
24.630 
8.130 
6.100 
5.9O0 
4.500 
-
9.467 
9.144 
200 
) 123 
1.520 
2.966 
10.800 
3.500 
) 4.500 
2.8O0 
1971 
121.936 
85.073 
11.500 
10.700 
10.200 
5.400 
2.000 
19.400 
7.200 
6.760 
5.030 
4.064 
1.626 
173 
300 
170 
500 
25.830 
8.550 
6.100 
6.900 
4.500 
-
9.405 
9.040 
200 
163 
1.630 
2.966 
10.900 
3.500 
4.500 
2.900 
processine 
1972 
124.222 
86.559 
10.900 
10.700 
10.200 
6.100 
2.000 
19.800 
8.460 
6.760 
5.000 
5.940 
1,626 
173 
300 
- 600 
27.000 
8.500 
6.300 
7.250 
5.150 
-
9.163 
8.800 
200 
163 
1.500 
2.966 
10.992 
3.500 
4.592 
2.900 
capacity (at 
1973 
141.970 
89.545 
10.900 
10.700 
10.200 
6.400 
2.000 
19.400 
9.600 
8.60O 
5.000 
4.300 
1.445 
- 300 
- 700 
41.750 
8.300 
15.400 
8.900 
5.150 
4.000 
9.175 
8.800 
200 
175 
1.500 
2.966 
10.992 
5.500 
4.592 
2.900 
the end 
changes 
1973/1972 
, 
. 
4 
_ 
4 
4 
» 
-
-
* 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
+ 
17.748 
2.986 
_ 
-
- 300 
-
400 
1.140 
1.B40 
- 360 
181 
173 
-
- 100 
14.740 
-
9.100 
1.650 
- 4.000 
12 
_ 
- 12 
-
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
1 
of the year 
t 
♦ 14,5 
3,4 
_ 
-
- 4,9 
2,0 
* 13,5 
4 27,2 
- 9,1 
11,1 
- 100,0 
-
- 4 16,7 
4 54,6 
_ 
4 144,4 
4 22,8 
-
-
* 0,1 
_ 
- 7,4 
-
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
Souro« : Energy Statistic· - Eurostat. Luxemburg 
29 Table 4 
Refining capacities of oil groups in Western Europe 
(M t/an - en %) 
Group 
Esso 
Chevron 
Gulf 
Mobil 
Texaco 
Total
 TJ«S. majors 
Shell 
B.P. 
Total European majors 
CFP/Total 
ELP/Antar 
ENI 
Petrofina 
Φ . ·, European integrati 
ioxa± companies 
J U.S. independents 
1 
: German independents ( 
Italian independents 
Other independents 
Total independents 
General total 
Capacities at year end 
1972 
M t/an 
126,4 
22,9 
25,6 
38,4 
28,9 
242,2 
133,4 
110,5 
243,9 
49,6 
37,6 
19,6 
16,1 
id 122j9 
33,8 
a) 60,4 
85,3 
75,0 
254,5 
863,5 
% total 
14,6 
2,7 
3,0 
4,4 
3,3 
28,0 
15,4 
12,8 
28,2 
5,7 
4,4 
2,3 
1,9 
14,3 
3,9 
7,0 
9,9 
8,7 
29,5 
100,0 
1973 
M t/an 
142,7 
24,8 
20,4 
42,6 
34,3 
264,8 
133,9 
121,1 
255,0 
50,7 
40,0 
33,0 
18,0 
141,7 
36,9 
65,0 
78,0 
74,0 
253,0 
9H,5 
% total 
15,6 
2,7 
2,2 
4,7 
3,8 
29,0 
14,6 
13,2 
27,8 
5,5 
4,4 
3,6 
2,0 
15,5 
4,0 
7,1 
8,5 
8,1 
27,7 
100,0 
M = Million 
(a) details for VEBA  26,8 
NB.: The expression VEBA refers to the 
into being during the crisis. 
Source : Statistics published by the 
3,1 29,4 
VEBA GBAG group which came 
Direction des Carburants, Prance. 
3,2 
30 Β. THE OIL CRISIS 
1. Trends in the demands for energy in the Community between i960 et 1973 
During the period i960 to 1973 the gross domestic energy 
consumption of the nine countries of the Community increased at an 
annual rate of 4· 7 Ì
0> But whilst the consumption of hydrocarbons 
(oil and natural gas) increased at an average rate of annual growth 
of almost 13 $, the consumption of solid fuels (coals and lignite) 
reduced at a rate of about 3.4 f> per annum. 
The disparity between these rates led to a distinct change 
in the pattern of dependance on the various sources for the energy 
consumption of the Community. In i960 solid fuels still accounted for 
about 67.4 Ì° of the total energy consumption as compared with 26.9 Ì° 
for hydrocarbons. In 1973 the situation was reversed. Hydrocarbons then 
accounted for 71· 9 f° of the total energy consumption, whilst solid 
fuels accounted for no more than 23.7 /» (See Table 5)· 
T^ble S  Domestic consumption of primary energy in —
 
¿
 
the enlarged European Economic Community 
Energy sources 
Coal and equivalents 
Lignite and équivalents 
Oil and equivalents 
Natural gas 
Other fuels 
Electrical energy-
Tot al 
I960 
M 
tec 
463 
33 
185 
13 
1 
41 
736 
% 
total 
62.9 
4-5-
25.I 
1.8 
0.1 
5r6 
100.0 
1970 
M 
tec 
333 
35 
674 
88 
2 
57 
1.189 
7" 
total 
28.0 
2.9 
56.7 
7.4 
0.2 
4.8 
100.0 
1971 
M 
tec 
299 
34 
704 
114 
2 
53 
1.206 
% 
total 
24.8 
2.8 
58.4 
9.4 
0.2 
4.4 
100.0 
1972 
M 
tec 
27I 
35 
750 
147 
2 
57 
1.262 
* 
total 
21.5 
2.8 
59.4 
11.6 
0.2 
4-5 
100.0 
1973 
M 
tec 
280 
37 
793 
163 
2 
57 
1.337 
% 
total 
20.9 
2.8 
59-3 
12.6 
0.1 
4-3 
ro.c 
too = tonnes of coal equivalent 
Source : Bulletin of Energy Statistics - EUROSTAT, Luxembourg. 
The explanation of this development lies in the fact that 
during the decade i960 to 1970, oil was abundant and cheap. This 
situation had the effect of accelerating the shrinkage of the coal 
industry and slowing down the development of nuclear energy in the 
Community. 
31 As a result, in 1973 almost 60 % of the energy needs of the 
Community was covered by oil of which about 98$ was imported (see 
Table 6). Almost 95 % of this oil came from the Middle East and from 
Africa : Table 6 shows clearly the dependence of the energy requirements 
of the Community on the countries in these regions of the world. 
Table 6 
Oil supplies of the European Economic Community 
Origin of 
crude oil 
A. Production of 
the Community 
B. Imports from 
the Near and 
Middle East 
Africa 
Rest of the 
world 
Total imports 
C. TOTAL supplies 
(A + B) 
I97O 
M/t 
13 
265 
219 
34 
518 
531 
total 
2.4 
49.9 
4I.3 
6.4 
97.6 
100.0 
I97I 
M/t 
12 
321 
183 
33 
537 
549 
total 
2.2 
58.5 
33.3 
6.0 
97.8 
100.0 
1972 
M/t 
11 
360 
I70 
30 
56O 
571 
total 
1.9 
63.O 
29.8 
5-3 
98.1 
100.0 
1973 
M/t 
11 
421 
161 
28 
610 
62
1 
lo 
total 
1.8 
67.8 
25.9 
4.5 
98.2 
100.0 
1974 
M/t 
10 
415 
137 
19 
571 
581 
* 
total 
I.7 
71.4 
23.6 
3.3 
98.3 
100.0 
Source : Bulletin of Energy Statistics EUROSTAT, Luxembourg. 
The countries who, in 1973 depended least on oil for their 
energy requirements, were the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
where, in both cases, dependence on oil was below 5° foi in the case 
of the Netherlands this is attributable to their resources 
of natural gas which has been extensively developed as an alternative 
fuel whilst the economy of the United Kingdom is strongly and 
traditionally related to coal. The countries most dependent on oil 
were Italy, Ireland and Denmark : in the first two cases 75 % ^¿L i
n 
the third case almost 90 f° of the domestic consumption of prime 
energy was satisfied by oil (see Table 7). 
32 H 
Table 7 
Domestic consumption of primary energy in the European Economic Community - 1973 
Country 
Germany 
Prance 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Luxem »òurg 
Unixed Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Community Total ! 
Hard co 
M 
tec 
85 
40 
11 
4 
17 
3 
115 
1 
3 
279 
al 
37 
Ρ 
total 
30,5 
14,3 
3,9 
1,4 
6,1 
1,1 
41,2 
0,4 
1,1 
100,0 
Lignit 
M 
tec 
34 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
-
2 
0 
38 
3 
% 
total 
89,5 
2,6 
2,6 
0 
0 
0 
-
5,3 
0 
100,0 
Crude oil 
M 
tec 
209 
177 
136 
42 
39 
2 
155 
8 
25 
793 
, |M| , 
total 
26,4 
22,3 
17,·2 
5,3 
4,9 
0,2 
19,5 
1,0 
3,2 
100,0 
II,! 
Natural gas 
M 
tec 
39 
20 
21 
41 
10 
0 
37 
-
-
168 
total 
23,2 
11,9 
12,5 
24,4 
6,0 
0 
22,0 
-
-
100,0 
Other 
M 
tec 
1 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
™ 
" 
1 
| „ 1 
fuels 
4,  7° 
total 
100,0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
-
-
~ 
100,0 
Primary 
electricity 
,M 
tec 
12 
19 
14 
0 
0 
1 
12 
0 
0 
58 
°/o 
total 
20,7 
32,8 
24,1 
0 
0 
1,7 
20,7 
0 
0 
100,0 
1 
Total 
consumption 
M 
tec 
380 
257 
183 
87 
66 
6 
319 
11 
23 
1.337 
1° 
total 
28,4 
19,2 
13,7 
6,5 
4,9 
0,5 
23,9 
0.8 
100,0 
m = Million 
tec = tonnes equivalent of coal 
The differences between the data in Table 5 for 1973 and the data set forth in Table 7 as the "Community total" 
arise« from the rounding off of the figures. 
Sourco f Bulletin of Energy Statistics : EUROSTAT - Luxembourg. . 
to 
co 2. The events in 1973 
During 1973 there gradually developed a market situation 
which was particularly favourable to sellers. This was due to events 
which influenced both the demand and the supply of oil. 
During this year, the total world needs had increased by some 
8 % which was more rapid than had been envisaged : in Japan and in the 
United States the increase was 15 % and 4·5 % respectively. Paced 
with a serious shortage in domestic resources, the national production 
having decreased slightly, and with inadequate refining capacity, the 
Government of the United States authorized an increase in imports of 
crude oil and refined products. Thus the United States for the first 
time became an important buyer of crude oil from the Middle East and 
Africa. As a consequence of the restrictions imposed by the U.S. 
legislation concerning environmental protection, this extra demand was 
concentrated almost exclusively on the market of crude oil from Africa 
which has a low sulphur content (Algerian, Libyan and Nigerian oil) as 
well as that of light products and middle distillates. 
These products had been purchased by the United States partly 
from Europe and this fact, together with a brisk domestic demand, did 
not fail to cause pressure on the markets for petrol and gas oil, 
particularly during the first three months of 1973· Por the whole year, 
the total demand for oil products in the Community of nine increased 
by about 6 fo, the demand for gas oil exceeding by 12 fo that of 1972. 
All these events influencing demand came about at a moment 
when the supply situation on the world market was relatively weak. 
This was attributable to several reasons. Firstly, certain producer 
countries, particularly Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria and Bahrain had reduced 
their production for technical reasons or with the aim of conserving 
their resources. Thus despite the production effort of Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, the resulting increase in supply was not entirely able to 
cover the inorease in the demand for oil. 
There were, in addition, various factors of a technical and 
economic character which had the consequence of delaying the development 
of the capacity of production installations and port facilities for the 
transport and loading of crude oil in oertain producer countries. 
These delays were partly due to delays in manufacture and delivery 
of material for exploitation and, on the other hand, to the postponement 
by the oil companies of certain investments because of the uncertainty 
concerning conditions of production which had existed since 1970. 
34 The close balance "between supply and demand reached its 
crisis point at the time of the war "between Israel and Arab 
countries of 6 to 16 October 1973· 
+ V» 
On 8 October, the oil companies and the six oil producing 
countries of the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabiat Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Abu 
Dhabi and Quatar) met in Vienna to review the Teheran Agreement on 
prices of February 1971· Another meeting between the producer 
countries of the Persian Gulf took place on 16 and 17 October 
in Kuwait. They decided unilaterally to fix new prices for crude oil 
which were 75 i° higher than the previous prices. At the same time 
they decided to reduce gradually, by 5 ρ each month, their production 
of crude oil until the withdrawal of Israel from the territories 
which it had occupied and,further,to put an embargo on exports to 
countries which they considered to be enemies of the Arab cause, 
especially the United States, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
On 22 and 23 December, at a meeting in Teheran, the oil 
producing countries of the Persian Gulf decided to increase their 
st 1 
prices for .crude oil from 1 January 1974 by more than 100%. At the 
same time, however, they decided to relax from that date their 
restrictions on production but the embargo was to be maintained for 
a further two months. 
Thus as can be seen from the example given in Table 8, the 
average cost of access to one type of crude oil increased almost 
five-fold within the space of three months. 
Table 8 
Price of Arabian light crude oil from Ras Tanura 
(in f> J barrel) 
Price 
Posted price 
Average cost of 
access for the 
producing 
companies 
1.10.73 
3.01 
2.01 
16.10.73 
5.12 
3-39 
1.1.74 
11.65 
9-34 
1.7.74 
II.65 
9.51 
35 3« Immediate consequences of the oil crisis 
The events described above had serious repercussions on the 
national and international economic life of all the countries in the 
Community. The problems which arose concerned principally the availa-
bility of supplies and price levels, and it became necessary to adjust 
energy policies to the changes in these two factors. 
The supply conditions had been disturbed for several months 
before the end of the war of October 1973 and the security of supplies 
of certain countries of the Community was very uncertain. All countries, 
very quickly after October 1973, took measures aimed at guaranteeing 
security of their supplies: these measures included export controls of 
oil products, setting up of stocks, prohibition on the driving .of 
motorcars on Sundays, petrol rationing, which was introduced briefly 
in the Netherlands, and bilateral agreements with producer countries. 
Prom the start}the crisis has been regarded essentially as a 
problem of shortage of oil, but as the grounds for fear in this direction 
vjere reduced, the problem of prices, with all its financial and economic 
consequences, came to the forefront. 
In fact the supply difficulties reduced, particularly after 
December 1973, whilst prices increased in a spectacular way. In the 
space of a few months, petrol quotations on the Rotterdam market had 
more than doubled, those of gas oil had increased by two and a half times 
and those of industrial fuels had increased more than six-fold (see Table 9). 
The domestic prices for oil products did not increase at 
the same pace particularly as they were closely controlled by the 
Governments in most of the member countries. In fact,the cost of crude 
oil conxributes only partly to these domestic prices which are composed 
also of costs of refining, of transport, of distribution and, for some 
products, particularly of indirect taxes on consumption. 
Nevertheless,these prices were increased several times, 
although at different dates, in the various countries of the Community, 
in order to take account of the increases in costs of crude oil 
(see Table 10). 
36 .Table 9 
QUOTATIONS POR OIL PRODUCTS AT ROTTERDAM (a) 
in t per t. 
Products 
Normal petrol 
91 - 92 RM 
Super petrol 
93 - 99 RM 
Diesel oil 
Heavy fuel oil 
S : 1 % max. 
S : 3,5 ^ max. 
Bunker C(extra-heavy 
fuel oil) 
Feb. 
I97O 
18.25-
I9.OO 
23.90-
24.75 
20.00-
2O.5O 
12.25-
I2.5O 
12.75-
13.00 
Aug. 
1970 
26.50-
28.00 
31.75-
32.25 
29.so-
so. 50 
25.00-
27.00 
24.50-
26.00 
Dec. 
1970 
22.50-
23.00 
31.00-
32.25 
33.00-
34.5O 
24.00 
22.75 
22.75-
24.00 
April 
I97I 
26.00-
27.OO 
34.25-
35.00 
30,00-
3O.5O 
22.5O 
21.50 
21.50-
23.00 
Dec. 
I97I 
23.00-
23.5O 
32.5O-
33.00 
27.00-
28.25 
I3.5O 
12.25 
12.25-
13.25 
Dec. 
1972 
41.75-
43.00 
47.75-
5I.OO 
35.00-
36.75 
22.25 
15.25 
15.25-
16.00 
April 
1973 
64.00-
69.OO 
74.00-
77.50 
44.00-
46.OO 
24.5O 
I5.5O 
I5.5O-
16.25 
June 
1973 
98.OO-
106.00 
110.00-
II7.5O 
65.OO-
69.OO 
29.25 
18.75 
18.75-
20.00 
Aug. 
1973 
72.00-
76.OO 
80.00-
85.OO 
68.25-
71.00 
21.75 
16.25 
16.25-
17.50 
Oct. 
1973 
98.OO-
103.00 
108.00-
II4.OO 
130.00-
I4O.OO 
33.00 
25.OO 
25.OO-
27.OO 
Dec. 
1973 
160.00-
180.00 
I7O.OO-
I9O.OO 
I65.OO-
180.00 
I4O.OO 
130.00 
130.00 
I4O.OO 
Feb. 
1974 
I4O.OO-
I5O.OO 
I45.OO-
I55.OO 
97.00-
IO3.5O 
76.00 
70.00 
70.00-
80.00 
June 
1974 
I43.OO 
I48.OO 
153.00 
I58.OO 
87.5O 
9I.OO 
67.5O 
64.OO 
64.OO 
67.OO 
(a) Piatt's quotations for cargoes F.O.B. Rotterdam co 
Domestic prices for certain oil products - taxes included 
Table 10 a 
in $ per m 
Products 
Super petrol 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
30.4-74 
Normal petrol 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
3O.4.74 
Diesel oil 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
3O.4.74 
Domestic fuel 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
3O.4.74 
Heavy fuel oil, high 
sulphur content 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
3O.4.74 
Exchange rate 1 ft 
24.7.73 
27.11.73 
30.4.74 
Germany 
3I9.7-363.I 
277.4-32O.4 
375-3-399.8 
289.2-337.O 
25I.O-294.O 
346.7-367.2 
299.6-325.7 
26O.O-29O.2 
354.9-366.3 
73.9-78.3 
64.2-67.9 
I26.6-I3O.7 
45.7 
39-6 
77.6-79.6 
= DM 
2.3O 
2.65 
2.45 
France 
309.8 
298.4 
359-7 
285.O 
276.3 
330.9 
I98.O 
I9I.2 
213.8 
7I.9 
8O.4 
IO8.9 
43,1 
35-7 
63.6 
FF 
4.04 
4.52 
4.87 
Italy 
280.1 
306.0 
409.9 
262.8 
289.5 
.389.4 
138.3 
I57.I 
212.8 
32.8 
3O.9 
7I.6 
23-9 
22.8 
55-2 
Lira 
578.4 
604.6 
634.12 
Netherlands 
321.7 
302.9 
379-4 
3IO.8 
292.8 
368.6 
161.3 
I72.O 
2O8.7 
82.2 
98.0 
I23.9 
30.9 
32.1 
65.7 
Fl. 
2.55 
2.76 
2.58 
Belgium 
326.0 
296.3 
354.0 
309.3 
292.8 
338.6 
171.2 
I65.3 
215.2 
86.2- 81.6 
90.I- 86,1 
IO5.7-IOI.5 
38.2 
41.4 
90.8 
HF 
34.82 
39.62 
37.43 
Luxembourg 
261.4 
239.5 
293.2 
249-6 
229.2 
281.9 
113.7 
113.1 
155.9 
75-3 
86.3 
86.6 
50.I 
50.9 
53.8 
BF 
34-82 
39-62 
37.43 
United 
Kingdom 
194.6 
I84.4 
245-8 
183.4 
174.1 
235.9 
182.4 
178.3 
240.7 
54.9 
91.7 
95.3 
49.8 
46.3 
85.6 
L 
0.394 
0,427 
0.4II 
Ireland 
206.8 
201.5 
268.7 
192.8 
188.6 
258.O 
155.2 
I5O.7 
213.5 
43.7 
41.7 
90.9 
39.4 
37.7 
81.2 
h 
0.394 
O.427 
0.4II 
Denmark 
396.0-396.0 
385-4-374.2 
373.6-373.6 
383.5-38I.O 
37I.9-36O.6 
363.4-363.4 
129.5-129.5 
160.0-128-5 
140.9-164.7 
94.6- 94-6 
135.2- 96.9 
137.5-137.5 
60.3-n.q. 
64.9-n.q. 
108.3-n.q. 
Kr 
4.02 
4.44 
5.89 
.q. = not quoted on a public exchange. Domestic prices for certain oil products - exclusive of taxes 
in $ per m 
Table 10 b 
Pre luets 
Super petrol 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
30.4.74 
Normal petrol 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
30.4-74 
Diesel oil 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
30.4.74 
Domestic fuel 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
30.4.74 
Heavy fuel oil high 
sulphur content 
1.8.73 
23.11.73 
30.4-74 
Same exchange rates 
as are set forth in 
Table 10 a. 
Germany 
96.7-135.8 
83.9-122.6 
158.5-180.6 
69.2-112.3 
60.0-98.8 
132.8-151.2 
89.7-113.2 
77.8-IO5.O 
150.5-160.8 
62.9-66.9 
54.7-58.O 
IIO.6-II4.3 
35.3 
30.5 
64.3-66.I 
France 
97.9 
IO5.8 
I65.6 
86.0 
95-2 
148.7 
74-5 
78.7 
103.9 
56.6 
64.4 
88.8 
36.6 
30.3 
54.1 
Italy 
72.4 
81.4 
183.0 
62.9 
73.1 
170.9 
49.4 
58.3 
111.8 
24-3 
26.9 
63.3 
20.0 
I9.I 
48.I 
Netherlands 
112.1 
108.4 
I48.8 
102.7 
99.7 
I39.5 
88.9 
IO4.3 
I35.3 
66.3 
82.4 
IO6.5 
29.2 
30.4 
62.7 
Belgium 
93.9 
90.8 
130.4 
79.8 
87.9 
II7.3 
7I.9 
75-7 
114.3 
62.7-58.7 
67.7-64.2 
80.7-77.0 
30.9 
34.0 
77-2 
Luxembourg 
95.3 
93.1 
136.3 
84.I 
83.3 
125.5 
75-3 
78.7 
117.8 
60,8 
72.6 
72.3 
45.1 
46.2 
48.8 
United 
Kingdom 
69.O 
68.5 
I25.4 
57.8 
58.2 
II5.5 
56.8 
62.4 
120.3 
49-3 
86.5 
89.9 
44.2 
4I.I 
80.2 
Ireland 
77.9 
8I.9 
I4O.6 
64.8 
69.8 
I3O.6 
46.4 
49-8 
IO5.I 
40.9 
39.I 
85.I 
36.9 
35-3 
76.1 
Denmark 
I39.9 
I5O.O-I4O.3 
177.4 
I29.O-I26.9 
138,3-128.5 
168.5 
112.6 
I39.I-III.7 
I22.5-I43.2 
82.3 
II7.6-84.3 
II9.6 
52.4 
56.4 
94.2 The considerable rise in price of crude oil contributed 
at the same time to price increases in the various sectors of activity 
throughout the oil industry and accelerated the rate of inflation which 
was already raging in several countries. 
The additional charges which had to be borne in order to have 
access to the same quantities of crude oil as before, had as an immediate 
consequence, an increase in the external d.ebts of several countries of 
the Community. 
In order to face up to all these problems which arose from 
the oil crisis, the Governments of member states of the Community brought 
into operation certain defensive measures which had an influence on the 
operation and unity of the common market. 
40 4. Reactions of the Commission 
Since the start of the oil crisis the Commission of the 
European Communities had taken several initiatives which were aimed 
at resolving,at a Community level, problems which confronted member 
states. 
At the end of their conference which took place in Copenhagen 
on 14 and 15 December 1973, the Heads of State or of Government 
asked the Commission to put forward propositions " aimed at resolving, 
in a concerted manner, the problems arising from the development of the 
present energy crisis " and to provide "arrangements which will ensure 
that all member states take, on a collective and equitable basis, 
measures aimed at reducing the consumption of energy ". 
On 16 January 1974 the Commission communicated to the 
Council six propositions in respect of measures which might be taken in 
the Community because of the oil crisis. These propositions envisaged 
simultaneous action on transactions in oil products between member states 
and with other countries, on the prices of these products, and on 
measures which were aimed at reducing energy consumption, by such means 
as would maintain, by common action as a Community, the smooth operation 
of the common market. 
In its communication to the Council,the Commission said that 
exchanges of oil products within the Community would have to be 
undertaken with due respect for the principle of free circulation of 
goods and that procedures were envisaged which would allow remedies 
to be applied in any cases of difficulties v/hich might arise in 
member states. It further proposed that abnormal exports to third 
countries which might jeopardize the availability of supplies to the 
Community should be avoided. The attainment of these objectives 
depended on a ready access to precise and homogenous information on 
intra-Coiamunity exchanges and on exports to third countries. They also 
called for frequent consultations between member stetes and the Commission 
in order to agree on possible commercial measures. 
The Commission further proposed to the Council a temporary 
Community system for the supervision of prices of oil products and 
subsequently a recommendation of the Council was addressed to member 
states on the subject of the maintenance and harmonization of voluntary 
measures for the reduction of energy consumption in the Community. 
Since these measures were aimed at facing up to a crisis 
situât ion,the Commission hoped that its propositions might be adopted 
41 + Vi 
by the Council for application up to 30 June 1974« In fact 
the crisis had receded somewhat by the beginning of 1974 and 
the Council never pronounced on these propositions by the 
Commission. 
The reactions by the Commission to the onset of the 
oil crisis were justified by the outbreak of the war in the 
Middle East and the measures decided upon by the member countries 
of OPEC. It was, at that time, impossible to foresee future 
developments and it would have been improvident not to take a 
serious view of the possibility of a crisis of long duration. 
The impression may perhaps be gained from this report 
that the effects of the crisis on supplies to the Community 
viere not particularly severe. Such a conclusion is possible now, 
several months afterwards. It nevertheless remains true that 
the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974 was regarded by the 
Community, member states, oil companies and consumers as a 
period of crisis and attitudes and measures then taken were 
conditioned by the desire to be prepared for a possible long 
duration. 
42 PART III PART III 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OIL COMPANIES AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
Close relationships existed in all countries in the Community between 
the oil companies and public authorities. During the oil crisis such links became 
more extensive, particularly in Belgium, the Netherlands, Prance and Italy. 
Sometimes the relationships are based on laws or regulations such as in Italy 
and Prance; in other instances the relationship is on a de facto basis. 
Section A below analyses the general relationship between the oil companies 
and the national authorities. Section Β describes the relationship which existed 
between the oil companies and national governments in respects of the resolution 
of certain specific problems which arose, such as that concerning the maintenance 
of supplies to certain classes of consumers and independents during the oil crisis. 
Section C deals with agreements concerning supplies to certain national enterprises. 
A. GENERAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES DURING THE 
OIL CRISIS 
(a) Belgium 
In pursuance of a Convention dated 12th May I964, a committee of control -
Comité du contrôle d'électricité et du gaz - was established in Belgium with 
responsibilities for submitting recommendations to the Government in respect of 
tariffs and distribution arrangements for gas and electricity. Before the crisis, 
no such arrangements existed in respect of oil. 
However there existed a Consultative Committee for oil created by Royel Decree 
of 27th September 1972. At the beginning of November 1973 a further liaison 
committee was created but not as the result of any legislation or specific 
regulation. The president of the committee was the Minister of Economic Affairs 
and members were drawn from various ministries with associated interests and the 
oil companies. This liaison committee was divided into three specialised sections 
dealing respectively with : 
- gas oil, light heating oil and petrol 
- residual fuels 
- liquid petroleum gas. 
The activities of the liaison committee gave rise to the publication 
by the Minister of a number of directives concerning, for example, requisition 
procedures and the maintenance of supplies to independents. 
45 But the oil crisis had emphasized the necessity of a more permanent relationship 
between the Government and the oil companies. There was accordingly created 
by oyal decree on the 8th April 1974«the Comité de Concertation et de Contrôle 
(Officiai Gazette, of the lOth April 1974)· The Committee had as its prime 
purpose the exploration of solutions to problems concerning the production, the 
supply, import, distribution, transport, storage, marketing and costs of oil and 
of oil products. The Committee was empowered to deal with the problem of 
formulating prices for oil products. 
Membership of the Committee was drawn from three sources -organizations 
with a supervisory' role (trade unions and professional associations), 
organizations to be supervised (refining and distributing companies) and public 
authorities. 
Price structure difficulties were sorted out by the 'planning 
agreement' signed on 24th July 1974 by the Minister of Economic Affairs and the 
Belgian Oil Federation , which set up a procedure for establishing sale prices. 
(b) Holland 
The relationship between the oil companies and the government
 na
s 
always been based on what might be described as a gentlemen's agreement. Up 
to I95O, Shell was the only refining company operating in Holland. The 
subsequent establishment of new refineries meant tha/t the Minister for Economic 
Affairs was obliged to contact each of the oil companies concerned when he wished 
to discuss problems affecting the oil industry in Holland as a whole. In order 
to simplify these contacts, the Olie Contact Commissie (O.C.C.) was established 
about I95O at the invitation of the government. The chairmen of the O.C.C, have 
always been former directors of Shell. All the companies which undertake 
refining in Holland are represented on the O.C.C., that is Shell, Esso, BP, 
Chevron, Texaco, Mobil, Gulf, Compagnie française des pétroles and Petrofina 
which hires refinery capacity. One of the functions of the O.C.C, is to submit 
to the Minister of Economic Affairs joint propositions in respect of the 
calculation of maximum prices. 
During the oil crisis the members of the O.C.C, in agreement with the 
organizations for commercial retailers of oil products, proposed minimum profit 
margins for deliveries of oil products through the Rijksbureau,whose function is 
described in detail in Section B. The recoriime.nded niar^ins were subsequently 
opposed by the independent oil companies 0:1 the basis that they did not peirir.it 
these companies to cover their costs of distribution. During the oil crisis the 
46 companies who were members of the O.C.C, cooperated with the Rijksbureau for 
the establishment and maintenance of 'pools' of oil products which were intended 
to provide supplies to consumers and independent companies who found themselves 
in particular difficulties through the shortage of oil products. 
(c) France 
The French oil industry is regulated by the Lav; of 1928. This law 
organizes the oil industry and casts the public authorities in the role of 
guardian of the oil companies. This undoubtedly had the effect of creating a 
strong state interest in the oil sector represented by CF.P. and Elf Srap but it 
also gaVe rise to a situation favourable to concertations between oil companies. 
Without describing in detail the French legislation, mention may be made of the 
main principles together with some indication of how this legislation h?Æ 
influenced the behaviour of the French cil companies during the oil crisis. 
The successive laws and government decrees affecting the oil 
industry dealt with such matters as the import of crude oil, the distribution of 
refined products, the establishment of prices at both the refinery and distribution 
level, the definition of oil products and the control of quantities made available 
for sale on the French market. Oil companies in France participated to some 
extent in the operation of a state monopoly,a function which had been assigned to 
them by the Law of 1928. In effect, the provisions of the various laws and 
decrees envisage that the right to import crude oil will be reserved exclusively 
to certain named companies who have been granted an authorization which is valid 
in principle for ten years. Similarly the right to import and distributo 
refined products depends on the grant of an authorization which is valid for three 
years and which deals with quota arrangements for petrol only. At the present 
time no limits are fixed in respect of other oil products. La Compagnie Française 
de Raffinage, which is a subsidiary of the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, also 
enjoys a special authorisation for it to distribute annually 25$ of the oil 
products intended for domestic consumption and to import corresponding quantities 
of crude oil. 
These arrangements had the effect of inducing certain concerted 
practices which went beyond the limits envisaged by the legislators. 
47 The enquiry undertaken by the French national authorities established 
the fact that a system of distribution quotas had existed over two periods, i960 
to 1962 and 1968 to 1969» Attempts by the oil companies to increase prices by 
concerted action, however, were rare during these periods. Such concerted 
practices concerned sales of fuel oil to municipal establishments and on the 
wholesale market for fuel oils and petrols. These enquiries, which covered the 
whole of Prance, were the subject of an opinion expressed by the Committee on 
Cartels and Dominant Positions, (Bulletin Officiel des Services de Prix dated 
l8th April 1973). In this opinion the French authorities recognised that the 
law of 1928 had of necessity given rise to a certain concertation in the field 
of distribution of oil products. The Committee stressed, however, that the 
restrictive practices which had been detected had gone far beyond the extent 
necessary for the proper application of the government regulation. That Committee 
also recommended that no legal action should be taken before 1st October 1973, 
on condition that by that date the public authorities and the oil industry would 
have defined the field and the extent to which concerted practices were admissible 
in the sector of oil products. 
Because of the action taken by the French authorities, the Commission 
did not deem it appropriate to introduce formal procedures under Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty of Rome in respect of the concerted practices which had been brought 
to light by the report of the Committee on Cartels and Dominant Positions. 
Towards the end of 1973, a protocol was drawn up by the public 
authorities and signed by the oil companies and the trade organizations. This 
protocol and its ratification by the signatories was published on 20th February 1974« 
The object of the protocol was to define the commercial practices which were 
admissible in the light of the rules of competition under French law. 
So far as the concerted practices of a regional nature are concerned, 
in particular those involving the municipal markets in the region of Marseilles 
and which were the subject of legal action commenced by the French judiciary at 
the beginning of 1973, their essentially local character places them outside the 
criteria for the application of the Treaty of Rome. 
48 (d) United Kingdom 
When it became clear in October 1973 that the production of crude 
oil would be affected by the Israel-Arab conflict, the Department of Trade and 
Industry in the United Kingdom set up an Oil Emergency Group which was charged 
with coordinating government action. At the same time, the Oil Industry 
Emergency Committee (O.I.E.C.) was convened under emergency arrangements for 
dealing with supply difficulties. Membership of the O.I.E.C. consisted of 
representatives of the principal oil refining and marketing companies in the 
United Kingdom: several subcommittees were formed to deal with special topics, 
such as marketing, retail supplies and statistics. Following the introduction 
of the Fuel and Electricity (Control) Act 1973, directions were issued in 
November 1973 to all companies requiring them to reduce deliveries to customers 
of the main oil products to 90$ of the level of deliveries in the previous year. 
(e) Italy 
The plan for the reorganization of the Italian oil industry was 
adopted by the Inter-Ministry Committee of Economic Planning (C.I.P.E.) some 
time before the commencement of the oil crisis. Its aims were : 
— to give a defined status to the State companies and especially to 
Ente Nazionale ds Idrocarburi (ENI) and its subsidiary; Azienda Generale 
Italiana Petroli (AGIP); and 
— to maintain conditions of competition between a large number of enterprises. 
The crisis and the various national regulations which maintained 
maximum prices below international levels accelerated the process envisaged 
by the plan of reorganization and modified extensively the structure of the 
Italian oil industry. Shell Italiana and B.P. Italiana left the market, the 
former being purchased completely by A.G.I.P. and the latter by the Monti Group. 
The outcome was a reinforcement of the influence of the State on the Italian oil 
industry but this was achieved at the cost of heavy losses which wore suffered 
during the crisis by A.G.I.P. 
49 The new plan for the reorganization of the oil sector provided for 
the introduction of import quotas for crude oil and an increase of the quantity 
authorized for A.G.I.P. It also envisaged the development of a fleet of 
tankers of E.N.I, under the Italian flag. It further envisaged the development of 
all the oil activities of A.G.I.P. and eventually the extension of state control 
to the whole of the sector concerned with thé distribution of oil products. The 
development of A.G.I.P. in the various fields was considered by the State as 
necessary to ensure the adequacy of supplies for the national market. To 
effect this, the plan envisaged an extension of the activities of E.N.I, in 
the sector of the production of crude oil either by an intensification of 
exploration activities or by the conclusion of medium and long-term purchasing 
contracts within the framework of exchanges, of links and of contracts for 
cooperation and industrial assistanoe with oil producing countries. 
So far as refining is concerned, the part played by international 
oil companies was already extremely limited. In 1974» 79$ of the authorized 
refining capacity was already covered by the following companies : 
E.N.I. 20$ 
Esso 19.1$ 
Monti Group 15.1$ 
Montedison 8.6$ 
Moratti 8.3$ 
Rovelli 4.1$ 
Garrone 4.0$ 
79.2$ 
It can been seen that Esso was, and it remains, the only international 
company of significance in the field of refining. The other international 
companies which exist in Italy represent in total no more than 11.5$
 o
f the 
authorized capacity. 
In conclusion, the oil crisis modified the oil policy in Italy. 
Before the crisis the activity of the E.N.I. Group constituted a competitive 
factor with the other international groups established in the country. Sinoe 
the crisis, the influence of the State in the oil sector has been clearly 
extended. E.N.I, now occupies the role of a supply agency in respect of 
crude oil both for its own refineries and for non-integrated Italian groups 
who undertake process refining. 
50 (f) Ireland 
During the oil crisis the relationships between the Irish Government 
and the oil industry in handling the oil supply shortage and economy measures 
were pursued on a basis of close cooperation between the oil companies and the 
Minister for Transport and Power. In addition, regulations governing the 
maintenance of oil reserves were made by the Minister. Under Irish legislation 
however, the Minister for Transport and Power can, in an emergency situation, 
control the activities of oil companies through the Fuels (Control of Supplies) 
Act 1971. 
(g) Denaark 
In normal times, the delivery of oil products by the oil industry to 
traders and consumers is not subject to any form of legislation but during the oil 
crisis two ministerial decrees were issued — on 19th and 27th November 1973. 
Both these decrees concerned gas oil, diesel oil, bottled gas and fuel oil. The 
first of these decrees established two committees : the first was concerned with 
the allocation of oil products between traders and the second was established 
by the Minister of Commerce -as a general supervisory body: the latter was also 
empowered to investigato and act in respect of complaints received, from consumere. 
The first decree also contained provisions concerning the registration by 
suppliers of details of their transactions in oil prodmcts. 
(h) Germany 
During the crisis the Federal Government did not find it necessary 
to introduce any law or regulation concerning quantities and prices of oil 
products. 
The difficulties which nevertheless arose in connection with 
supplies v.-ere solved through close contacts between the public authorities 
and the oil companies. Enterprises in the oil sector, producers, importers 
and dealers were represented on supply committees — 'Industry' and 'Importers 
and intermediary dealers'. 
51 Several arrangements resulted from this cooperation. For 
Borne oil products including petrol, industrial and domestic fuels and 
naphtha, communication networks were set up by the oil companies to avoid 
disturbances of supply. A voluntary information system was established 
under which the oil companies regularly informed the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs of, in particular, imports of crude oil and oil products, refining, 
sales,stocks and selling prices. 
In respect of the supply of diesel oil, priority was given to 
meeting the requirements of industry to avoid an adverse effect on the 
employment situation. Supplies of light fuel oil to domestic consumers were 
limited to 75$ of their normal consumption to induce consumers to make the 
fullest use of their stocks. The oil companies endeavoured to prevent their 
filling-stations from giving priority to regular customers. 
In addition, voluntary limitations were introduced on prices of 
certain products, including light fuel oil. 
(i) Luxembourg 
Almost all the oil products to meet the requirements of Luxembourg had 
for a long time originated from refineries at Antwerp. In 1972 Luxembourg 
began to receive some products from Germany, particularly residual fuel oils. 
The existence of a system of maximum prices for these products in Luxembourg 
caused difficulties for some independent companies who obtained supplies from 
Germany. 
Export licences 
Side by side with these rules and arrangements dealing primarily 
with price levels, all the Community countries except Denmark and Ireland 
introduced export licensing systems for oil products during the crisis. Although 
these licences were theoretically granted without restrictions in time, at 
no cost and for whatever quantity was requested, the control facilities which 
they placed in the hands of the Member States in fact inevitably tended to 
segregate the common market. 
52 Hence during the crisis,all the member states equipped themselves 
with the means to take action with varying degrees of compulsion. It is 
interesting to note that none of these measures really had any .influence on 
trade in overall terms. Greater quantities of products might have been 
expected to flow away from markets with low controlled prices to markets where 
prices were higher or uncontrolled. But this did not happen, and although 
the figures show that imports into Germany did swell in October and November 
I973, trade flows remained stable over the six-month crisis period and Germany 
continued to import the same volumes (99·8$ of the corresponding period of 
the previous year) from the same exporting countries (mainly the Netherlands). 
B. SPECIAL MEASURES AND PROBLEMS INVOLVING OIL COMPANIES ATO GOVERNMENTS 
DURING THE CRISIS 
a) Supply pools in Belgium and in the Netherlands 
In Belgium and in the Netherlands the governments asked the large 
oil companies to make supplies available to consumers who were unable 
to obtain deliveries, such as independent companies who were unable to 
obtain oil products on the national market or by importation. From 
the point of view of competition,these pools led to very close contacts 
between the various companies who were members of the pools, without 
achieving a complete resolution of the supply problems of the independent 
companies. 
Belgium 
The Ministerial Decree of 6 November 1973 and subsequent 
notices provided that supplies should be made available to independent 
companies on the following basis : 
53 - independent companies who were regular customers should be supplied 
with a minimum of 75$ of their reference quantities; that is,the quantities 
which were delivered to them during the corresponding period in 1972; 
- those companies who had made occasional purchases (on a "spot" basis) 
should receive a minimum of 50$ of their reference quantities; 
- other customers should be supplied with a minimum of 45$ of their reference 
quantities. 
However the interpretation of these provisions was left to the 
discretion of the largo companies and they were implcmonted by directives 
of the Liaison Committee of the Belgian Oil Federation. This Federation 
set up a pool with a secretariat which had representatives of five of the 
large oil companies: B.P., Texaco, Shell, Esso and Calpam (SHV/Çhovron). 
The pool had two main functions : 
- to supply independent importers with up to 45$ of the quantities they 
had required in the corresponding period of the previous year ; 
- to supply priority customers, such as hospitals and schools. 
The pool then allocated between its members those orders which 
the independents were unable to meet. The result was, for a time, a typical 
sharing arrangement of those markets which the independents had boon forced, 
to quit. 
In March and April 1974»the operation of this pool was backed up by 
powers allowing the authorities to requisition products so as to moet certain 
very difficult situations facing the independents and priority customsrs. 
According to information provided by the. Belgian oil companies, certain of 
these requisitions were carried out only to an extent varying between 15$ and 4?·$. 
54 Holland 
A state office, the Rijksbureau, was set up in Holland by a 
Ministerial Decision of 13th November 1973, to organise the country's 
supplies of oil products. The Rijksbureau consisted of experts, seconded 
from oil companies operating refineries in Holland, supported by administrative 
staff. It was essentially an executive body. At the request of the 
Minister for Economic Affairs, it drev; up a scheme of rationing and organized, 
a pool of oil products, contributed by the oil companies, from which supplies 
were allocated to meet special demands of consumers and independent 
distributors. The activities of the Rijksbureau ceased on 1st April 1974. 
h) Special problems relating to government price controls 
In certain countries, particularly Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Italy, one of the effects of the price levels of the various oil products 
fixed by the government was to provoke movements of stocks of crude oil. 
55 In the Netherlands a reduction in the production of heavy fuel 
by the refineries was noticed, due to the consumption having dropped by 
considerable proportions in comparison with the preceding year because natural 
gas was being used as a substitute form of energy. 
The production of petrol increased,although during the crisis the 
consumption of petrol on the national market also diminished by 15$ to 20$ 
in respect of the reference months of the preceding year following the Dutch 
authorities' recommendations on fuel economy. Despite the oil embargo 
directed against the Netherlands, as a result of purchases of lighter oils which 
gave a greater yield of petrol, the production of petrol was maintained and,in 
fact, the proportion of petrol exported of the total production of petrol 
increased from 44$ in January 1974 to 56$ in March 1974. The fixing cf domestic 
prices in the Netherlands for petrol at a level which was considerably lower 
than the international price therefore gave rise to a proportional increase in 
the exports of petrol. 
In Belgium the introduction of maximum prices similarly influenced the 
behaviour of the oil companies, leading them to reduce their stocks and their 
imports of crude oil. In fact, it is apparent from an analysis of the 
financial effects of the crisis on one company in Belgium that 
the profits achieved by the enterprise on the whole of its products attained 
their highest level during the fourth quarter of 1973, then tailed off until 
they disappeared completely and turned into a deficit for fuels and gas oils 
from the beginning of 1974· 
A note from the Oil Federation dated 16 January 1974 confirms that 
all the oil companies found themselves in the same situation. At the same time, 
refinery production reduced during the first quarter of 1974 i" comparison 
with the corresponding quarter of 1973 by about 26$ for petrol, 25$ for gas oil 
and middle distillates and 27$ for heavy fuel oil. 
56 In Italy, according to data obtained from four companies, the 
average monthly prices for purchases of crude oil c.i.f. were, before the 
start of the oil crisis, largely above the prices fixed by the CIPE (the 
Inter-Ministry Committee for Economic Planning). 
However, one must take into account the fact that because of the 
considerable capacities for stocks which existed in Italy, the increase in 
the Eaxiraum prices authorized by the CIPE in February 1974 allovred the oil 
companies to achieve considerable profits on the quantities held in stock. 
Crude oil purchased in November 1973 at 23.255 lire per -tonne was accounted 
for on' the basis of the price of 45.000 lire established by the CIPE in 
February 1974· These profits were,however, only temporary because the costs 
of replacing the oil sold had to be taken into account. Two international 
enterprises abandoned their activities en the Italien market - Shell Italiana 
and B.P. Italiana. The Moratti Group increased its activities in the field. 
of refining services for export whore prices were free. Moreover,the prices 
of naphtha, which were not subject to maximum price control, increased quite 
considerably. The petro—chemical refineri.es, such as those of Montedison, 
recovered the increase in price of crude oil on naphtha and petro-chemical 
bases since they were not able to d.o so on oil products which were subject, to 
maximum price control. AGIP which by talcing up the DP network, hod increased 
its share of the market, sustained considerable losses due to its purchases 
of crude oil at prices which were too high, taking into account the maxi~.ua 
prices in Italy. 
57 This control of prices influenced the structure of the oil 
industry in Italy by discouraging international groupings which had 
partly given up their place to the ENI Group and had abandoned their 
refining activities to Italian companies offering refining services. 
c) Stocks of crude oil and of refined products in Belgium 
This problem was studied in considerable detail in view of the 
questions which had been raised in the European Parliament in respect of 
Belgium. The Commission supplemented its investigations on this aspect by 
sending a detailed questionnaire to eight Belgian oil companies who were 
carrying out refining in Belgium in the period from the end of November 1972 
to the end of April 1974. 
The Commission confirmed that the total stocks of crude oil 
increased up to 30th June 1973 and then thereafter were reduced uniformly until 
30th April 1974« The reduction in the level of stocks showed some 
relationship with the increase in the price of crude oil and with the maintenance 
of the prices of oil products in Belgium at a level lower than the international 
quotations. 
An analysis of the relevant data of the eight companies during 
this period in respect of each of the four occasions when price increases were 
authorized by the Belgian Government, revealed no similarity of movements 
in the stocks of crude oil belonging to the various companies which might 
have led one to presume the possibility of some concerted practice aimed at 
gaining profit from the increase in maximum prices. 
A positive indication of the existence of a concerted practice 
would have been a collective increase in the stocks of crude oil in anticipation 
of the increase in maximum prices of oil products, and then a reduction in 
stocks when the increases in maximum prices had been approved. 
58 In respect of the price increase of 1st January 1973 
this double movement is identifiable only in respect of two companies out of 
tne eight studied. For the increases which were put into effect on 1st June 
1973 and 1st July 1973, this double movement ivas present in respect of all 
eignt companies concerned. For the price increase of 15th November 1973, only 
one of the eight companies showed this double movement. For the increase of 
1st April I974 this double movement is noted for four companies out of the eight 
It therefore seems that, except for the price increase 
of 1st June 1973 when the oil companies increased their stocks before the 
price increase and reduced their stocks when the price increase became 
effective, the companies chose rather to attempt,by reducing their stocks of 
crude oil,to exert pressure on the Belgian Government to increase the maximum 
prices of oil products. 
The Commission has found that in all countries operating 
price controls, the oil.companies exerted pressure on governments in order to 
have prices adjusted in line with the increase in the cost of crude oil,Belgium 
appears to be the only country where this pressure was accompanied by stock 
movements and a slowdovm in imports. The reason, no doubt, is that in 
other countries the regulations issued by the- authorities gave them more 
clearly defined powers in controlling what the coupanies did with their stocke, 
while other governments decided more quickly on their attitude to requests 
from companies. 
C. ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING SUPPLIES TO CERTAIN NATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
The Commission has examined certain supply 
arrangements between oil companies and some large national undertakings. 
59 In France the Commission has examined the contracts entered 
into by two oil companies and Electricité de France. Both companies 
concluded with EDF contracts of similar type for the same duration of ten 
years, for the exclusive supply to certain power stations. Such contracts 
of exclusivity of supply could give rise to problems with regard to the rules 
of competition. Their terms will be the subject of further examination. 
In Italy the contract entered into by Esso and Montedison for the 
provision of naphtha was for a duration of ten years. It has just expired. 
The Commission will examine the conditions on which it has been renewed. 
In general, contracts between oil companies and national enterprises 
would have to be the object of a more detailed examination in order to 
determine whether the nature of these contracts 'has contributed to some 
sharing out of customers. 
60 PART IV PART IV 
TEE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS OK QUANTITIES AND PRICaS 
A - Quantities 
(a) General remarks 
One of the items dealt with in this chapter will be supplies of crude 
oil. A number of terms used in the oil industry are used here and a 
definition of these terms and a brief description of the way in which 
crude oil is acquired may be helpful. 
Before the crisis ,the ownership of crude oil in the various producer 
countries depended on a series of agreements concluded in 1972 between 
the producer countries themselves and the oil companies or groups. Under 
these agreements, known as "participation agreements", the companies 
owned part of the crude oil. This was known either as "concession oil" 
or as "equity crude". The proportion of total production accounted for 
by concession oil varied from country to country 3;ad from agreement to 
agreement. Before the crisis, for instance, concession oil represented 
75 % of total production in Saudi Arabia. 
Another portion of crude oil production, owned, by the producer state i 
line with its shareholding, was known as "participation" oil or crude 
and in January 1973 represented 25 f° of Saudi Arabian production. 
"Participation oil" is further subdivided into "bridging oil" and 
"phase-in oil". These were defined by the participation agreements. 
n 
63 "Bridging oil" was the term applied to agreed quantities of 
participation crude oil which producer countries were obliged 
to sell back to oil companies during the first three years of 
the operation of the participation agreements (that is, 1973, 
I974 and- 1975) "to permit these companies to fulfil, during these 
transitional years, their existing supply commitments. In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, 18,75$ of the total oil production was 
allocated as bridging oil. 
"Phase-in oil" was the term applied to agreed maximum quantities 
of participation crude oil which producer countries could require 
the oil companies to buy back from them, if, during the period when 
the producer countries were developing (phasing-in) their own 
commercial policy, these countries encountered difficulties in 
disposing themselves of crude oil within these maximum quantities. 
It was envisaged that the "phase-in" arrangements would extend 
to I99I. In the case of Saudi Arabia, in I973 3,75% of the total 
oil production was allocated as phase-in oil. The concepts of 
bridging oil and pha-se-in oil were not opera/bed by all the oil 
producing countries and indeed fell out of use towards the end 
of I973. 
The balance of participation crude oil not earmarked as bridging oil 
or phase-in oil was referred to as "state oil", a term which is 
sometimes also used as an alternative to "participation oil". 
These were the concepts which were in operation at the onset of the 
oil crisis} however, the situation changed rapidly. The proportion 
of total oil production attributed to participation oil was fixed, 
as has been said, at about 25$ and should have remained at this level 
until 31 December 1977, after which date it was due to be increased 
annually until a limit of 51$ was reached in I982. But already by I974 
the various participation agreements were no longer respected by the 
producing countries and the proportions of concession oil and participation 
oil were, in that year,/\.0'fo and 60$ respectively for the Persian Gulf 
states whilst the comparable proportions for Nigerian crude oil became 
45$ and- 55$ respectively. 
64 (b) Total Community imports of crude oil 
An examination of this cannot be undertaken without bearing 
it in mind that a comparison of data relative to two periods takes 
no account of increased consumption, which, in view of the economic 
expansion, it was normal to expect for the period October 1973 to 
March 1974, compared with October 1972 to March 1973. 
Nevertheless, subject to this qualification, imports from 
October 1972 to March 1973 (the reference period) can be compared 
with those from October I973 to March 1974 (Table ll). 
The total Community imports of crude oil were at substantially 
the same level during the crisis as during the reference period. 
An analysis of the imports of individual countries shows some 
variations to this. 
In Germany, imports rose during the first two month of the 
crisis. The rise was due both to the desire of the oil companies 
to shield themselves against the effects of the embargo on crude 
oil exports to Rotterdam, which is the source of most German 
imports of refined products from Community countries (nearly 70$), 
and to the attractiveness of the German market, where the level of 
prices allowed the largest profit margin. 
By January 1974» the German market was saturated and imports 
began to fall off. Total German imports over the crisis period 
were 2% below those of the reference period. 
In the Netherlands, the effects of the embargo began to be 
felt seriously in December 1973 when crude imports fell to roughly 
50$ of the October level. By January, however, the supply situation 
in Rotterdam began to brighten as a result of the arrangements 
made by the large international companies to reroute, mainly through 
the United Kingdom, certain quantities intended for their Rotterdam 
refineries. 
65 ON 
Crude oil imports from non-member countries 
TABLS  11 
Month  Germany  France  e 1 Italy ¡detherlandé Belgium 
.^1. ,„ , ^„r ;,. ,,._. t 
Community I 
(a) 
1972 Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1973 Jan 
Feb 
Ear 
j Total Oc-t.-'TS-Mar '73 
1973 
L,-i -
Dec 
Feb 
Mar 
Total Oct.'73 -Mar '74 52.438 
8.282 
9.172 
9.O76 
9.244. 
8.502 
9-455 
53.731 
10.019 
9.346 
8.777 
8.707 
7.259 
8.3SO 
IO.045 
11.697 
IO.454 
12.302 
10,352 
12.547 
67.397 
II.873 
12.548 
IO.625 
II.4O7 
II.285 
IO.65O 
68.593 
IO.546 
IO.751 
IO.505 
9.802 
9.389 
II.C4I 
62.035 
10.822 
9-937 
10.881 
11.134 
10.006 
IO.514 
63.294 
6.366 
6.I25 
5.514 
6.332 
5.963 
6.101 
36.4OI 
6.469 
6.438 
3.453 
5.257 
d.686 
5.509 
31.812 
3.222 
3.232 
2.818 
2.522 
2.534 
3.437 
17.765 
2.161 
3-358 
3.I4I 
2.763 
2.34-3. 
1.082 
I5.45S 
8.788 
8.691 
9.I24 
8.945 
7.838 
9-613 
53.049 
11.737 
8.923 
8.895 
9.820 
8.921 
10.376 
53.672 
1.023 
722 
839 
5.033 
881 
622 
532 
550 
867 
4.414 
; 
! 1973/72 Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1974/73 Jen 
Fob 
Mar 
Oct.'73-Mar '74/ 
Oct. '72-üar '73 
21,0 
1,9 
- 3,3 
-5,8 
- 14,6 
- 11,4 
- 2,3 
13,2 
7,3 
3,5 
-7,3 
9,0 
- 15,1 
1,8 
2,6 
-7,6 
3,6 
13,6 
6.6 
-4,8 
2,0 
Difference 
1,6 
5,1 
- 37,4 
-17,0 
- 21,4 
-9,7 
-12,6 
^ j 
in Ja 
- 14,3 
3,9 
11,5 
9,8 
-7,3 
-63,5 
- 13,0 
..-
_ 
-. 
— 
mm 
— 
— 
33,6 
2,7 
- 2,5 
9,8 
13,1 
7,9 
10,6 
mm 
— 
-
_ 
— 
_ 
(5,8) 
(-25,3) 
(-36,1) 
- 7,4 
- 22,4 
3,3 
- 13,2 
48.082 
50.501 
43.325 
50.175 
45.350 
53.033 
295.460 
54.567 
51.172 
46.504 
50.045 
45.055 
47.378 
294.731 
13,5 
1,3 
-3,8 
- 05<3 
- 0,6 
- 10,7 
- 0,2 
(a) Excluding Ireland, where no monthly figures are available Ultimately, Dutch supplies during the crisis were 12,6$ below those 
of the reference period. 
In Belgium, despite the country's partial dependence on Rotterdam for 
supplies of crude oil by the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline, imports 
developed along different lines than in the Netherlands. 
The fall in crude oil imports only became apparent in February 1974? it 
increased in March when the oil companies lost interest in the 
Belgian market, where the maximum prices imposed by the. Government did 
not allow them to operate profitably. 
In Denmark, ,the embargo had the same effects on imports as in 
the Netherlands, but this had no perceptible impact outside the 
country since Denmark is not an exporting country. 
On the other hand, the existence of price controls imdoubtedly led 
the companies to reduce their purchases of cru.de oil as in Belgium. 
Italy, in contrast, imported a little more crude oil during the 
crisis than during the reference period, the reason being that the 
companies continued to exploit their Italian surplus refining 
capacity on the export market (Italian exports of finished oil 
products rose by l°/o over the reference period.; see Table I4). 
The United Kingdom also increased its crude oil imports, but to a 
cruch greater degree than Italy (lO. 6
L/o). The rea.son for this was 
that the companies were using their British refineries to make up 
for the temporary loss of output in Rotterdam caused by the embargo. 
France was able to continue a normal supply pattern, and its refineries 
ran at full capacity. 
67 (c) Quantities of crude oil refined ( Table 12) 
During the first six months of the crisis, the volume of crude oil 
processed in Community refineries was 303 million tonnes as compared 
with 305 million tonnes during the reference period. 
The Netherlands and Belgium witnessed a sharp drop of 13$ and 10$ 
respectively in refining activity. 
France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, refined greater 
volumes than in the previous year. 
(d) Supplies to European companies with inadequate sources of 
crude oil 
In times of crisis, it might be feared that companies not having 
enough crude oil of their own to keep their refineries running 
at capacity would be faced with supply difficulties. 
On the whole, these companies did not suffer from a shortage 
of crude oil during the crisis. 
68 Table 12 
Crude oil processed in refineries 
Month 
1972 Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1973 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Total Oct '72 - Mar '73 
1973 Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1974 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Total Oct '73 - Mar '73 
I973/72 Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1974/73 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Oct '73 - Mar '74/ 
Oct '72 - Mar '73 
Germany 
9,733 
9,587 
9,886 
10,096 
9,205 
9,926 
58,433 
10,813 
10,145 
9,587 
9,136 
7,826 
8,355 
55,862 
France 
10,963 
11,395 
11,684 
12,000 
10,140 
10,856 
67,038 
12,044 
11,952 
12,133 
11,681 
10,963 
11,293 
70,066 
Italy 
11,572 
10,451 
11,399 
10,362 
9,470 
10,784 
64,038 
10,993 
9,893 
11,297 
11,153 
9,788 
11,917 
65,041 
Nether-
lands 
»000 t 
6,568 
6,083 
6,244 
6,251 
6,268 
6,117 
37,531 
6,278 
5,712 
5,030 
5,012 
5,127 
5,456 
32,615 
Belgium 
2,860 
3,236 
3,304 
2,111 
2,896 
3,435 
17,842 
2,965 
3,449 
3,400 
2,560 
2,366 
1,363 
16,103 
Luxem-
bourg 
-
United 
Kingdom 
8,728 
9,030 
9,906 
9,894 
8,377 
9,554 
55,489 
10,226 
9,534 
10,211 
9,510 
9,185 
10,233 
58,899 
Ireland 
-
Denmark 
(730) 
(730) 
(730) 
874 
787 
880 
(4,731) 
830 
739 
760 
775 
740 
810 
4,654 
• — 
Community 
51,154 
50,512 
53,153 
51,588 
47,143 
51,552 
305,102 
54,149 
51,424 
52,418 
49,827 
45,995 
49,427 
303,240 
Difference in % 
11.1 
5.8 
- 3.0 
- 9.5 
- 15.0 
- 15.8 
- 4.4 
9.9 
4-9 
3.8 
- 2,7 
8.1 
4.0 
4-5 
- 5.0 
- 5-9 
- 0.9 
7.6 
3.4 
10,5 
1.6 
- 4.6 
- 6.1 
- 19.4 
- 19.8 
- 37.3 
- 11.8 
- 13.1 
3.7 
6.6 
2.9 
21.3 
- 18.3 
- 60.3 
- 9.7 
-
17.2 
5-6 
3.1 
- 3.9 
9.7 
7.1 
6.1 
-
(13.7) 
(1.2 
(4.2) 
- 11.3 
- 6.0 
- 8.0 
- 1.6 
5,9 
1.8 
- 1.4 
- 3.4 
- 2.4 
- 4.1 
- 0,6 
(a) Excluding Ireland, where no monthly figures are available 
0--Petrofina, which has no resources of its own, had for several 
years been obtaining supplies from BP Trading under a long-term 
contract. BP and Petrofina ovm and operate the SIBP refinery at 
Antwerp on a 50/50 basis. 
,A comparison during the entire crisis period of BP's deliveries 
to its ovm refining subsidiary, Anglo-belge des Pétroles (ABP), 
and to Petrofina shows that deliveries to Petrofina developed 
in the same way as those made to ABP. 
In 1973, AGIP-ENT was prevented, to varying degrees, from exporting 
its production of crude oil by certain producing countries,with 
Iran blocking as much as 69/Ó of its production. 
Of nearly l8 million tonnes produced outside Italy, AGIP was able 
to ship only 10,6 million tonnes that year. 
During the crisis,the proportion of its supplies accounted for 
by its ovm production fell steadily from 367» in October 1973 to 
29$ in March 1974. 
Hence, AGIP was forced to buy more crude oil on the free market, 
in other words, outside that part of the market governed by 
participation agreements. It paid a higher price for the crude oil 
which it obtained than that paid by the integrated international 
companies, which have the best supplies of crude oil. The difference 
was between 10 and 20"/ó. 
70 Montedison had no supply difficulties since it was able to.buy 
on the free market and pass the price difference on in products 
used in the petrochemical industry where there were no price 
controls. 
Judging by the development of stocks held by Veba's refineries in 
Germany, which rose between October 1973 and March 1974, Veba does 
not appear to have experienced any difficulties with its supplies, 
which viere assured, on tne one hand, by its contracts with Mobil and 
BP and, on the other hand, by its own sources and its purchases 
elsewhere. For these latter purchases, Veba had to pay higher 
prices. 
(e) Quantities of refined, products supplied to the domestic market 
(domestic consumption) (see Table 13) 
The stability of crude oil supplies, quantities refined and stocks 
held meant that the available quantities of finished products 
lso remained highly stable. 
None the less, supplies of oil in the common market during the 
crisis viere 5»6/£ lower then those of the reference period. 
However, exports to non-member countries rose by the same 
proportion. This resulted undoubtedly from the combined effect 
of energy-saving measures introduced in Community countries, a 
slight reduction in industrial activity and the attraction of 
world market prices. 
The reaction of the oil companies to price controls also had 
repercussions on the extent to which the domestic markets of 
certain member countries continued to receive supplies. 
71 13 
Domestic supplies of oil products· 
Month  Germany  France  Italy  iïether-
låSåä . 
s 
1972 Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1973 Jan 
Fob 
i Mar 
¡Total Oct «72 -Mar '73 
L973 
1974 
Oct 
Nov 
Doc 
Jan 
Feb 
i 
¡Total Oct '73 -Mar '74 
¡1973/72 Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1974/73 Jan 
psb 
Kar 
IO.885 
11.144 
I2.O5O 
12.389 
11.125 
II.718 
69.3II 
12.76I 
12.035 
10.636 
11.024 
7.7IO 
9.395 
8.972 
9.587 
10.954 
11.630 
10.320 
IO.705 
62.168 
10.547 
IO.689 
11.738 
10.647 
3.998 
9.445 
63.6II ! 62.C64 
7.835 
7.601 
8.897 
8.336 
8.II9 
8.O51 
48.839 
7.652 
7.I68 
7.876 
(7.752) 
(7.752) 
(7-752) 
45.952 
'000 t. 
2.187 
2.386 
2.403 
2.482 
2.247 
2.302 
14.012 
2.52I 
2.059 
2.143 
1.989 
2.002 
1.860 
12.584' 
Belgium  Lux.e,m- United 
Kingdom  Ireland 
2.113 
2.359 
2.228 
2.3OI 
2.283 
2.431 
13.715 
2.320 
2.336 
I.986 
2.208 
2.058 
I.652 
12.610 
123 
122 
210 
1Λ8 
135 
142 
880 
149 
137 
227 
137 
10 
123 
783 
8.320 
9.017 
9.054 
9.826 
8.855 
9.644 
54.726 
9.129 
9.281 
8.096 
8.708 . 
8.159 
8.990 
52.363 
Difference in % 
Oct '73 - Nar 
Oct '72-
——1 
Denmark 
¡'Community 
r 
lity 
) ! 
(1.660) 
(1.66O 
(1.660 
2.023 
I.758 
I.848 
(IO.6I4) 
I.847 
1,638 
I.48S 
1.393 
I.I72 
1.357 
8.935 
'74/ 
'73 
17,2 
8,0 
-11,3 
- 11,0 
- 30,7 
- 19,2 
-8,2 
17,6 
11,5 
7,2 
-8,5 
- 12,8 
- 11.3 
- 0,2 
- 2,3 
9,4 
- 11,5 
- 7,0 
- '4,5 
- 3,7 
- 5,9 
15,3 
8,7 
- 11.0 
-19,9 
- 10.9 
—19,2 
- 10,2 
9,8 
1,1 
- 10,8 
- 4,0 
- 9,9 
- 33,0 
-8,1 
21,1 
12,3 
8,1 
- 7,4 
- 92,6 
- 13,4 
- 11,0 
9,7 
2,9 
- 10,6 
- 11,4 
- 8,0 
— 0 ,o 
-4,3 
: 
— 
(11,3) 
, (i,7) 
(- 10,4) 
- 31,3 
- 33,3 
- 24,4 
-15,3  -
42.095 
43.876 
47.461 
49.140 
44.852 
46.841 
274.265 
46.926 
45.453 
44.240 
43.853 
37.851 
40.614 
258.952 
11,5 
3,6 
6,8 
10,7 
15,6 
13,3 
•5,6 
vii) Excluding Ireland, where no monthly iigj.res  available In the Netherlands and Belgium, in particular, the drop in 
supplies was partly due to the reluctance of the companies 
to supply products at the rather lov.' maximum prices set by 
the Government. Domestic heating oil was the hardest hit. 
In Germany, escalating prices in February 1974 acted as a brake 
on consumption, especially of domestic heating oil and diesel fuel. 
Quantities were available but the demand was no longer there. 
(f) Total Community exports and imports of finished oil 
products (see Tables I4 a and 14 ,b) 
Table I4 a (total exports) includes for each Community country: 
- supplies to "other Community countries 
- exports to non-member countries. 
Table I4 b (total imports) includes for each Community country: 
- imports from other Community countries 
- imports from non-member countries. 
The figures given in the column for the Community thus cover trade 
within the Community (Tables 14a and 14b), Community exports to 
non-mernber countries (Table I4 a) and Community imports from non-
member countries (Table I4 b). 
Total Community exports (to member countries and non-member countries) 
fell by only 5.&fo in the crisis period compared with the corresponding 
months of the year before, which demonstrates that they were hardly 
affected by events in the Middle East. 
However, the fall was sharper in two traditional exporting countries, 
the Netherlands and Belgium, which felt the effects of the embargo 
imposed on Rotterdam. 
73 TOTAL EXPORTS OF ALL OIL PRODUCTS 
Table I4 a 
1972 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1973 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
TOTAL 
Oct '72 - Mar '73 
1973 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1974 
Jan 
Peb 
Mar 
TOTAL 
Oct '73 - Mar '74 
1973/1972 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1974/1973 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Oct '73 - Mar '74/ 
Oct '72 - Mar '73 
Germany 
725 
665 
612 
650 
680 
698 
4,030 
1,018 
968 
603 
766 
687 
1,013 
5,055 
40.4 
45.6 
- 1.5 
17.8 
1.0 
45.1 
25.4 
France 
1,046 
945 
927 
1,116 
1,041 
1,002 
6,077 
1,172 
943 
1,142 
1,021 
883 
1,096 
6,257 
12.0 
- 0.2 
23.2 
-8.5 
- I5.2 
9-4 
3.0 
Italy 
2,275 
2,371 
2,088 
2,313 
2,135 
1,915 
13,097 
2,340 
2,243 
1,960 
2,207 
2,657 
1,806 
13,213 
Nether-
lands 
3,541 
3,718 
3,841 
3,765 
3,524 
3,709 
22,098 
3,849 
3,266 
2,446 
2,464 
3,110 
3,453 
18,588 
Belgium 
»000 t 
1,102 
1,024 
1,395 
609 
1,121 
1,251 
6,502 
1,286 
1,152 
1,509 
573 
695 
466 
5,681 
Luxem-
bourg 
-
-
-
-
-
-
United 
Kingdom 
1,257 
1,342 
1,455 
1,314 
1,000 
1,150 
7,518 
1,767 
1,461 
1,138 
996 
756 
791 
6,909 
Ireland 
-
-
-
-
-
-
Denmark 
(176) 
(176) 
(176) 
205 
202 
287 
1,222 
303 
207 
207 
226 
231 
155 
1,329 
Difference in % 
2.9 
- 5.4 
- 6.1 
- 4.6 
24,4 
- 5.7 
0.9 
8.7 
- 14.O 
- 36,3 
- 34.6 
- 11.7 
-6,9 
- 15.9 
16.7 
12,5 
8.2 
- 5.9 
- 38.0 
- 62.7 
- 12.6 
-
-
-
40.6 
8.9 
- 21.8 
- 24.2 
- 24.4 
- 31,2 
- 8.2 
-
-
-
(72.2) 
17.6) 
(I7.6) 
10.2 
I4.4 
46.O 
8.8 
Community 
(a) 
10,122 
10,241 
10,494 
9,972 
9,703 
10,012 
60,544 
11,735 
10,240 
9,005 
8,253 
9,019 
8,780 
57,032 
15.9 
0 
- 14.2 
- 17.2 
- 7.0 
- 12.3 
-5.8 
(a) Excluding Ireland, where no monthly figures are available TOTAL IMPORTS OF ALL OIL PRODUCTS 
Table 14 b 
1972 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1973 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
TOTAL 
Oct '72 - Mar '73 
I973 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1974 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
TOTAL 
Oct '73 - Mar '74 
1973/1972 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1974/1973 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Oct '73 - Mar '74 
Oct '72 - Mar '73 
, 
Germany 
2,727 
3,266 
3,821 
3,313 
3,110 
3,026 
19,263 
3,988 
3,685 
3,168 
2,726 
2,862 
2,796 
19,225 
46.2 
12.8 
- I7.I 
- I7.7 
- 8.0 
7-5 
- 0.2 
France 
774 
817 
734 
(627) 
(627) 
(627) 
4,206 
728 
519 
496 
340 
465 
342 
2,890. 
- 5.9 
- 36.5 
- 32.4 
(-45.8) 
(-25.8) 
(-45-5) 
- 31.3 
Italy 
(500) 
(500) 
(500) 
321 
512 
414 
2,747 
(350) 
(350) 
369 
246 
126 
309 
1,750 
Nether-
lands 
824 
797 
946 
788 
721 
619 
4,695 
I.271 
671 
726 
701 
58O 
776 
4,725 
Belgium 
Í000 t 
433 
425 
329 
647 
539 
631 
3,004 
924 
570 
622 
58O 
520 
494 
3,710 
Difference in % 
(-30.0) 
(-30.0) 
(-26.2) 
- 23.4 
- 75-4 
- 25.4 
- 36.3 
+ 54.2 
- 15.8 
- 23.3 
- 11.0 
- 19.6 
25.4 
0.6 
113.4 
34.1 
89.1 
- 10.4 
- 3.5 
- 21,7 
23.5 
Luxem-
bourg 
122 
127 
203 
138 
144 
139 
873 
162 
139 
238 
143 
108 
116 
906 
32.8 
9.4 
17.2 
3.6 
- 25.O 
- 16.5 
3-8 
United 
Kingdom 
1,814 
1,921 
2,078 
2,158 
1,942 
1,655 
11,568 
1,219 
983 
749 
1,043 
1,209 
1,234 
6,437 
Ireland 
-
-
-
-
-
Denmark 
(1,035) 
(1,035) 
(1,035) 
1,355 
1,025 
1,065 
6,550 
1,039 
888 
878 
830 
636 
619 
4,890 
- 32.8 
- 48.8 
- 64.O 
- 51.7 
- 37.7 
- 25.4 
- 44-4 
— 
-
-
(0,4) 
(-14.2) 
(-15.2) 
- 38.7 
- 38.0 
- 41.9 
- 25.3 
Community 
(a) 
8,229 
8,888 
9,646 
9,347 
8,620 
8,176 
52,906 
9,681 
7,805 
7,246 
6,609 
6,506 
6,686 
44,533 
17.6 
- 12.2 
- 24.9 
- 29.3 
- 24.5 
- 18.2 
- 15.8 
(a) Excluding Ireland, where no monthly figures are available This reduction in exports from Belgium and the Netherlands was 
offset by increased exports from Germany in particular. The 
increase in German exports (45$ more in March 1974 than in 
March 1973) can be explained in part by the fall-off in demand 
on the domestic market at the end of the crisis in March 1974« 
This can also be attributed to the mild winter, to the fact that 
there vías some consumption of industrial and domestic stocks and 
to the end of a period of panic over shortages which had begun' in 
October 1973 and which, for a number of months, had triggered off 
an abnormally heavy demand. 
The sum of the total imports of Community countries fell by 15«0$. 
However, German imports, which during the crisis period represented 
43$ of total Community imports, remained virtually static as comparo! 
with the reference period (- 0.2$). 
Significant reductions occurred in French, Italian and British imports. 
Por the Communiti'· as a whole, the crisis resulted in a clear slowdown 
of trade in oil products, with a fall-off in both total exports and 
total imports. 
During the crisis the exporting activities of Rotterdam and, to 
a. lesser extent, Ant werp, vrere drastically curtailed. 
(g) Intra-Comrûunity trade in oil products (see Tables 15 a and 
15 b ; ,___„„___—_— 
W»rta»^WW — ■ ■—— '■»■! f·»! I II .ΙΙΜ»Ιϋι.ΜΙ1..»ΙΙΙ«ιι*..1.ΙιιΙΙ»ΙΙΙ»Ι1πΜΙ»ι«-»ΙιίΙΙΙΙΙΙΙ·«Ιί W**WWMIÌ » Ij M .JÉ nil ι » ■""■ '■' »— 
If vre take 1972 as a normal year, vre see that intra-
Comraunity trade rose in 1973 ar.d then fell in 1974,both these 
years being affected by a three-iiionth period of the crisis .iSven 
after the end of the crisis, continuing effects can be seen* 
76 INTRÂ-COMMUNITY TRADK LN ALL OIL PRODUCTS 
1972, 1973 and 197»  iOOO t. 
Table 15 (a) 
Importing 
country 
GERMANY 
1972 
1973 
1974 
FRANCE 
1972 
1973 
1974 
ITALY 
1972 
1973 
1974 
NETHERLANDS 
1972 
1973 
1974 
BELGIUM 
1972 
1973 
1974 
LUXEMBOURG 
1972 
1973 
1974 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1972 
1973 
1974 
IRELAND 
1972 
1973 
1974 (a) 
DENMARK 
1972 
1973 
1974 
COMMUNITY 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Exporting country 
Germany 
1,354 
1,236 
1,176 
111 
71 
109 
1,520 
997 
1,017 
240 
247 
350 
160 
121 
274 
586 
259 
365 
23 
11 
(11) 
272 
225 
673 
4,274 
3,167 
3,975 
France 
3,168 
3,137 
3,094 
526 
562 
209 
467 
989 
561 
540 
942 
417 
138 
132 
71 
1,413 
1,464 
702 
48 
(48) 
41 
185 
144 
6,293 
7,459 
5,246 
Italy 
2,292 
2,613 
2,286 
3,683 
2,438 
1,408 
1,400 
1,001 
1,028 
334 
269 
408 
-
2,928 
1,913 
1,401 
19 
16 
(16) 
785 
462 
636 
11,441 
8,712 
7,263 
Nether-
lands 
18,569 
22,161 
17,713 
803 
717 
731 
70 
104 
168 
3,269 
4,236 
4,048 
168 
214 
15 
9,036 
7,145 
6,223 
109 
39 
(39) 
1,750 
2,503 
2,709 
33,774 
37,119 
31,646 
Be 1 π i um 
2,316 
2,236 
1,693 
326 
211 
270 
48 
106 
59 
1,001 
1,437 
1,423 
1,017 
1,211 
1,202 
1,0 58 
2,001 
1,005 
33 
55 
(55) 
945 
1,146 
888 
7,624 
8,453 
6,595 
Luxem-
bourg 
-
-
-
-
5 
5 
-
-
-
5 
5 
United 
Kingdom 
1,717 
1,161 
1,089 
80 
247 
287 
110 
63 
141 
1,053 
1,010 
2,095 
334 
281 
311 
-
2,478 
3,048 
(3,048) 
3,715 
4,111 
3,017 
9,487 
9,921 
9,988 
Γ reland 
-
0 
0 
20 
-
-
603 
493 
425 
-
623 
493 
425 
Denmark 
66 
89 
38 
5 
0 
19 
74 
36 
5 
0 
-
97 
52 
24 
32 
(32) 
242 
228 
99 
Community 
28,128 
31,397 
25,913 
6,251 
4,849 
3,872 
865 
925 
686 
5,623 
5,520 
6,129 
4,717 
5,980 
5,619 
1,483 
1,670 
1,562 
16,521 
13,327 
10,145 
2,662 
3,249 
(3,249) 
7,508 
8,632 
8,067 
73,758 
75,557 
65,242 
(a) estimation IMPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AS A PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNITY IMPORTS OF OIL PRODUCTS 
1972, 1973 and 1974 
Table 15 (b) 
Importing 
country 
GERMANY 
1972 
1973 
1974 
FRANCE 
1972 
1973 
1974 
ITALY 
1972 
1973 
1974 
NETHERLANDS 
1972 
1973 
1974 
BELGIUM 
1972 
1973 
1974 
LUXEMBOURG 
1972 
1973 
1974 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1972 
1973 
1974 
IRELAND 
1972 
1973 
1974 (a) 
DENMARK 
1972 
1973 
1974 
COMMUNITY 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Exporting country 
Germany 
21,7 
25,'5 
30,4 
12,8 
7 7 
15J9 
27,2 
18tl 
16.6 
5,1 
4..1 
6.2 
10.8 
7^2 
17.5 
3.5 
1.9 
3.6 
0.9 
0 3 
(0.3) 
3 6 
2 6 
s;3 
5.8 
6.1 
France 
11.3 
10.0 
11,9 
60.8 
60.8 
30.4 
8.5 
17.9 
9.1 
11,4 
15.8 
7.4 
9.3 
7 9 
4*. 5 
8,6 
11.0 
6.9 
1.5 
(1,5) 
0.5 
2,1 
l'.8 
8,5 
9.9 
8.0 
Italy 
8,2 
8.3 
3.8 
58,9 
50,3 
36,3 
24.9 
13. 1 
16. 8 
7.1 
4,5 
8.7 
-
17,7 
14J4 
13,8 
0 7 
o.'s 
( 0.' 5 ) 
10, 5 
5*. 4 
7.9 
15, 5 
11. 5 
11.1 
Nether-
lands 
66.0 
70.6 
68.4 
12.8 
14. 8 
18.9 
8.1 
11.2 
24.5 
69.3 
70.8 
72.1 
11,3 
12.7 
1.0 
54,7 
53.6 
61,3 
4,1 
1.2 
(1,2) 
23.3 
29.0 
33,6 
45. 8 
49. 1 
48. 5 
Belgium 
8,2 
7,1 
6.5 
5,2 
4.3 
7.0 
5.6 
11.4 
8.6 
19.2 
26,9 
23-2 
68.6 
72^2 
77,0 
11.2 
15,0 
9.9 
I.
2 
1.7 
(1,7) 
12.6 
13.3 
11. 0 
10.3 
11.2 
10. 1 
Luxem-
bourg 
-
-
-
-
°.-i 
oli 
-
-
-
0 
0 
United-
Kingdom 
6,1 
3,7 
4,2 
1,3 
5.1 
7.4 
12.7 
6.8 
20,6 
18.7 
18.3 
34,2 
7.1 
4.7 
5; 5 
-
93.1 
93.8 
(93.8) 
49.5 
47.6 
37.4 
12.9 
13 -1 
15-3 
Ireland 
-
0 
0 
0.4 
-
-
3,7 
3-7 
4.2 
-
0.9 
0.7 
0.7 
Denmark 
0.2 
0..3 
0.2 
0,1 
0 
2.1 
1.3 
0,7 
0..1 
0 
-
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
1.0 
(1 0) 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
Community 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100· 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
ICO 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
(a) estimation If we compare the percentages of each member state of total .intra-
Community exchanges, vre will see that they remained much the same. 
Changes have occured, however, in the sources of supply of a number 
of countries' which import oil products. 
In 1974» Germany imported slightly less from the Netherlands and a 
little more from France and Italy. On the other hand, the crisis 
resulted in a reduction of French imports from Italy. These imports 
had previously been affected to a large extent by independent French 
companies, which, at the behest of the French Government, changed 
their sources of supply and started buying from refineries in France. 
On the other hand, Dutch exports to Italy rose at the expense of 
French exports. 
The crisis modified trade in oil products between the two sides of 
the Channel: there was an increase first in Dutch imports from the 
United Kingdom and then in British imports from the Netherlands. 
However, the crisis did not have a significant effect on the most 
voluminous ana most consistent trade flow, exports from Rotterdam to 
Germany, despite the slight increase in German imports from Italy 
and France. 
Quite a pronounced increase was seen in Danish imports from Germany, 
marking the new linies novi being forged between the Danish and German-
markets. 
Lastly, the crisis resulted in a permanent diminution in the volume 
of intra-Co?nmunity trade of about 5 Ì° (1972 as compared with the average 
%or 1973 andl974). 
79 (h) The Rotterdam free market 
The role played by Rotterdam in intra-Community trade and 
in trade between the Community and the rest of the world merits 
some special observations. 
The Rotterdam market, supplied predominantly by local refineries 
belonging to the major companies, is the source of most intra-
Community trade - nearly 50 fo in 1973 (see Table 15 b). 
The market is important not only because of the volume of 
transactions made there, but also because of the nature of the market. 
In 1973, Dutch exports of oil products totalled nearly 42 
million tonnes, A substantial part of these exports is sold on the 
free market. 
This free market can be defined as the market in oil products 
exported from the Netherlands which are not the subject of transfers 
within the same company or of trade in kind between companies, but 
which require the services of a jobber. Forty percent of this market 
is accounted for'by products refined outside the Netherlands (Italy, 
Belgium, France, Germany, United Kingdom, USSR) and sixty percent 
is accounted for by Dutch-refined products. 
Although the volume of sales from this market to destinations 
in countries of the Community is not really considerable since it 
represents only approximately 3 $ of the total Community consumption 
of oil products, it nevertheless assumes in a period of market 
pressure, a special importance despite its marginal character. 
If the term "free market" is defined as set forth above, then 
20 million tonnes of petroleum products were sold on the free market 
of Rotterdam in 1973· Out of these 20 million tonnes, more than 50 Í
3 
(over 10 million tonnes) was exported to Germany (about one third of 
German imports from the Community). Of the rest, between 5 and 6 
million tonnes were exported to non-member countries (mainly to USA, 
Switzerland and Sweden) and between 4 and 5 million tonnes went to 
other common market countries. 
80 Initially, these latter exports may seem surprising 
because they were, at least in part, to countries where maximum 
price were in force. However, although it would appear that the 
importing companies had incurred a loss, these marginal imports 
nevertheless enabled the companies to solve the problem of a 
shortage o? certain products (e.g. gas oil and diesel fuel), 
which are not obtained in sufficient quantities in the refineries, 
and to avoid producing products for which there would have been 
no market if additional quantities of crude oil hsd been refined.. 
The following approximate picture emerges from a breakdown 
of the products handled on the Rotterdam free market : 
Gas oil, diesel fuel, light fuel oil 70 % 
(middle distillates) 
Residual fuel oils 20 % 
Petrol 10 % 
Total 100 fo 
A substantial proportion of the middle distillates is 
exported from the Netherlands by way of the Rotterdam free market, 
81 Β - Prices 
(a) Posted price 
As a basis for the calculation of tax and royalty payments due to 
a producing country from the oil companies,a price is determined 
for concession crude oil which is known as the "posted price". 
ι 
This posted price is a reference value determined purely for 
accounting purposes and may or may not correspond to the market 
price of the crude oil. 
The part played by the "posted price" and its relation to the 
actual costs, including taxes paid to the producing country 
("tax paid costs"), incurred by an oil company in making a 
ba,rrel of concession oil available for shipment to its refineries 
can be summarized as follows. 
1. A "posted price" per barrel of concession crude oil is 
declared by the producing country as a basis for the calculation 
of tax and royalty payments. 
2. From this posted price are deducted: 
— the production costs of the oil company, including transport costs 
to the point of loading j and 
— royalties due from the oil company to the producing country in 
respect of concession oil: these royalties, based on long-standing 
agreements between the oil companies and the producing countries 
in which they operate, amount to 12,5/° of the posted price of a 
barrel of crude oil. 
3. The sum remaining after this deduction of production costs 
and royalty payments from the posted price is used a,s the base sum for 
calculating the taxes due from the oil company to the producing 
country: they amount to 55/& °* this base sum. 
82 4. By this stage in the calculation, three items have been deducted 
from the posted price - production costs, royalties and taxes. 
The total of these three items constitutes the "tax paid cost" to 
the oil company concerned of one barrel of concession crude oil. 
In the following example (Table 16), a comparison is made between 
the posted price and the corresponding tax paid costs of one oil company 
in October 1973 and January 1974· 
Table 16 
Tax paid cost price of concession crude oil of the type "Arabian Light" 
S/bbl 
Posted price (item 1 above) 
Costs of production (item 2 above) 
Royalties (12,5$ of posted price: 
Item 2) 
Base sum for calculation of'taxes 
(item 3) 
Taxes (55/= °i" base sum above: 
'Item 3) 
Total tax paid costs 
October 
0,10 
0,74 
2,41 
3.15 
1973 
5,12 
QJJA 
4,38 
■ ' ■ ■ ■ *■*-
January 1974 
0,10 
1,46 
1,56 
5,55 
7.U 
. i 
11,05 j 
1,56 
10,09 
(b) Cost of access to crude oil of the large companies 
The cost of access is a weighted average of the prices paid by the 
companies depending on the type of crude oil. 
In the case of concession crude oil the cost is calculated, 
as .above, from the posted price. 
83 Tlie price at which participation oil can be bought back by the 
oil companies is also related to the posted price, but in a 
period of short supply it might be above the price of concession 
oil. 
The posted price was initially increased hy about 75/¿ about mid-
October 1973, and with effect from 1 January 1974 it was raised 
again, by 130$. This resulted in the cost of crude oil being 
multiplied almost fivefold in the course of a year: in fact the 
average price of crude oil from the Middle East,which v/as ft 2 
per barrel during the third quarter of 1973, had already 
increased to $ 9,43 per barrel by the first quarter of 1974· 
The average cost of crude oil per barrel is determined on the 
basis of the proportions of concession oil and participation oil 
fixed by the participation agreement with the producing country 
concerned. This average cost is normally used by the oil companies 
in determining the price at which crude oil is made available to 
companies in their group. 
In the view of the Commi s si on,the complexities surrounding the 
application of the various concepts of participation oil and 
concession oil at the basic stage in the commercial pperations 
introduce a factor of uncertainty. It would appear that the average 
cost determined in this way, on the basis of fixed proportions of 
concession oil and participation oil, may not always correspond to 
the true average cost, as these proportions may not always correspond 
to the actual proportions of participation oil and concession oil taken 
by the oil companies. It will thus be seen that if a company includes 
in a given period a higher proportion of lower-priced concession oil 
than of participation oil which has been bought back at higher prices, its 
average costs will be correspondingly lower. 
The following tables (Tables 17 a to 17 e) relate to a major interna-
tional, company. They give the costs of concession oil and buyback prices 
for participation oil in respect of various types of crude oil during 
the period from the first quarter of 1973 to the first quarter of 1974· 
Tables 18 a and 18 b show, for eleven types of crude oil acquired by this 
company, 3, comparison of the average costs per barrel with the prices at 
which the cocroaziy transferred crude oil to its refineries. 
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Cost of crude oil to a major international company 
Type of crude 
1 
2 
3 
4' 
5 
6 
7 
8 
-, o(c)  Average 1- o 
9 
10 
11 
Average 9-11^° 
(c  Average i_ u^ 
Sçuity cost 
ff/Wl 
1,54 
1,61 
1,58 
1,83 
1,80 
1,72 
1,74 
1,63 
1,60 
2,37 
2,27 
2,32 
¿U33 
1,6? 
Buyback Dri ces 
Bridging' 
í 
jf/W 
1,94 
2,05 
1,99 
2,22 
2,13 
2,30 
2,18 
— 
2,02 
) 
\ 1\A 
J 
-
-
Phase-i.*
0 
SÍ/bbl 
1,88 
1,97 
1,91 
2,13 
2; 04 
2,24 
2,09 
hSl 
KA 
-
-
Equity/ 
buybaci: ,, 
, . ib  ratio 
1" 
75Λ' 
- equity 
Ί8.7555 
— bridging 
3.75% 
— pliasc—in 
Ν A 
Ave rage 
cost 
■ fMl' 
1,63 
1,71 
1,67 
1,92 
1,87 
1,85 
1,84 
1,73 
ItZP. 
2,37 
2,27 
2,32 
2,13 
1,78 
(a) Defined on page g^. 
(b) This company bought .no state oil 
(c) Weighted for quantities bought; see pp. 83-84, 
85 2nd QUARTER. 
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TABUS 17 (b) 
Cost of crude oil to a major international corr.pany 
Tps of^nrude 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average 1 — o 
9 
10 
| ii 
¡Average 9-1' 
average 1-11 
Equity 
cost 
#/bbl 
1,65 
1,73 
1,70 
1,96 
1,92 
1,85 
1,87 
1,75 
1,72 
2,55 
2,44 
2,50 
ZÆ. 
1,83 
Buyba 
Bridging 
Jj/bbl 
2,08 
2,20 
2,12 
2,37 
2,28 
2,45 
2,33 
— 
2,17 
Buyback 
3,30 
3,13 
3,19 
3,21 
-
ck prices 
Phase-in 
¿/Wal 
1,99 
2,09 
2,03 
2,26 
2,17 
2,37 
2,22 
-
2,07 
Option
0 
3,50 
3,33 
3,39 
3,41 
-
Equity/ 
buybaci;: 
rat i o 
% 
X 
f τ?ί° 
- equity 
' 18.75$ 
- bridging 
3-75?° 
- phase-in 
/ 
65/33 
65/35 
65/34 
^/tbl 
1,75 
1,83 
1,79 
¿,ν.·., 
2,00 
1,99 
1,97 
1,85 
LL§2 
2,61 
2,70 
2,15 
2J6 
L.9J 
(a) Defined on page 64» 
(b) Weighted for quantities bought; spe pp. 83-84 , 
(c) Quantities buyable in excess of contract. 
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TABLE 17 (c) 
Cost of crude oil to a major international company 
1973 
Type of crud 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average , \ 
1-8
 
W
 
9 
10 
11 
Average 
9 - ir' 
Average 
1 - if
0' 
Equity 
s cost 
^/bbl 
1,7.9 
1,89 
1,84 
2,12 
2,09 
2,01 
2,03 
1,89 
i486 
2,79 
2,67 
2,73 
¿Já 
1,98 
Buy "back prices 
bridging ' 
#/bbl 
' ia) 
Phase-in
 
;
 
#/bbl 
July/August 
2,23 
2,35 
2,27 
2,52 
2,43 
2,60 
2,48 
— 
2,21 
Buybank 
3,54 
3,36 
3,42 
■M5. 
-
2,12 
2.23 
2,16 
2,40 
2,31 
2,52 
2,37 
2,10 
0otiorf
d' 
3,74 
3,56 
3,62 
ifi 
-
937Í PP
b
)
 
¿/bbl 
September 
2,74 
2,83 
2,78 
3,02 
2,96 
2,98 
3, CO 
-
lie?. 
. 
-
— 
-
-
Equity/ 
buyba'ck 
ratio 
% 
"'" " ' 
) 
) - equity 
{ 18.75ÍÍ 
\ - bridging 
J3..73Æ 
\ - phase-in 
65/33 
65/34 
65/35 
_ .J 
i 
Average 
cost 
! //bbl 
1,93 
¡2,03 [ 
1,97 
2,24 [ 
C ,1-1 
2,17 
2,17 
2,02 
?.ap2 I 
3,05 
2,93 
2,93 
2*22 
âià 
~—^~—.._., ί 
a
-* Defined cr. page 64 · 
b) In September '¡973,thy producing countries set the buybr-.ck price at 93": of the posted 
price, abandoning tr.c  dging/phase-iii method of calculation us;  α hitherto. 
0) 'Weighted for· quantities bought; see pp. 83-84 . 
¿} Quantities tunable in excess uf co.iiz-act. 
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TABLE 17 (d) 
Cost of crude oil to a major international company 
Type of crude 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average 1 — o 
9 
10 
11 
A;
s_
raf|bi 
T!>) 
Equity 
cost 
#/bbl 
2,80 
3,06 
2,89 
3,52 
3,31 
3,45 
3,39 
2,95 
2,97 
4,78 
4,61 
4.,72 
4,72 
3,24 
Buyback prices 
935Ό PF*
7 
#/bbl 
4,25 
4,60 
4,35 
5,12 
4,79 
5,17 
5,03 
4,37 
4,46 
Buyback Optiorf ' 
5,53 5,73 
5,36 5,56 
5,42 5,62 
5,45 5,64 
4,62 
Equity 
buyback 
ratio 
% 
* 
- equity 
; - buyback 
j 
65/33 
65/35 
.65/34 
Average 
CCS'. 
¡¿/bbl 
3,13 
3,42 
3,23 
3,89 
3,65 
3,85 
3,77 
3,28 
3,31 
5,04 
4,89 
4,97 
4,93 
3,57 
(a) In September 1973, the producing countries set the 'tuycack price at 93/- of the poetcc' 
price, abandoning the bridging/phase-in method of calculation used hitherto. 
(V Weighted for quantities bought; see pp. 83-8't 
(c) Quantities buyable in excess of contract. 
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TABLE 17 (e) 
(a) Defined on pase 83. 
(b) Weighted for- quantities bought; ses PD. 03-8^ . 
1974 
Type of crude 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average, 
I - 8
 (t
) 
9 
10 
11 
Average j 
9 - 1! ' 
Averag«v 
1 - if' 
L -_— 1 
Tax paid 
os-r^ 
Sf/bbl 
7,04 
7,25 
7,11 
7,80 
7,51 
7,74 
7,80 
7,23 
7^20 
9,26 
8,99 
9,08 
2iL3. 
L42 
Buyback price 
9Ap F? 
^/bbl 
10,86 
11,16 
10,94 
11,86 
11,41 
11,92 
11,63 
10,93 
11,06 
12,15 
11,99 
12,07 
I·^ 
ìli
2.
2. 
Equity/ 
buyback 
ratio 
A
1 
40/52,3 
40/55,2 
40/55,3 
40/54 
40/53,1 
40/54,5 
40/6O 
40/60 
65/32,0 
65/35 
65/33,5 
Average 
cost 
//bbi 
9,20 
9,52 
9,33 
10,13 
9,74 
10,15 
10,10 
9,45 
2d>3 
10,22 
10,04 
10,09 
¿kìà 
2ÚÀ 
89 (c) Transfer prices of crude oil 
Supplies of crude oil obtained by the oil companies are 
distributed between associated refining companies and a price is attributed 
to such supplies for accounting purposes betxveen the companies concerned. 
This price is known as the " transfer price " of crude oil. It is usually 
settled on the basis of the fob cost price plus a transfer margin (Tables 
18 (a) and (b) ). This transfer margin represents an allowance made by 
the company at the outset which is subsequently reflected at all stages 
in the price of oil products. It is intended, in theory, to cover part of 
the company's costs, but, in fact, it is internal to the group concerned 
and it is difficult to say what its precise function is. Thus the 
transfer price is essentially a price fixed by an oil company on the 
basis of its own mechanisms for use within its own group of companies, 
but it constitutes for the refineries a significant factor in their costs. 
The Commission has compared the monthly weighted average fob 
transfer prices of eleven companies with respect to their refineries in the 
Community for two types of crude oil, Arabian Light 34° API and Iranian Light 
34° API . It generally noted that price levels vary from group to group 
and that the average prices for some international groups (those with 
adequate or surplus supplies of crude oil) are lower. This is explained by 
the higher proportion of cheaper concession crude oil in their cost calcu-
lations. Among the large international groups, the variations between their 
respective price levels are relatively slight and are attributable either 
to the sources of the crude oil or to a policy of differentiating the 
transfer prices according to destinations. 
l) On grounds of confidentiality the figures are not included in 
this report. 
90 Table 18 a 
Average coat, margin and transfer price of a major international company 
Type of crude 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average 1-8 
9 
10 
11 
Average 9 - H 
Average 1-11 
1st QUARTER 1973' 
Average(a) 
cost
 v 
$ /bbl 
1.63 
1.71 
1.67 
1.92 
1.87 
1.85 
1.84 
1.73 
1.70 
2.37 
2.27 
2.32 
2.33 
1.78 
Margin 
$ /bbl 
+.34 
+.39 
+.37 
+.29 
+.27 
+.49 
+.37 
+.28 
+.36 
+.75 
+.80 
+.80 
+.78 
+.41 
Transfer 
price 
$ /bbl 
1.97 
2.10 
2.04 
2.21 
2.14 
2.34 
2.21 
2.01 
2.06 
3.12 
3.07 
3.12 
3.11 
2.19 
2nd QUARTER 1973 
Average/ \ 
cost
 K&) 
$ /bbl 
1.75 
1.83 
1.79 
2.05 
2.00 
1.99 
1.97 
1.85 
1.82 
2.81 
2.70 
2.75 
2.76 
1.95 
Margin 
i /bbl 
+.35 
+.42 
+.38 
+.34 
+.30 
+.51 
+.37 
+.31 
+.38 
+.51 
+.57 
+•57 
+•55 
+.40 
Transfer 
price 
$ /bbl 
2.10 
2.25 
2.I7 
2.39 
2.30 
2.5O 
2.34 
2.16 
2.20 
3.32 
3.27 
3.32 
3.31 
2.35 
3rd QUARTER 1973 
Average. } 
cost
 v ' 
$ /bbl 
1.93 
2.03 
1.97 
2.24 
2.21 
2.17 
2.17 
2.02 
2.00 
3.O5 
2.93 
2.98 
2.99 
2.13 
Margin 
i /bbl 
+.47 
+.55 
+.52 
+•53 
+.45 
+.71 
+.55 
+.47 
+.51 
+.82 
+.88 
+.89 
+.87 
+•57 
Transfer 
price 
$ /bbl 
2.4O 
2.58 
2.49 
2.77 
2.66 
2.88 
2.72 
2.49 
2.5I 
3.87 
3.81 
3.87 
3.86 
2.70 
(a) See last column of Tables 17 a - c. VO 
IO 
Table 18 b 
Type of crude 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average 1-8 
9 
10 
11 
Average 9 - H 
Average 1-11 
4th QUARTER 1973 
Average, v 
cost
 v ' 
f /bbl 
3.13 
3.42 
3.23 
3.89 
3.65 
3.85 
3.77 
3.28 
3.31 
5.04 
4.89 
4.97 
4.98 
3.57 
Margin 
#/bbl 
+.23 
+.24 
+.20 
+.18 
+.14 
+.29 
+.15 
+.20 
+.22 
+.71 
+.68 
+.73 
+.72 
+.30 
Transfer 
price 
ß/bbl 
3.36 
3.66 
3.43 
4.07 
3.79 
4.14 
3.92 
3.48 
3.53 
5-75 
5.57 
5.70 
5.70 
3.87 
1st QUARTER 1974 
Average/ N 
cost
 w 
fi/Vbl 
9.20 
9.52 
9.33 
10.13 
9.74 
IO.I5 
10.10 
9.45 
9.43 
10.22 
10.04 
10.09 
10.13 
9.53 
Margin 
#/bbl 
-.35 
-.40 
-.39 
-.42 
-.36 
-.42 
-.47 
-.42 
-.39 
+ 1.16 
+ 1.02 
+ 1.08 
+ 1.01 
-.16 
Transfer 
price 
ß/bbl 
8.85 
9.12 
8.94 
9.7I 
9.38 
9.73 
9.63 
9.03 
9.O4 
11.38 
11.06 
11.17 
11.23 
9.37 
(a) See last column of Tables 17 d - e. Analysing the Community countries individually, it will be observed 
that the prices of two of the majors were the same whatever 
the destination of their crude within the Community. The prices of another 
three display differences from one country to another which are due to 
overlapping of the prices applied during each month. 
The prices of one of the large international companies differed 
substantially "between the countries of the common market. According to the 
company concerned, the reasons for these differences relate primarily to the 
prevailing conditions on the various markets. 
The prices paid by two European companies, which have inadequate 
supplies of crude oil under their own control, were, on an average, 10-20/i 
higher than those paid by large international companies. The differences 
were sometimes even greater : Arabian Light, February 1974, Germany, a 36 f> 
difference; March 1974, Italy, a 31 % difference. 
Overall, with respect to the two types of crude studied, 
price differences between groups and between countries reflect both 
differences in the companies' supplies of crude oil and certain differences 
between conditions existing in the various countries. 
These differences between transfer prices are in a way arbitrary and do 
not reveal strategies being practised by each group. Nevertheless, the transfer 
price system does permit some apportionment of income from one country to anothe: 
or from one continent to another in pursuance of the policies of the groups. 
(d) Crude oil prices for certain European companies with inadequate supplies 
of crude oil. 
The supplies of European companies which are short of crude oil were 
studied in more detail for three companies in Belgium and Italy. 
93 In Belgium, an independent company obtained its supplies 
from a large international company under a basic contract which set 
pj ces by reference to the latter's production costs plus a profit 
margin. 
The invoiced prices paid by the independent company were 
lower than those invoiced to the subsidiaries of the large international 
company. 
In Italy, no system of transfer pricing for crude oil is in 
operation by the large companies which operate refineries but which do 
not belong to any of the large international oil companies. To afford 
some comparison with the transfer prices applied by the large interna-
tional companies, some information is given below on the import prices 
for crude oil in Italy. 
94 The import prices for crude oil paid by two Italian companies 
were based on the monthly notifications in the"Istituto Centrale di 
Statistica" ("Arrivi di Materie, Prime e Prodotti Petroliferi"), in which 
the fob costs of each type of crude oil were also quoted. However, these 
do not refer to the day of loading but are based- on an average of all 
quantities imported in the course of a month, »o that these prices cannot 
be compared exactly with the transfer prices charged by other companies. 
It can nevertheless be seen that the txvo companies paid higher prices than 
the major international companies, especially as they bought more on the 
free market. 
A comparison of the average prices of these two Italian companies 
for two of their main types of imported crude oil shows that up to July 
1973, the crude oil prices of the companies varied only minimally between 
each other, although one of the companies showed average prices which 
tended to be somewhat higher than those of the other company. 
From September 1973, however, the prices paid by the first company were, 
in general,significantly greater than those paid by the second,and the reason 
for this may be.associated with the differing commercial motivations of the 
two companies.One company operates the more usual commercial policy of a 
large integrated oil company, that is, purchasing crude oil with the intention 
of producing from it a large range of oil products for distribution through 
its own networks. The other company, on the other hand, purchases supplies 
of crude oil primarily for the production of basic material for further 
processing in the chemical plants of its ovm group. 
95 The first company, whose refinery capacity greatly exceeds that of the 
second company, concluded supply contracts on a long-term basis in an attempt 
to ensure adequate supplies of crude oil for its refinery programme, and 
the operation of the price escalation clauses in such contracts resulted 
in the application of the significantly higher prices from September 1973· 
On the other hand, the second company did not rely on long-term contracts but 
tended to purchase its supplies of crude oil in smaller quantities arid at 
times when it could obtain them at a lower price ; it therefore avoided 
the effect of price escalation clauses in contracts. 
96 (e) Prices for oil products 
The previous sections of this part of the report dealt with the 
pricing of crude oil. This section considers prices at subsequent stages 
in the chain of production and distribution of oil products. It will 
deal with the factors which are taken into account in determining transfer 
prices for refined products and will analyse the application of these 
factors in the method adopted by some major oil companies for the calculation 
of prices. 
Oil products are distributed by oil companies mainly along 
three routes : 
- consumption on the domestic market of the country in which the refinery-
is situated ; 
- distribution to companies in the same oil group in other countries ; 
- sale to third parties in other countries. 
1. Prices on domestic markets 
So far as the first route is concerned, the introduction of 
price control in several countries of the EEC meant that the prices of 
refined products on the domestic market were no longer subject to the 
normal market forces during the period of the oil crisis. In some member 
states (in the Netherlands, for example) only the price to the customer was 
controlled, but in other countries (for example, Prance) the controlling 
regulations extended to the ex-refinery prices of products as well as to 
the prices to the consumer. One of the aims of this latter form of price 
control was to permit a viable margin to the independent distributors of 
oil products, and, whilst the extent of the margin thus available to 
distributors was frequently criticized, nevertheless it helped to reduce 
the severe difficulties which were encountered by independent distributors. 
97 Imposition of maximum prices for the consumer proved 
effective in controlling the upward spiral in the costs of oil products 
during the oil crisis but also injected a degree of unreality into the 
market for oil products in those countries. Thus the prices fixed for 
certain oil products often bore no relation to the actual costs of their 
production, given the increases in the prices of crude oil. 
Direct comparison of prices between the different countries of 
the Community is difficult because prices are quoted in the different 
currencies of the countries concerned and parity of currency changed 
several times during the period under review. In addition, no uniform 
unit of quantity is used. It is nevertheless possible to describe the 
domestic price situation in the various countries of the Community. 
Netherlands 
So far as the sale of oil products on the domestic market is 
concerned, maximum prices were authorized by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs on the basis of proposals submitted by the oil companies acting 
through the Olie Contact Commissie. The Ministry had the right, if it 
was of the opinion that certain price increases seemed excessive or 
were otherwise unacceptable, to request the oil companies to modify their 
proposals for price adjustment. The regulation concerning prices for 
oil products was issued on 22 January 1974» 
Maximum prices were proposed by oil companies on the basis of 
the following factors : 
- fob price of the product on the international free market compiled from 
Piatt's Oilgram (see page 119) in the following proportions : 
- 25 % Gulf of Mexico : spot cargoes all ports 
- 25 fo cargoes fob Italy 
- 25 % barges fob Rotterdam 
- 25 fo APM/Rotterdam/Amsterdam (see page II8) 
These percentages may sometimes vary, depending on the product. 
98 - price of sea transport, based on the APRA tariff ; 
- transport insurance and transport losses ; 
- taxes ; 
- margin of profit for importers, distributors and retailers. 
Table 19 shows, for three products, the market prices which 
were in operation, compared with the maximum prices authorized by 
the Dutch Government ; prices are expressed in Dutch guilders. 
Table 19 
Product 
Date 
Superpetrol 
HBO I( light-
heating oil) 
Heavy fuel 
oil 3500 
Price on the Rotterdam 
free market 
I5.II. 
I973 
Hfl/100 
94.24 
46.O3 
Hfl/l.O( 
I63.28 
22.01. 
I974 
litres 
IO3.5O 
37.13 
30 kg 
278.52 
04.02. 
I974 
IO5.26 
35-55 
273.69 
Maximum price 
I5.II. 
1973 
83.5O 
26.5O 
9O.4O 
22.01. 
1974 
88.7O 
26.50 
9O.4O 
04.02. 
I974 
88.70 
26.50 
9O.4O 
Difference 
I5.II. 
1973 
10.74 
19.53 
72.88 
22.01. 
1974 
I4.8O 
10.63 
188.12 
04.02. 
1974 
16.56 
9.05 
183.29 
The difference between the market price and maximum price was., 
in previous years, generally small. However, on I5 November 1973, the 
difference for heavy fuel oil was already 72.88 guilders per tonne and 
it reached its maximum level on 22 January 1974, when it was 188.12 
guilders per tonne. These figures show how prices soared on the 
Rotterdam free market during the crisis months. 
The dealers' margin for sales from filling stations of petrol 
and diesel fuels was also determined by representatives of the oil 
industry in cooperation with BOVAG (Bond van Automobiel-en Garagen-
bedrijven) and accepted by the Government. On the other hand, no 
fixed margins of profits existed for light and heavy fuel oil. 
+ Average Freight Rate Assessments (see Page II8) 
99 As, in the Netherlands, maximum prices were fixed by the 
Government only at the level of the consumer, no controls applied to 
the ex- refinery prices. Distribution margins for the retailer for 
petrol and diesel fuels were fixed as a result of agreements reached 
between the oil companies and the trade organizations. They were 
therefore accepted rather than approved by the Dutch Government. Two 
results emerged from this absence of controlled prices at the refinery 
level. Firstly, there was a considerable variation between the ex-
refinery prices operated by the oil companies due in particular to the 
different markets to which the products were destined. A further result 
was the difficulty encountered by independent wholesale dealers, who 
operated exclusively in the Netherlands, when certain oil companies fixed 
their ex-refinery prices so close to the maximum prices that the margins 
to the wholesalers were excessively reduced. 
Belgium 
The calculation of prices in order to fix maximum prices at 
the consumer level was based on the price structure drawn up by the 
Belgian Oil Federation (Fédération Pétrolière Belge - PPB). Maximum 
prices were fixed for oil products by a ministerial regulation dated 
29th June 1973. 
net price ex-refinery 
+ tax on oil products 
gross price ex-refinery 
+ margin 
+ additional zone charge 
- rebates 
+ VAT 
market price to the consumer 
100 The net price ex-refinery was obtained by assuming that the product had 
been imported as a final product - the system described as 'import parity', 
This system takes into account the following cost items : 
- minimum price fob Carribfoean Sea or Gulf of Mexico, according to 
quotations in Piatt's Oilgram (see page 120) ; 
- sea freight, based on AFRA, by "medium-range" tanker for the distance 
Aruba/Curaçao-Antwerp ; 
- insurance against damage and losses in transit ; 
- charges for duty and inspection. 
The margin must cover the cost of distribution and delivery to 
the consumer. When sales are made without intermediaries the margin is 
retained by the oil company. 
The additional zone charge is necessary to cover the transport 
cost from refinery to the dispatch depot. There are three zones : 
- zone 0 covers an area of 15 km around Antwerp ; 
- zone I comprises the rest of the province of Antwerp, East Flanders, 
Brabant and Tessenderlo ; 
- zone II is the rest of the country. 
The investigations confirmed that during the crisis, the maximum 
prices were respected and that the tariffs operated by the oil companies 
corresponded to these maximum prices, including the trade margins. 
It was noted that, from 1972 to the middle of 1974, the margins 
of the distributors became progressively smaller. In the middle of 1974» 
they were eqTial to the margins fixed by regulation, so that it was no 
longer possible to offer rebates. 
101 France 
The regulation of 30 June 1945 (Ordonnance No. 45-I483) 
empowered the public authorities to fix prices for goods and services. 
Besides petrol and gas oil, since 1973 light and heavy fuel oil for 
domestic and industrial use were also subject to the price system called 
"regime de cadre de prix" imposed by the Government. The intermediary 
trade does not establish its own price list and sales conditions but sells 
on the basis of the price lists of the trading associations, which are 
obliged to submit the price lists for each category of product to the 
appropriate authorities sqcas to enable the authorities, if they wish to 
raise an objection, to defer their entry into effect. 
Formulation of the price lists is complex and i.3 based on strict 
provisions. The price determination starts with the ex-refinery price, 
which is fixed by the refineries, under Government supervision, talcing 
account of the following items : 
- international quotations for oil products on certain markets(prices 
fob Carribbean according to Piatt's Oilgram); 
- sea transport, based on AFRA; 
- cost of insurance and port d.ues. 
Except for this common base, the pattern of pricing .is different 
for each category of product even though the same elements of the market 
price for consumers remain the same (trade margins, taxes including the 
fee to the French Petrol Institute (IFP) which is in the nature of a levy, 
and rebates). The French market is split into zones, wlfich involves 
local extra charges and predetermined transport costs from the nearest 
refinery. 
102 Spot-checks of invoices for domestic sales confirmed that the 
invoiced prices were in conformity with the maximum prices laid down by 
law and that rebates became increasingly smaller towards the end of 1973 
and the beginning of 1974· 
Sak 
The law introducing a new method of calculating official maximum 
prices in connection with the new system of taxation was introduced 
retroactively from 1 January 1973« The former system of 'import parity· 
was replaced by the concept of costs of production. Three levels of these 
costs can be distinguished - cost of raw material, refining costs and cost 
of distribution. The cost of raw material is the average fob price of the 
imported crude oil plus the average transport cost. This price is 
apportioned between the final products according to a system based on the 
API scale for viscosity of the crude oil. Typical refining costs for 
refineries with full cycle are apportioned between the different oil 
products. The maximum price as fixed by the Comitato Interministeriale 
Prezzi (CIP maximum price) is applicable for the whole country without 
regard to the location of the refinery or depot and includes the processing 
tax (imposta di fabbricazione) as well as the profit margin for the retail 
trade. 
The transport costs are fixed by the Comitato Interministeriale 
Prezzi and applied by regional price committees (Comitati Provinciali Prezzi, 
CPP) within the limits fixed by the Comitato Interministeriale Prezzi. 
It may be mentioned in this connection that all the oil companies 
protested against what they claimed was a totally unrealistic price 
situation lasting for several months owing to the fact that during the 
crisis there was a time lag between the fixing of new maximum prices for 
oil products and the impact of price increases for crude oil. 
103 Luxembourg 
Because of the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union and the 
fact that the great majority of petroleum products comes from Belgian 
refineries, the regulations in these two countries are largely the same. 
The Law of 30 June I96I empowers the Minister of Economic Affairs 
to determine prices which must not be exceeded under penalty of sanctions. 
A price office is entrusted with supervision and may, if necessary, 
examine the bookkeeping and invoices. As in Belgium, any price increase 
may be proposed by the oil companies on the basis of the 'import parity' 
system. 
For a long time - in fact, up to the start of 1970 - these 
provisions hardly applied, since the market prices were always below the 
maximum prices. At the end of 1970, however, the Minister rejected the 
proposals of the oil companies and froze the maximum prices in the belief 
that the proposed increases could be made up for by dispensing with the 
discounts previously granted to customers. 
104 Denmark 
The oil market in Denmark is supplied by private enterprises, 
mainly the Danish subsidiaries of international oil concerns. Their 
predominance is more evident on the market for light products than on the 
market for residual oils, where independent suppliers and a few major 
consumers make up an appreciable portion of the market. 
The prices of oil products are subject to the legal provisions 
governing prices in general, i.e. the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Control Act and the Prices and Profits Act, 1974« Both acts are enforced 
by the Monopolies Control Authority. 
Until October 1970, control was based on the Monopolies Act in 
the form of a standard calculation system set up under an agreement between 
the Monopolies Control Authority and the three largest oil companies in the 
Danish market. The calculation sysi,em did not include heavy fuel oil. 
From October 1970, prices of oil products came within the 
provisions of the Price Stabilization Act and from April 1971 those of the 
Prices and Profits Act, 1971» The standard calculation rules of the Prices 
and Profits Act resulted in lower selling prices for oil products in 
Denmark than in most other Western European countries. 
In November 1973, the oil companies were granted an exemption from 
the Prices and Profits Act in order to reduce the negative effects that the 
relatively low selling prices in Denmark might have on the supply of 
oil products. By the terms of this exemption, the oil companies were 
permitted to calculate their selling prices on the basis of current 
replacement costs for crude oil or imported products instead of the costs 
actually incurred. This arrangement is maintained under the new Prices and 
Profits Act in 1974· 
105 Ireland 
As Ireland is completely dependent on imports, whether crude oil 
or refined products, prices are basically determined by the prices 
on the international markets. 
Since imports, refining and distribution are handled by private 
enterprises, these devise their own pricing policies and set their 
sales prices without direct state intervention. 
However, price increases have to be approved by the Department 
of Industry and Commerce, after applications have been examined by 
the National Prices Commission» This latter body, which includes a 
member appointed by the Association of Irish Housewives to represent 
consumers, makes recommendations to the Department of Industry and 
Commerce after each application for a price increase· The examinations 
are based on the following criterion: the increase must not exceed the 
amount of the unavoidable and permanent rise in costs incurred by the 
applicant company· At the end of 1973» "the Department decided, at the 
suggestion of the National Prices Commission, that no wholesale price 
without tax for oil products would be permitted to exceed the corresponding 
price charged by the subsidiary or associated company in the "outer zones" 
of the United Kingdom· In the absence of a subsidiary or associated 
company, the limit would be the standard wholesale price posted for the 
"outer zones" of the United Kingdom. 
United Kingdom 
Up to I973 the prices for oil product were determined solely by the 
oil companies. In spite of its holding in British Petroleum, the 
state took no action in this area· 
The market»therefore, was a free one, but three large international 
oil companies, accounting for over 60 % of total sales, exert a strong 
influence on the trend of prices. Consumers played only a marginal 
role and then only in negotiating individual contracts· 
106 There was no official tariff, nor was there any obligation to publish 
prices. The oil companies did, however, compile price lists at regular inter-
vals and these were published in the specialised journals. Discounts were 
given on the listed prices. The size of the discount varied with the size of 
the order, terms of delivery and the market situation. 
Prom 1973, before any price increase for oil products can have effect, 
the oil companies are obliged to obtain authorization from the Price 
Commission which pays particular attention to the margins. Prom December 
1973 to December 1974, maximum retail prices were fixed for motor fuel. 
For other oil products the system of prior approval by the Price Commission 
remained in force. 
By reason of the very structure of supply, it can be said that this 
is a homogeneous market where price differences are slight given similar 
conditions of consumption. 
Germany 
In Germany, the only market on which a large number of suppliers 
actively competed with each other, prices varied considerably between 
suppliers, from one region to another and from one period to another. 
These differences are illustrated in Tables 20 a to 20 e. 
Even for a homogeneous product like petrol, which is also homogeneous 
from the distribution and utilization point of view, the prices of the large 
international oil companies to their distributors varied from I40 to 240 DM/ 
m in December 1973 and from 230 to 330 DM/m in March 1974. 
Price differences for other oil products were less striking but 
nonetheless appreciable. It is also interesting to note that while prices 
to independent dealers allowed them a substantial margin in October 1973, 
this was gradually eroded over the crisis period to become negative on many 
occasions in March 1974, at least for light fuel oils. 
Emerging from this review of the domestic prices for oil products is 
the fact that in those countries which introduced maximum price regulations 
during the oil crisis, varying degrees of concertation existed between oil 
companies in so far as they participated through their trade associations in 
the fixing of maximum prices for oil products on their national market or 
even in the submission of proposals to the public authorities concerning 
maximum prices. 
107 There are in addition, with the possible exception of Italy, certain 
factors used in the determination of prices, such as Piatt's Oilgram 
quotations and, in the case of Belgium, the Aruba/Curaçao-Antwerp freight 
rate, which are not realistic in so far as they reflect notional rather 
than the actual costs involved in the production of oil products. 
Tables 10 a and h of Part II of the report list consumer prices, 
both inclusive and exclusive of taxes, and reveal that one of the main 
consequences of the disparity between the price policies of the member 
states was the extreme difference between the prices practised in the 
countries of the Community. This necessarily distorted competition, 
although it is impossible over the short period of the crisis to assess the 
real effect of this on production and trade. 
On 23 November 1973, the domestic price for heating oil, inclusive 
of taxes, was f¿ 3l/m in Italy and $ So (over 300 fa higher) in the Uetherlands. 
On 30 April 1974, the domestic price for gas oil was fl 150/m in 
Denmark and $ 360 (230 fa higher) in Germany. 
108 REGULAR PETROL 
Sales prices in Germany (exoluBÍvo orftaxesj 
DH/m
3 
Table 20 a 
Diat ribut ion"channels 
Distributors under 
own brand name 
Independent 
dealers 
Major consumers 
i Year/month 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Janv. 
Fe^. 
March 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Janv. 
Feb. 
March 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Jarrv. 
Feb. 
March 
A 
157,00 
171,00 
192,00 
191,00 
279,00 
277,00 
120,00 
144,00 
155,00 
155,00 
245,00 
247,00 
152,00 
155,00 
159,00 
157,00 
247,00 
257,00 
Β 
140,80 
149,70 
166,10 
169,50 
259.20 
259,50 
132,96 
142,57 
159,70 
160,74 
260,58 
258,23 
147,50 
162,20 
174,60 
185,50 
270,40 
264,80 
C 
(a) 
162,90 
180,35 
202,09 
195,33 
257,40 
263,60 
139,15 
185,81 
183,32 
189,39 
255,38 
258,61 
149,09 
202,07 
219,79 
196,70 
262, ar 
269,41 
Comp 
E 
(b) 
186,00 
204,90 
226,40 
240,40 
311,50 
311,30 
160,83 
176,64 
202,42 
220,45 
284,79 
285,56 
134,66 
176,73 
205,79 
202,84 
296,69 
271,68 
any 
F 
145,06 
166,78 
181,71 
192,57 
264,65 
263,14 
130,33 
143-, 21 
159.46 
168,79 
250,66 
251,70 
228,59 
200,33 
210,23 
228,41 
308,82 
282,39 
Η I 
207,30 
220,70 
244,70 
243,00 
332,10 
328,90 
— 
-
-
-
I 
202,00 
218,10 
241,30 
238,20 
326,00 
323,20 
138,00 
152,30 
160,30 
160,00 
250,00 
250,00 
154,60 
170,70 
196,20 
183,50 
273,50 
268,90 
J 
127,82 
140,16 
142,41 
156,55 
222,48 
235,02 
134,06 
153,14 
164,19 
177,58 
251,51 
252,83 
137,15 
142,49 
171,33 
179,91 
254,35 
262,60 
K 
207,30 
220,70 
242,20 
256,00 
312.Λ0 
327,30 
126,40 
143.00 
155,10 
160,50 
244,50 
246,10 
153,20 
165,90 
180,30 
196,70 
273,20 
271,80 
(a) Average price : Düsseldorf & Mannheim 
(b) Average price : Karlsruhe, Duisburg à Ingolstadt SUPER PETROL 
Sales prices in Germany (exclusive of taxes) 
DM/m
3 
Tabi- ' j h 
Distribution 
channels 
Distributors under 
own brand name 
Independent dealers 
Major consumers 
Year/month 
'73 Oct. 
Hov. 
Dec. 
•74 Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
»74 Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
Company 
A 
214.00 
233-00 
256.OO 
252.OO 
344.00 
340.00 
179.00 
I92.OO 
208.00 
208.00 
298.OO 
302.00 
200.00 
2I5.OO 
219.OO 
217.OO 
307.OO 
317.OO 
Β 
196.30 
205.60 
218.50 
227.30 
316,70 
313.70 
180.08 
193.11 
213.80 
215.03 
314.87 
313.20 
203.50 
216.40 
228.90 
242.50 
325.20 
321.60 
C 
(a) 
I84.68 
22.9.6I 
261.82 
256.IO 
347.69 
338.15 
177.17 
239.10 
254.19 
249.20 
306.57 
309.98 
194.54 
258.6I 
283.74 
264.IO 
3I6.98 
321.84 
E 
(b) 
214.O6 
268.90 
292.20 
303.30 
374.30 
373.30 
218.79 
228.44 
260.83 
276.86 
357-47 
350.71 
175.94 
243.90 
278.80 
301.60 
358.7O 
363,60 
F 
2IO.91 
231.90 
245·86 
258.92 
331.63 
328.79 
179.47 
190.98 
205.72 
218.71 
296.52 
298,41 
208.21 
227.O6 
242.82 
261.38 
342,30 
335.50 
H 
273.20 
285.9O 
308.60 
307.5O 
397.80 
395.10 
-
-
-
-
I 
267.OO 
286.30 
308.60 
304.20 
391.50 
388.10 
188.00 
205.6O 
219.30 
219.OO 
309.OO 
305.OO 
213.10 
230.70 
256.20 
243.50 
333.50 
328.90 
J 
173.79 
199.37 
203.02 
214.OO 
287.15 
295.65 
173.O6 
196.76 
210.46 
217.03 
299.O8 
296.94 
I84.OI 
204.55 
217.96 
231.78 
305.73 
309.20 
K 
273.20 
285.90 
307.70 
321.90 
382.00 
393.70 
169.40 
202.70 
204.10 
217.40 
301.00 
304.30 
212.20 
226.20 
24O.4O 
263.80 
334.80 
335.7O 
(a) Average price Düsseldorf & Mannheim 
(b) Average price Karlsruhe, Duisburg & Ingolstadt DIESEL FUEL / GAS OIL 
Sales prices in Germany (exclusive of taxes) 
DM/m
3 
Table 20 c 
Distribution 
channels 
Distributors under 
ovm brand name 
Independent 
dealers 
Major consumers 
Year/month 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
A 
210,00 
224.00 
246.00 
255.OO 
35O.OO 
340.00 
I57.OO 
I95.OO 
208.00 
220.00 
305.OO 
270.00 
182.00 
206.00 
214.OO 
224.00 
302.00 
27O.OO 
Β 
162.10 
197.00 
224.80 
226.60 
270.90 
261.80 
151.87 
189.90 
204.39 
212.83 
268.35 
249-80 
168.10 
214.40 
229.60 
240.00 
290,10 
273.00 
C 
(a) 
I77.O9 
24O.O9 
272.63 
246.52 
265.31 
244.25 
I74.O2 
266.80 
266.02 
249.21 
259.98 
259.18 
203.35 
280.33 
303.34 
275.87 
279.33 
261.75 
D 
I77.OO 
226,00 
256.OO 
266.00 
310.00 
29O.OO 
177.00 
224.00 
261.00 
273.OO 
27I.OO 
257.00 
I84.OO 
211.00 
170.00 
221.00 
261.00 
29I.OO 
C 0 
E 
(b) 
236.8O 
27I.4O 
306.30 
329.IO 
386.2O 
391.10 
191.46 
234.20 
303.79 
305.O8 
396.34 
257.O2 
I88.54 
247.02 
284.29 
25O.47 
296.36 
257.86 
η ρ a η y 
F 
172.79 
206.36 
228.49 
237.20 
310.61 
286.18 
153.33 
178.87 
Ι99.Ι7 
212.16 
286.26 
272.65 
174.44 
204.44 
220.97 
24Ι.84 
316.89 
290.71 
G 
-
-
— 
-
I7O.8O 
243.5O 
333.30 
342.80 
H 
I73.2O 
207.8O 
230.30 
25O.O2 
313.00 
286.00 
— 
-
-
-
I 
248.40 
269.50 
293.6O 
3O5.6O 
382.80 
383.00 
173,40 
186.70 
202.20 
216.40 
299.40 
259.40 
196.20 
199.50 
207.40 
220.40 
301.10 
264.90 
J 
I65.47 
205.22 
205.94 
232.40 
286.80 
246.71 
I59.O8 
I86.42 
202.06 
213.37 
288.56 
25I.3O 
159-42 
I83.69 
198.23 
223.28 
295.69 
278.50 
Κ 
251.00 
268.20 
280.80 
310.30 
361.90 
391.80 
152.70 
189.40 
204.40 
222.60 
254-10 
243.10 
173.20 
207 · 80 
230.30 
244-60 
312.70 
292.10 
(a) Average price Düsseldorf & Mannheim 
(b) Average price Karlsruhe, Duisburg & Ingolstadt LIGHT FUEL OIL  Sales prices in Germany (exclusive of taxes) 
DM/m
3 
Table 20 d 
Distribution 
channels 
Distributors under 
ovm brand name 
Independent dealers 
Major consumers 
Year 
'73 
'74 
'73 
'74 
'73 
'74 
/month 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
A 
174.00 
198.00 
202.00 
210.00 
265.OO 
243.00 
Β 
184.10 
219.00 
230.60 
227-40 
232.50 
244.30 
178.54 
207.42 
228.81 
222.35 
246-55 
240.10 
206.50 
243.20 
247.90 
245.90 
289.70 
261.20 
C 
(a) 
I88.52 
259.88 
266.48 
253,88 
248.O3 
239.36 
223.58 
268.9I 
296.98 
255.84 
254,26 
242.43 
24O.7I 
305.82 
309.42 
327.71 
276.43 
249.52 
C 
D 
200,00 
252.OO 
256.OO 
255.OO 
253.00 
243.00 
I97.OO 
269.OO 
278.OO 
273.OO 
226.00 
249.OO 
210.00 
27O.OO 
260.00 
265.OO 
27O.OO 
252.OO 
0 m ρ a 
E 
(*>) 
191.22 
265,62 
309.02 
278.51 
259.22 
237.77 
208.77 
253.98 
290.62 
285.66 
278.86 
251.20 
η y 
F 
I8O.7I 
207.89 
214.56 
233.40 
301.57 
255.3O 
I69.78 
I89.36 
195-37 
210.39 
276.63 
285.79 
174.60 
189.19 
204.17 
228.18 
303.69 
257.93 
H 
I85.O4 
222.43 
242.92 
25O.O2 
266.5I 
244.95 
— 
_ 
I65.7I 
225.34 
263.68 
258.77 
283,86 
260.61 
I 
I96.6O 
201.80 
205.9O 
222.80 
289.5O 
245.5O 
208.30 
212.30 
207.6O 
224.40 
29I.4O 
246.7O 
204.20 
207.70 
217.20 
249.30 
312.00 
260.60 
J 
177.46 
209.I6 
213.43 
233.16 
270.73 
238.23 
176.27 
215.62 
213.95 
231.14 
270.72 
237.05 
175.89 
200.83 
214.27 
222.98 
286.84 
248.66 
Κ 
187.29 
235.62 
253.42 
257-67 
245.79 
238,17 
191.99 
243-58 
265.10 
263.47 
240.98 
237-40 
183-14 
260-49 
282.35 
267.20 
244-91 
236.71 
(a) Average price Dusseldorf & Mannheim 
(b) Average price Karlsruhe, Duisburg & Ingolstadt (-) 
HEAVY FUEL (ca. 2 fa S) 
Sales prices in Germany (exclusive of taxes) 
DM/t 
Table 20 e 
Distribution 
channels 
Distributors under 
ovm brand name 
Independent dealers 
Major consumers 
Year/month 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
'73 Oct. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
'74 Jan. 
Feb. 
March 
A 
70.00 
80.00 
101.00 
128.00 
174.00 
174.00 
Β 
— 
-
54.61 
77.76 
109.63 
135.99 
175.56 
173.01 
. 56.OI 
84.27 
119.62 
144,41 
182.35 
179.68 
C 
(a) 
66.83 
90.46 
121.26 
126.26 
180.02 
177.74 
67.32 
101.36 
127.82 
143.97 
186.80 
189,23 
D 
58,00 
77.00 
144.00 
133.OO 
173.OO 
176,00 
53.00 
69.OO 
106,00 
129.00 
177.OO 
178.OO 
61.00 
84.00 
126.00 
I38.OO 
I83.OO 
180.00 
Con 
lb 
(b) 
47.22 
73.87 
109,69 
143.81 
178.36 
173.29 
55.80 
73.48 
110.55 
145.07 
179.70 
172.45 
1 ρ a η y 
F 
70,86 
96.80 
126.92 
139.42 
194.56 
194.21 
-
-
66.46 
86,50 
107.75 
134.96 
I88.7I 
184.05 
G 
-
_ 
-
_ 
83.97 
89.22 
183.93 
189.21 
H 
-
-
56.99 
66.94 
107.62 
126.23 
I7O.39 
I68.85 
62.9O 
88.23 
IIO.98 
137.73 
I75.7O 
I83.O5 
I 
-
_ 
78.OO 
82.00 
IO9.OO 
129.00 
179.00 
179.00 
79.00 
83.00 
110.00 
130.00 
180.00 
180.00 
J 
82.08 
83.38 
102.32 
136.20 
187.57 
183.28 
56.54 
70.97 
107.I6 
132.70 
177.15 
171.O6 
60.54 
88.46 
102.24 
116.00 
156.98 
154.99 
Κ 
56.26 
72,31 
102.11 
144.81 
176.91 
175-57 
54-33 
74.94 
111.18 
154.08 
187-57 
176.96 
57.86 
67.49 
87.78 
111.88 
158-53 
166.83 
(a) Average price Düsseldorf & Mannheim 
(b) Average price Karlsruhe, Duisburg & Ingolstadt 2) Transfer prices for oil products 
The impact of transfer prices charged by a company for oil products 
on the price at which those products are actually sold on the market in the 
country of destination should not be overestimated. Whilst it would 
undoubtedly be preferable for the procedures for the calculation of transfer 
prices to be more readily seen to bear a relationship with the actual costs 
incurred by an oil company, these procedures remain essentially domestic 
to each oil group and, more particularly, to the accounting procedures 
between the various companies involved within that group. They were not 
seen to have a direct relationship with the final selling price for oil 
products by any company in any country of the Community, even Germany, 
where no controls on the prices of oil products were imposed by the 
Government. Indeed, as will be noted later, the transfer prices for 
petrol of one company to an associated company in Germany were above the 
prices at which that company sold petrol on the German market. 
The system of determining the prices at which oil products are 
transferred between companies within the same oil group in different 
countries varies considerably from one group to another : some oil 
companies vary their own system further, according to geographical areas 
within their field of operations. 
One major international company investigated (Company ï) bases its 
transfer prices on prices known as "supply prices" which are used for all 
products covered by the enquiry with the exception of naphtha. These 
"supply prices" are partly calculated by reference to the relevant quotations 
in Piatt's Oilgram (see later) but also take into account the costs of crude 
oil, freight charges and refining costs. 
Another company (Company F) referred to its transfer prices in Europe 
as "Channel zone" prices until January 1973 and based their calculation 
exclusively on the relevant quotations contained in Piatt's Oilgram. From 
January 1973, a system known as "mixed export parity prioe" (MEP) replaced 
that of Channel zone prices and was applied to all transfers of oil products 
to companies in the oil group of Company F, with the exception of certain 
deliveries to Belgium and to the German armed forces. The MEP can be 
described as a "composite price" since 25 fa of it was based on the Piatt's 
Oilgram quotation for that product and the remaining 75 f° was related to 
yet another factor called the "term price". This term price was itself drawn 
from several cost items such as the price of crude oil, freight, refining 
costs and costs of storage. 
114 In the case of Company A, the tranfer prices for the zone 
of operations from Bordeaux to Hamburg were known as North-West Europe 
(ME) prices. Here again, in the determination of the NWE prices, 
reference was made to Piatt's Oilgram quotations and to costs of crude 
oil, transport and insurance costs and costs of refining. 
An impression of the complexity of the calculations applied to 
obtain the transfer price may he gained from the following example, 
which sets out the procedure of one international company (Company ï) . 
In the case of this company, the supply prices are agreed monthly 
and apply to deliveries made on and after the first day of each calendar 
month. They are derived from an agreed percentage of an all-in cost price 
plus a percentage of a spot price. 
"The all-in cost price" is arrived at by : 
(A) calculating the fob cost of one tonne of Arabian Light crude oil 
by multiplying the fob price of one "barrel of Arahian Light crude 
oil (as agreed between Company I and its European affiliated 
companies as being the fair and commercial price ruling on the 
2)  twenty-third of the preceding month ) hy the appropriate ba 
tonne factor, which unless otherwise agreed is 7·38 ; 
1) In the text which follows, some types of crude oil, names of ports 
and products have been replaced by numbers, for reasons of 
confidentiality. 
2) The term "preceding" month as used in this procedure is interpreted 
as being the calendar month prior to that for which the supply price 
is being calculated. 
115 (Β) adding to the fob cost of one tonne of Arabian Light crude oil 
the appropriate freight from Port of loading 1 to Rotterdam, 
thus arriving at C ά Ρ cost of the orude oil at Rotterdam· The 
appropriate freight is that for VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers) ; 
116 (C) calculating the fob cost of one tonne of Type 2 crude oil by multiplying 
the fob price of one barrel of Type 2 crude oil as agreed between the 
companies as being the fair and commercial price ruling on the twenty-
third of the preceding month by the appropriate barrel/tonne factor, 
which unless otherwise agreed is 7«47 j 
(D) adding to the fob cost of one tonne of Type 2 crude the appropriate freight 
from Port of loading 2 to Rotterdam, thus arriving at a C and F cost of the 
crude at Rotterdam. The appropriate freight is the AFRA rate for LR (Long 
Range) vessels applicable during the preceding month ; 
(E) calculating the C and F cost of a representative tonne of crude oil at 
Rotterdam by adding 70 fa of the C and F cost of Arabian Light crude (as 
calculated in B) to 30 fa of the C and F cost of Type 2 crude oil (as 
calculated in D) ; 
(F) calculating the all-in cost of the product yields (derived from distillation/ 
platforming) of a representative tonne of crude oil at Rotterdam by adding 
ρ 4·50 (as representing the cost of processing plus a reasonable return on 
capital) per tonne to the C and F cost of a representative tonne of crude 
oil as set out in E, 
The product yields referred to are : 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5-
6. 
Refin<  sry fuel & loss 
7.7 fo by 
3.3 fa 
5-5 fa 
35-5 fa 
28.0 fa 
I5.O fa 
5.0 fa 
tt 
II 
II 
II 
π 
It 
weight 
II 
II 
II 
It 
It 
tt 
(G) calculate the all-in cost per tonne of each of the individual products by : 
1. multiplying the percentage yields set cut in F by the appropriate Piatt's 
Rotterdam Low quotation effective the ultimo of the preceding month ; 
2. adding together the result values, thus arriving at the value 
(calculated at Piatt's Rotterdam Lows) of 0.95 tonne of products 
derived from 1.0 tonne of crude oil ; 
3. the so-called list prices are arrived at by multiplying the Piatt's Low 
of each product by the ratio of all-in crude cost (as under F)/value of 
yield (as mentioned under G.2.). 
The Spot prices are the appropriate Piatt's Rotterdam Low quotations effective 
per the ultimo of the preceding month (see G.I.). 
117 Freight rates 
The value to be used for the freight rates factor is 
generally "based on the indications of the costs of shipments 
of oil known as Average Freight Rate Assessments (AFRA). These 
indices are established monthly by a group of shipping brokers 
operating from London who take into account the freight costs, 
on both a long and a short-term basis, effective during the pre-
vious month. Spot purchases as well as fixed term contracts are 
taken into consideration as are the costs of shipment by tankers 
operated by the oil companies themselves. The AFRA freight in-
dices are grouped according to the classification of the vessels. 
An example of the use of AFRA freight indices has been given 
above in the internal procedure of Company I for determining its 
supply prices. This stipulates that "the appropriate freight rate 
shall be the AFRA rate for LR 2 vessels applicable during the 
preceding month". (LR 2 = long range vessels class 2). 
The AFRA scale is expressed in US dollars per long ton. 
AFM quotations 
The AFM prices for diesel fuel and petrol are established 
by the Aussenhandelsverband für Mineralöl, a group of independent 
importers based in Hamburg. Quotations are published by AFM week-
ly on the basis of the range of prices at which its members have 
concluded transactions for various types of diesel fuel and 
petrol. Although the AFM quotations are published in Piatt's 
Oilgram (see below), they are perhaps less accepted for use by 
the major oil companies. Unlike Piatt's own quotations, whiqh 
are subject to daily cross-checks, the AFM quotations, being 
compiled weekly from a smaller number of transactions, tend to 
be less representative. 
118 Piatt's Oilgram quotations 
Piatt's Oilgram is a daily oil price recording and 
reporting service by McGraw-Hill Publications, whose main 
office is in New York but which has agencies and associated 
companies throughout Europe and the rest of the world. Among 
its daily topics are, for example, the prices at which trans-
actions in oil products have been made, including, so far as 
Europe is concerned, bulk prices for cargoes fob Italy and 
for barges fob Rotterdam, for a range of oil products. 
119 Unlike other world-wide commodities, such as copper or sugar, 
the prices of oil products are not quoted on any international exchange, 
and the Piatt's Oilgram quotations, although unofficial, have acquired 
some significance as a market indicator. They are used extensively by 
oil companies in determining their transfer and sale prices. 
Governments have also taken the quotations into consideration when 
determining their prices for oil products. 
The basis of the pricing service consists of the acquisition of 
information about transactions not only of the major oil companies 
but also of independent dealers and brokers in principal oil centres. 
It has been assessed that the majority of the information is obtained 
from major oil companies. In Europe, the Piatt's Oilgram Pricing Servioe 
has an office in Brussels from which, each week, contact is made with a 
number of oil firms, dealers and brokers in the Netherlands to obtain 
recent prices for transactions in oil products together with some 
impression of market trends. The information thus collected is transmitted 
weekly to New York. Every day the coordinator of the information in 
New York telephones to some oil companies and dealers in the Rotterdam 
area to ensure that the information is as up to date as possible. 
A similar collecting service for information about oil transactions 
operates from London. Information about transactions in Italy is 
obtained in a similar fashion. 
Apart from quotations collected from their own sources, Piatt's 
Oilgram publishes the AFM prices for petrol and diesel fuel. 
As has already been seen, one of the steps in the determination by 
Company I of its transfer prices requires the percentage yields of 
certain oil products to be multiplied "by the appropriate Piatt's 
Rotterdam Low quotation effective the ultimo of the preceding month", 
and 25 % of the MEP price operated by Company F was based on quotations 
in Piatt's Oilgram. Company A decided to include, from July 1973» 
Piatt's Oilgram quotations in calculating the base costs from which 
the NWE price was determined (see page II5), and this had the clear 
effect of increasing these base costs and accordingly the NWE price. 
Thus the base costs in December 1973, bearing the influence of Piatt's 
Oilgram quotations, were almost I5 fo higher than they would otherwise 
have been. 
120 Tables 21 and 2 2 show the breakdown of the base costs of Company A 
and Company I, together with the effect on these costs of the use of 
Piatt's Oilgram quotations. 
Comparison of transfer prices for oil products 
In the course of the enquiries, the Commission requested from 
oil companies the average monthly prices at which they exported oil 
products to their associated companies in other countries of the Com-
munity. 
For super petrol (see Table 2'3j, whilst very slight variation 
is to be found between the transfer prices charged by Company F? for 
example, other companies show a tendency to apply prices which are 
distinctly higher for certain countries than for others. 
In the case of Germany, the transfer prices charged by one 
company for super and regular petrol were higher than the prices 
charged by its subsidiary on the German market. 
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CO Product: Petrol-super 
( 13 roup in t »rnnì del ί vrrles ) 
% per tonne «*x-rel irvry 
h'l' ·'} 
Supplying country 
Oct. 1973 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Nov. 1973 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Dec. 1973 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Jan. 1974 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Feb. 1974 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Mar. 1974 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Country of destination 
Germany 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Germany 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Germany 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Germany 
Belgium 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Company 
Β 
57,92 
68,37 
60,45 
85,27 
59,10 
63,66 
72,02 
83,16 
63,66 
85,18 
81,90 
85,29 
80,65 
115,66 
121,40 
108,21 
117,75 
139,52 
139,45 
135,07 
C 
73,40 
65,25 
79,-/81,-
125,-
81,-
77,-
115,-
D 
48,-
55,-
60,-
159,-
159,-
159,-
Γ 
65,-
62,-
11,-
75,-
'S.-
92,80 
110,-
110,90 
119,-
109,40 
126,-
118,20 
G 
79,35 
79,77 
79,56 
88,92 
91,72 
95,33 
96,57 
112,-
139,42 
134,49 
162,94 
157,46 
1 
60,75 
63,84 
67,-
69,85 
70,24 
73,08 
81,32 
86,62 
136,77 
J 
«1,58 
88,24 
80,12 
97,95 
93,24 
83,82 
110,93 
149,58 
175,97 
170,61 
194.83. 
142,41 
N.B. These are monthly average prices, so the raising of transfer prices during the course of a 
month could explain slight differences among common market countries. 
124 As regards the transfer price of gas oils and light fuel oils 
(which have not been tabulated because the variety of definitions 
from country to country makes comparison difficult), a con­
sistently higher price to Germany was noticeable for most oil com­
panies in respect of comparable qualities : Β in October and November 
I973, C in November 1973, F, G, Η and J all offer examples. 
In respect of aircraft fuel, in his review in September 1974 of 
the state of the world air transport industry, the Director General 
of the International Air Transport Association (LATA) said that un­
til 1973,7the costs of fuel had represented about 12$ of the total 
costs of the airline industry but that this percentage had risen by 
July 1974 to over 25%. By that time the cost of aircraft fuel had in­
creased over threefold from its level"»before the crisis, and because 
of the huge quantity of fuel consumed by aircraft, the airlines* total 
operating costs had soared as a result of the escalation in fuel prices. 
He went on to suggest that aircraft fuel had been priced at a higher 
level than was necessary, particularly as compared with other oil 
products. The Commission noted this situation and observations which 
had been made elsewhere expressing concern at the effect on the air­
lines, particularly on their prices. No formal complaints, 
however, had been made to the Commission by individual airlines about 
their situation concerning supplies of aircraft fuel. Contact was made 
with the European Airlines Research Bureau, the organization represent­
ing the collective interest of European based airlines, in the hope that 
it would make a representative comment to the Commission on behalf of 
its member airlines on any problems which European airlines were ex­
periencing from the point of view of supplies or prices, but it did 
not do so. 
The Commission subsequently decided to include aviation fuel among 
the products covered by the supplementary questionnaire which was.·sent 
out to oil companies during the course of the inquiry. Besides confirm­
ing a steep increase of price during the oil crisis, the resulting data 
shows a considerable disparity between the prices at which aircraft fuel 
was sold: this difference applies not only between companies but also 
between countries of destination. Thus, in November 1973, whilst delive­
ries were being made by Company Ρ to Germany at a price of $74.15 Pe
r 
125 tonne, the prices charged by Companies H and J were $138 per tonne and 
>101.6l per tonne respectively. Again, in December 1973, deliveries were 
m; e by Company I to Germany from a refinery in the Netherlands at the 
then particularly low price of $40.11 per tonne, whilst deliveries to 
the same destination from refineries in the Netherlands were made by 
Company H at $185 per tonne and by Company J at $113.83 per tonne. On 
several occasions during the oil crisis,Denmark appears to have re­
ceived aircraft fuel at prices which were significantly lower than 
the prices charged by the same oil group to destinations in other 
member states. In December 1973, for example, Company I delivered 
supplies to Denmark at $47 per tonne whilst its charges to Belgium and 
the United Kingdom were $94·19 sna $91.62 per tonne respectively. And 
again, in February 1974» the same company provided aircraft fuel to 
Denmark at a price of $84·99 per tonne whilst its deliveries to Ger­
many, Belgium and the United Kingdom were invoiced at $94·8θ per tonne, 
$94.33 per tonne and $114.24 per tonne respectively. 
Commenting in September 1975
 o
n "the effects of oil price increases 
on the operations of international airlines, the President of the Inter­
national Air Transport Association accused the oil companies of being 
unfair to airlines and indicated that studies commissioned by IATA had 
shown that the increases imposed by oil companies on the prices of jet 
fuel had been about 10% higher than the increases for other oil products. 
The contracting and supply arrangements between airlines and the oil com­
panies are themselves sufficiently complex to constitute the grounds for 
a separate inquiry, and this and further discussions with the parties 
concerned would be necessary before any firm conclusion can be based 
on the differences noted. 
126 It is difficult to offer general conclusions about the systems of 
calculating transfer prices which the Commission encountered during 
its inquiries, because of the variety of procedures involved. Some 
companies, notably Companies A and I, operated a system of transfer 
prices which was based on a standard price applicable to all countries 
in the Community and to which differentials were applied to reflect 
particular market situations. Company A applied differentials to take 
account of transport costs to destinations outside the zone to which 
its basic transfer prices related. Other companies recognized that 
some account was taken of'ijhe market situation in the country of des-
tination, and this would explain, at least partially, the higher 
transfer prices to Germany, which, apart from being deficient in 
refining capacity, had introduced no price controls for oil products. 
The accusation of absence of reality can be levelled at several 
aspects of the system of calculating transfer prices. The product 
yield used in the procedure of Company I for the calculation of its 
supply prices does not necessarily relate to the percentages of each 
product produced from 1 tonne of crude oil by that company but to 
the average yield expected from a typical refinery with an average 
capacity of 180,000 barrels per stream day (that is, about 9 million 
tonnes per year). Company A,at one stage in the calculation of its 
transfer prices, uses a yield of nine products from 1 tonne of crude 
oil which is representative of the European consumption of those pro-
ducts rather than of its own sales or of the yield actually obtained in 
its own refineries. Similarly, for freight costs, in the calculations 
AFRA quotations take the place of the actual shipping costs incurred 
by a company. 
The inclusion of quotations from Piatt's Oilgram is another factor 
in the calculation of transfer prices which does not relate to a com-
pany's own situation. In fact, during the oil criéis the prices given 
by Piatt's quotations largely reflected the conditions on the inter-
national market since the oil market of Rotterdam (from which, as has 
127 been mentioned earlier, much of the data for the compilation of 
Piatt's Oilgram appears to be obtained) is geared to the export 
trade. The absence of maximum price legislation in Germany during 
the oil crisis meant that high prices could be achieved for trans-
actions, and these were reflected ultimately in Piatt's Oilgram 
quotations, which themselves were used as the basis for further 
transactions. 
It is understood that the prices passed to the Piatt's Oil-
gram organization mav in^ludje prices in respect of transactions 
which are expected but not yet concluded. Moreover, it is not 
known to what extent the data passed by the oil companies concern 
transactions within their own group, but in this connection it is 
worth noting that even the major oil companies often use inter-
mediaries for their transactions and thus the exact nature of some 
of the prices passed to the Piatt's Oilgram organization may not 
be known· 
Every effort is undoubtedly made to ensure that the data used 
in the compilation of Piatt's Oilgram quotations are absolutely up 
to date, but the actual criteria for interpreting the data given 
and the means of determining the daily quotations are unknown, as 
indeed are the sources of the information themselves. 
It seems likely that the ultimate decision as to the level at 
which the daily quotations are to be fixed rests with the coordinator 
in New York, who doubtless takes account of market trends when 
applying his judgment to the interpretation of the data. 
It might be said, of course, that the Piatt's Oilgram quotation 
is regarded only as a guide in concluding contracts in respect of oil 
products and that the final prices are determined on. a basis of mutual 
agreement between the parties, taking account of the state of the mar-
ket and the transaction concerned. Nevertheless, there remains no 
doubt that throughout the studies undertaken by the Commission into the 
oil sector in Europe, extensive references were found to the use of, if 
not actual reliance on, the quotations contained in Piatt's Oilgram.and 
that such frequent reference to this publication raises some real pro-
blems concerning the correctness of prices. 
128 3. Sales to third parties in other countries 
The sales by oil companies to third parties consisted mainly 
of bulk sales to other companies in the market and to large independent 
jobbers which were made either on the basis of a firm contract or as 
spot purchases at the market prices. 
Because of the special nature of the German market with its 
inadequate domestic production of heating oil distillates and prices 
which were not subject to official regulation, exports to Germany of 
gas oil are of particular interest. 
In view of this, Table 24 compares the following : 
- prices charged by two independent Dutch dealers (Companies N and θ) 
for deliveries to Germany ; 
- the prices charged by Company A (an international company), for 
deliveries to a dealer selling to the German market; The price 
is described by Company A as "Average Piatt's low (Piatt's mean) 
Rotterdam for 30 days prior to the 15th of the month prior to the 
month of loading plus 35 cents"; 
- the transfer prices which Company A charged its own German refining 
subsidiary ; 
- the Piatt's Oilgram quotations. 
As the table shows, Companies N and 0 were the first to 
increase their prices when the crisis began, by approximately 40 fo 
between September and October 1973» broadly in line with Piatt's, 
whereas Company A raised its prices much less. 
129 G-A S OIL 
Exports to Germany 
Table 24 
1973 
July-
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1974 
January 
February 
March 
Company N 
Quantity 
(tonnes) 
5 900 
18 253 
15 843 
18 637 
23 109 
8 093 
23 668 
11 234 
9 094 
Price 
($/tonr.e) 
76.54 
67.04 
80,65 
114.34 
126,45 
148.62 
126.28 
108.67 
IO5.45 
Company 0 
Quantity 
(tonnes) 
1 837 
4 626 
2 411 
5 643 
8 522 
1 704 
8 794 
3 599 
3 847 
Price 
(^/tonne) 
72.35 
65.19 
73.95 
IO4.65 
155.O8 
175.46 
II5.58 
IO8.92 
IO6.25 
Company A 
Quanti i» 
(tonnes)' 
29 400 
30 400 
36 800 
29 200 J 
25 000 
24 500 
24 600 
24 600 
25 000 
Price 
(ß/tonne) 
60.14 
67.82 
71.56 
73.12 
86.39 
141.18 
204.8O 
152.56 
108.77 
Price charged by 
Company A to 
group companies 
in Germany 
51.60 
1/10-76.60. I6/10 
81.60 
99.0 
118.0 
94.0 
Piatt's 
P.otterdan 
(fi/tonne) 
70.96 
7O.I8 
77.67 
117.68 
I8I.7O 
175.84 
I25.6I 
100.64 
98.94 These differences between prices charged by Compæiy A to a 
dealer selling on the German market, on the one hand, and those of 
Piatt's and the independent dealers, on the other, were due to the 
interval related to the date of the Piatt's Oilgra.ni quotation specified 
in the supply contract between Company A and the dealers selling to 
the German market· 
The differences between Company A's transfer price and 
what it charged to a dealer selling to Germany were due to the 
different manner in which Piatt's Oilgram quotations enter into the 
calculation of the two prices: the price to the dealer selling to 
the German market is related almost entirely to Piatt's Oilgram 
quotations, whereas Piatt's influence on transfer pricing is, as we 
nave seen, luuch less. 
Table 25 illustrates, in respect of super petrol and 
heating gas oil, the disparity between two companies
1 (A's and I's) 
transfer prices and Piatt's Oilgram (mean) Rotterdam quotations. 
It will be observed that the transfer prices were always 
below Piatt's and that the gap widened during the months covered. 
131 ■o 
COMPARISON. OP TRANSFER PRICES OP COMPANIES- A AND I 
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S  0 Prom the information and trends set out above, it can be 
seen that the transfer prices of crude oil or of oil products had 
virtually no effect on market prices at the time of the crisis. 
Where there are price controls, the result of a market 
crisis is that market prices tend to align themselves on the maximum 
controlled prices. 
Where the market remains free of controls, prices tend to 
float up to the level of world market prices. They tend to follow the 
pattern of the highest prices, which are those either of the more or 
less marginal quantities of crude bought at higher prices or of 
refined products purchased on the world market. 
Variations or differences in transfer prioes in each of 
these two situations have no effect, except on the balance sheets of 
the international subsidiaries of the companies. 
Ultimately, it is in the terms under which the various 
companies supplying the market obtain their supplies that the factors 
governing price levels in times of crisis, as in times of market 
stability, are to be found. 
As regards crude oil, the major companies, which for a 
long time have had an almost exclusive control of Middle East oil, 
have established very close relationships with the producer countries 
and, despite the gradual disappearance of concession oil, still benefit 
directly or indirectly from privileged purchasing conditions in 
countries where production costs are in any case the lowest. With 
respect to crude oil then, the other companies are subject from the 
outset to a handicap which is felt at all stages right up to the 
finished product. 
133 The result is that when there is pressure on the market, 
companies other than the majors exert as much upward pressure on 
prices as the majors themselves. 
Since these are also companies which are partly state owned 
and whose market position the state therefore has an interest in 
strengthening, government price controls inevitably take account of 
their situation and preserve conditions in which they can continue to 
operate profitably. 
In some ways, the resulting price levels help to provide 
the large international companies with higher profits than they would 
attain in a real market economy. 
As regards refined products, as soon as the market begins to 
become restricted, the fact that dealers seek to acquire marginal 
quantities at world prices also has the effect of forcing prices higher. 
To sum up, in times of crisis, prices tend to rise to the 
highest level without any apparent relation to the internal transfer 
prices of the companies. 
134 The German market, the only one in which supplies and prices 
remained genuinely free during the cris:'.s, provides a good illustration 
of what we have just said and enables a number of comments to be made. 
Estimate of origin of supplies on the German domestic market 
(1973)  1) 
Origin 
German refineries of the large international 
companies 
German refineries of non—German European 
companies and American independents 
German refineries of German companies 
Oil companies refining in the Netherlands 
Rotterdam free market 
Imports from other Community countries 
(excluding Netherlands) 
Imports from non-member countries 
Percentage 
1) 
35% 
4% 
31% 
9% 
7% 
100% 
70% refined 
in Germany 
Total consumption of oil products in 1973t 137 million tonnes 
One particular feature of Germany's supplies of oil products is 
that only 70% is covered from refineries in Germany, the rest being 
imported. 
135 These imports came from the following four sources in 
somewhat similar proportions: the large international companies 
refining in the Netherlands who transferred oil supplies to their 
German subsidiaries, the Rotterdam free market, refineries elsewhere 
in the Community and non—member countries. 
This supply structure also explains the way prices are 
formed on the German market. 
As soon as the market experiences pressure, these prices 
inevitably have to fall somewhere between the cost of products refined 
in Germany by the large international companies and the cost of 
imported products paid for at the higher world market prioe. 
It can be assumed that approximately 20% of German 
supplies are obtained at prices fairly close to the world price. These 
products, handled mostly by dealers, are sold at this high price on a 
market where actual or feared shortfalls provoke customers into buying 
regardless of price. 
These quantities, marginal in terms of volume, in fact 
determine the market price since other sellers or intermediaries 
naturally aim to profit from the same price in their sales. 
Hence, at times of crisis, German market prices have tended 
to be similar to world prices. But the movement of prices is not uniform: 
there are exceptions in individual regions, and this explains the significant 
price differences throughout the crisis recorded in Table 20. 
136 The German example thus shows that transfer prices are 
economically meaningful and reflect product costs only when the market 
is in a state of long—term equilibrium. 
It is this disparity between real costs and transfer prices 
which gave rise to accusations against the oil companies that they were 
operating price systems which were so complex that they oould cover up 
any form of manipulation. Indeed all the systems which they operate 
certainly do lack clarity and logic, permitting uncheckable 
calculations to be made. 
If in one way or another transfer prices were to determine 
selling prices, and in certain circumstances and on certain markets they 
could be a contributory factor, the way they are formed would have to 
become much clearer. 
It is equally regrettable that when national authorities 
are determining prices, the bases of their calculations are not more 
closely related to reality instead of appearing to bear little relation 
to real costs at the various stages of production and distribution. 
137 PART V PART V 
THE INDEPENDENTS 
As the introduction to this report recalls, the press release 
announcing the Commission's decision to inquire into the conduct of 
the oil companies explicitly referred to difficulties facing the 
independents. 
Part II of the report referred to the Commission's classification 
of the oil companies into three categories: 
(a) the large integrated companies operating on a worldwide 
scale; 
(b) the integrated oil companies of which the activities tend 
to be concentrated in one or several member states; 
(c) smaller companies importing and distributing oil products 
and in some cases owning refineries. 
This classification does not make it clear what the Commission 
meant when it referred in 1973 to the "independents". 
The Commission's preoccupation at that time was the survival 
of small and medium sized firms, most of whose turnover depended on oil 
products and which were independent as regards supplies, distribution 
and prices. 
However, this definition is both academic and inadequate. 
Large numbers of enterprises have long-term contracts covering varying 
proportions of their requirements with this or that large international 
company. Are these enterprises independent or not? In concluding 
these contracts are they not giving up their freedom of source of supply 
by the-, very act whereby they seek to secure their supplies? 
jfloreover, this definition takes no account of the vital 
differences between an importer/wholesaler and a retailer. There 
^are probably some 60,000 dealers in oil products at all stages in the 
Community, yet only a few hundred of these are importers/wholesalers. 
14I Unlike API in Italy, most of the independent companies have 
neither their own refinery nor direct access to refining capacities. 
thers specialize in manufacturing or regenerating lubricants. Some, 
such as Bulk Oil. actually operate as jobbers, importing and selling 
oil proaucts. But the vast maiority of the independent dealers 
simply sell industrial and domestic fuel oils and sometimes petrol. 
It goes without saying that the interests of these dealers 
vary just as widely as their size, line of business and sales volume, 
which can range from several million tonnes in several countries to a 
few thousand tonnes in a single area or city. 
Nevertheless, although these independent dealers generally 
hold rather modest market shares, taken together they account for 
approximately 20% of the distribution of oil products. 
The situation varies from one country to another. Apart 
from France, where precise statistics exist, it is difficult to obtain 
an accurate picture of sales by the independents. 
This being said, the trade associations estimate that in those 
where the independents do a sizable volui 
accounted for the following market shares in 1973: 
1 
countries where the independents do a sizable volume of business they 
BELGIUM 
Diesel fuel and heating oil jfo 
Heavy fuel oils 50% 
Petrol at least 6% 
NETHERLANDS 
Diesel fuel and heating oil 8% 
Heavy fuel oils 10% 
Petrol 8$ 
Excluding Germany, for which the Commission has no figures showing 
the independents* market share. 
142 FRANCE 
Domestic fuel oil 22% 
Heavy fuel oil, excluding 
supplies to Electricité de 
France (EOF) and Société 
Nationale des Chemins de 
Fer Français (SNCF) 10% 
Petrol 9% 
ITALY 
Domestic fuel oil 90%  7° 
The role of the independents 
Before 1971i supply of oil products exceeded demand on the 
world market. Prices were depressed. The large and medium-sized 
independent companies absorbed the surplus and helped to keep supply 
and demand in equilibrium. In order to dispose of their surpluses, 
the refineries were willing to sell to the independents at relatively 
low prices. 
Their lower costs and their ability to obtain products on 
favourable terms enabled them to compete actively with the large 
companies. 
Hence, over the last twenty years or so, the independents 
were able to set up distribution networks in parallel with those of the 
large companies, to build up stocks and to acquire their ovm means of 
transport. They were well adjusted to the requirements of light 
industry and domestic consumers. 
The independent manufacturers of lubricants launched new 
brands, thus stimulating competition on this market. 
At the various stages of distribution the independents 
carved themselves out a substantial share of the market »side by 
side with the large companies. 
14: This is not to say that the independents had no problems 
before the crisis. 
Owing to their relatively modest size the independents feel 
the effect of regional,weather or economic variations more than the 
large companies, and likewise competition from other energy sources. 
They also suffer from the burden and cost of compliance with national 
or other regulations which are felt less by companies which are 
financially and administratively more substantial (controls of all 
kinds, compulsory storage, anti-pollution regulations, technical 
barriers to trade, etc.). 
From 1972 up to early 1974 demand was beginning to exceed 
supply. Countries with inadequate refinery capacity, such as Germany 
and the Scandinavian countries, became obliged to pay higher prices 
for their supplies. Refineries no longer had the slightest problem 
in disposing of their output. 
This was when the independents began to run into difficulties. 
Only a small minority of them were able to take advantage of the rise 
in prices by making profitable export deals from Community refineries. 
For most of them the problem was to supply their distribution networks 
on.competitive terms in order to defend them against their larger 
competitors. 
The crisis only exacerbated this situation - sometimes to an 
extreme degree. In Belgium»the independents - particularly those 
depending heavily on imports - were in serious trouble, with only 50% 
of their requirements supplied. 
Those which had their principal market in Belgium were offered 
products at prices higher than the maximum Belgian prices. Several of 
them managed to obtain supplies, particularly in March and April 1974» 
only as a result of government requisition orders. 
144 One of the big independent companies operating in Belgium, 
where it had crude oil refined and sold its products, also had very 
serious problems owing to the high prices it was obliged to pay for 
crude oil and to refining costs which were increased because of under-
utilization of hired capacity. 
The situation in the Netherlands was similar to that in Belgium, 
though aggravated to an extent because distribution margins were not, 
as in Belgium, fixed by the authorities at the same time as maximum 
prices. The action taken by the Rijksbureau vías not enough to put 
right in all cases the precarious situations in which the independents 
found themselves. 
Certain independent companies which were exporters,however, 
made substantial profits. For example, light fuel oil bought by an 
independent in December 1973 from one of the large international 
companies at Fl. 28.39 per 100 1. was sold to Germany at Fl. 47·57· 
Opportunities such as that resulted in some of these exporters 
increasing their storage capacity in the Netherlands above the level 
corresponding to real requirements in normal circumstances. The 
resulting burden of finance charges was too heavy, and the large 
international companies acquired some of this capacity. 
In France certain independents which were normally importers 
had problems in November 1973· A circular distributed in November 
1973 assigned to the Union des Chambres Syndicales des Industries du 
Pétrole (UCSIP) the task of preparing a plan for supplying those 
companies which now found it impossible to import. The plan fixed 
the level of supplies to these independents at 75% of reference 
levels. The result of this system was that during the crisis the 
companies' market shares were frozen, as were those of their distributors, 
This system ceased operating in 1974 and the independents were urged 
to secure their supplies by negotiating contracts direct with companies 
having refining operations in France; such contracts would be less 
uncertain than some import contracts which were sensitive to price 
fluctuations on the world market. 
41 141 An Italian ministerial circular dated 8 October 1973 laid down 
that supplies of heating oil were to be held at 80 fa of their 1972 level 
and furnished by the same distribution networks. The oil companies opposed 
this. Provincial committees (official bodies headed by the prefects) were 
set up to organize the distribution of these products. A ministerial 
instruction of 23 November 1973 announced the decision to grant distribution 
rights only to companies nominated by refiners. The reason for this was that 
the previous arrangements had given rise to some disorder on the oil product 
market by compelling refiners to make supplies available to dealers whose 
traditional sources of supply lay outside Italy. Naturally enough, the 
Italian oil companies favoured the distribution networks which were linked 
to them and which sometimes received more supplies than they could normally 
handle; on the other hand,certain independents received little or nothing. 
Normal channels of distribution were consequently disrupted. Some consumers 
were not supplied, and there even sprang up a black market in heating oil. 
There was no attempt to regulate^ supplies on the petrol market, and 
companies refused to sell petrol to the independents, resulting in the 
temporary closure of hundreds of petrol stations. 
Moreover, the reduction in distribution margins fixed by the Comitato 
Interministeriale Prezzi (CIP) both for petrol and heating oils affected the 
independents more seriously than the integrated distribution networks. 
Distribution margins 
1 January 1973 20 February 1974 
Heating oils 3 % 1.1 % 
Light fuel oil 2.6 fo 1.1 fa 
Heavy fuel oil 3.6 fa I.4 fa 
Another result of the limitation of the prices of oil products 
by the CIP was to reduce the trade margins of the coastal depots from which 
the independents obtain their supplies. The function of these depots is to 
import oil produots, mainly from the USSR and France, to regulate these 
imports by means of their storage capacity and thus help to keep the market 
in balance. During the crisis they found it difficult to cover their operating 
costs. This made it even harder for the independents to obtain supplies. 
The Commission will 'continue its examination of the conduct of the 
companies within the provincial committee system and its effects on supplies 
to independents during the crisis. 
146 Generally speaking, wherever price controls existed the 
independents found survival difficult during the crisis. The reduced 
margin between prices invoiced by refineries and maximum prices often 
failed to cover distribution costs fully, and in view of the price 
levels prevailing at home it was not practical to obtain supplies from 
abroad. 
It is impossible to establish accurately how the structure of 
the trade was changed by the crisis. One estimate is that the number 
of enterprises which went out of business, including those which 
became bankrupt and those which were taken over by another company, was 
no higher than a few hundred in all categories for the whole Community 
(only one per cent of all the companies). In the end, given 
market trends in recent years, the number of importer/wholesalers 
which are truly independent cannot be more than one out of two. 
147 PART  V I CONCLUSIONS 
st  The enquiry announced by the Commission on 21 December 
1973 covered the period from October 1973 to March 1974- the period 
marked by the oil crisis stemming from the armed conflict which 
broke out in the Middle East on 6 October 1973· The enquiry's 
findings and conclusions as to the behaviour of oil companies during 
this period do not necessarily apply to the situation which obtained 
before or after the crisis. 
The purpose of the enquiry was to examine the behaviour of 
oil companies in the Community and assess it with regard to the rules 
on competition set out in the Treaty of Rome. The Commission's 
investigative powers extend to all member countries, but the enquiry 
has also produced important information relevant to matters outside 
the Community, notably the formation of crude oil prices in producer 
countries and also the transfer prices charged by oil companies in 
respect of crude oil sold to their refineries and refined products 
sold to their distributing subsidiaries. 
The sudden pressure on the market for oil products, its 
impact on the price of these products and the uncertainty as to the 
gravity and duration of the crisis, rapidly produced within the 
Community a supply situation in respect of oil products which 
obliged the Commission to ensure, by the means of direct action 
available to it, that the situation was not being exploited by the 
03.I companies in violation of the Treaty's rules on competitions 
151 The Commission's apprehension was justified because of 
the specific structure of the market in oil products, which is 
controlled by a small number of large international companies 
distributing a limited number of homogeneous products obtained 
from the same raw material to which they have privileged access. 
In proportions which may vary, all these companies purchase their 
oil from the same sources, often from enterprises in which they 
have a joint interest, at prices which are broadly similar for 
a given supply point. They load the oil at the same ports and 
ship it to the same destinations, where they manufacture the same 
products under the same conditions and at the same refineries. 
Whether in the case of actual joint ventures, exchanges 
of refining capacities or transfers of products, the large companies 
are linked by an extensive network of relationships which, even 
if there are good historical and economic reasons for them, 
constitute none the less a factor in strengthening their solidarity 
and consolidating their position. 
The Commission will remain alert to the possibility that, 
by forging more and more of these links, the companies might create 
together a situation which would limit the scope for effective 
competition. 
Alongside these large international companies, there is 
a smaller number of integrated companies, also with refineries in 
the Community, which, to a varying extent, depending on their 
requirements,have access to supplies of crude oil, but at generally 
higher prices. 
Finally, as regards the supply of oil products, there are 
the independent wholesalers, who, in normal circumstances,are able 
to play an active and effective role, in that they are in a position 
to obtain supplies from the cheapest sources and to ask lower prices, 
thereby introducing a significant element of competition. 
152 During the crisis, not only did the large oil companies 
continue to enjoy access to sources of supply on better terms 
than their competitors but their market position was reinforced 
by the relative scarcity of supply and even more so by the fear 
of real shortage. This situation harboured increased risks of 
restrictive practices involving supplies or prices, notably 
market sharing, abusive price policies or the elimination of 
less well placed competitors or independent dealers. These were, 
incidentally, risks which the authorities in member states were 
concerned to limit by measures appropriate to the national 
markets. 
Once the threat of a shortage appeared, the conditions 
of supply were seriously affected not only by the onset of the 
crisis but also by the attitude adopted by governments towards 
this threat. 
In most member countries the refining capacities cover 
requirements. The authorities in those countries took steps to 
control price increases and to restrict exports of refined products. 
However, for reasons stemming both from its economic tenets and 
from an appreciable shortfall in refining capacities in Germany, 
the Government of that country chose to rely to a large extent on the 
free interplay of market mechanisms to make up by imports the 
shortfall in national refining capacity. 
The varied policy approaches adopted within the Community 
by the several member states and the differing national measures 
implementing these policies affected the oil companies and explain 
certain facets of their behaviour in member countries. 
153 Assessment in the light of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome 
The Commission has examined whether the changes in the 
respective positions of the parties economically involved, did not, 
during the crisis, lead to restrictive or unfair practices by 
companies as regards supplies and prices or towards independent 
dealers and users. 
Assessment of the facts was often made difficult because 
the authorities in most nember states pursued a short-term oil 
policy which meant that they had to involve -either themeelves or 
through their trade associations - the oil companies in determining 
or implementing national objectives. 
This concertation between companies obviously resulted in practices 
which, although they had the blessing of the member states, could 
not avoid having some impact on competition and were therefore apt to 
fall within the relevant rules of the Treaty. 
Subject to any conclusions to the contrary which the Commission 
may reach, when it has completed the action which it intends to take 
(see point 5 below), the findings of the enquiry are as follows : 
(l) The dominant position of the oil companies 
The whole of the report shows that the structure of supply was 
not fundamentally different during the oil crisis from what it 
had been previously but - bearing in mind the relative scarcity of 
oil products - insofar as certain oil companies had at their 
disposal the bulk of the crude oil produced, and transported and 
refined it, the position of the independents and even of some of 
the less powerful integrated companies was undermined. Nevertheless, 
at the same time,refiners in general saw their position strengthened 
to such an extent that, collectively, they acquired a dominant 
position on the oil market. 
154 In view of the scarcity of oil products and since dealers 
and consumers were, as a result, unable to rely on other suppliers 
even in their own countries, each of the companies with refining 
capacities in a given country thus became the sole and imposed 
supplier of all dealers and consumers who were its traditional 
customers. In the context of their collective dominant position, 
each of the refining companies was, therefore, in a monopolistic 
position towards its customers. 
A dominant position was created for the supplier in respect of 
these traditional customers, due to the collective dominant 
position of all refiners on the entire national market. Such a 
situation existed in all member states except Germany. 
The definition of what constituted a company's traditional 
customers gives rise, of course, to some difficulty. In the 
context of actual problems raised by the crisis, the Commission 
has taken the view that a company should have considered as a 
traditional customer, any buyer who, in the twelve months prior 
to the crisis, had in some way or another been its customer. 
It is on this basis that the Commission made its assessment 
of the companies' behaviour in this field. 
(2) The supply of oil products 
The information gathered on the overall supply of crude oil 
to all refineries in the common market shows that the contraction 
in supplies was the result of production cuts ordered by the pro-
ducing countries and of their embargo directed at the Netherlands 
and Denmark. 
155 The Commission's investigations did not reveal the existence 
of any practices forbidden under Articles 85 and 86 in the arrangements 
for supplying the Community with crude oil. All the oil companies 
experienced difficulties in their own supply systems in the oil-
producing countries. Some of them, with a lesser proportion of 
concession oil at their disposal, experienced greater difficulties 
than others in supplying their refineries. 
The integrated companies which had no crude oil resources of 
their own or whose resources were so inadequate that they had 
concluded supply contracts for crude oil with the large international 
companies, continued to be supplied on the basis of contracts. 
By the same token, the Commission was unable to establish that 
there had been any agreement between oil companies in Europe, within 
the meaning of Article 85, to restrict deliveries of refined products. 
This does not contradict the fact that, locallyf dealers or users had 
to face major supply problems during the most acute phase of the 
crisis - problems which were caused mainly by a steep rise in demand 
on the part of anxious customers and by interruptions in the rhythm 
of deliveries by the refineries and wholesalers. The national 
authorities did all they could to remedy this. 
(3) Prices 
The transfer prices charged by the large oil companies, whether 
for crude oil or refined products, relate to transactions between 
firms in the same group, that is to say, they are internal prices 
determined from tax, financial and economic considerations peculiar 
to the enterprise itself. Where such transactions are purely internal 
in their effect they are not caught by the rules on competition. 
156 However, the Commission could not rule out the possibility 
that certain internalpractices in respect of transfer pricing 
might be indicative of an agreement or a concerted practice 
between the oil companies if they revealed coordinated behaviour . 
Nor could the Commission rule out the possibility that a policy 
of high or diversified transfer prices,applied to subsidiaries in 
countries where the authorities do not intervene in the marketi 
might constitute an element of abuse through its effects on selling 
prices where the company in question was-in a dominant position. 
As a check on their behaviour among themselves, the oil 
companies' respective transfer prices, for both crude oil and 
refined products, were compared. This showed that all the oil 
companies had followed their own line and that the transfer prices 
of crude oil in particular, though differing very little from each 
other, nevertheless did reflect the differences between the supply 
situations of the various companies. They also reflected the 
differences between the price polioies pursued by the companies, 
some of which charge the same transfer prices to all their refining 
subsidiaries throughout the Community, while others vary them to 
take account of conditions on national markets. 
In view of the highly diversified supply arrangements in 
Germany and the market economy which prevails there, no oil company 
was able to abuse its position through the transfer prices it applied 
in transactions with its German subsidiaries. 
An analysis of the various systems and levels of transfer prices 
did not reveal any concerted practices among the oil companies. 
In respect of the selling price to consumers, the fact that 
most member states set maximum prices made concerted practices 
between the oil companies impossible in these countries, once the 
prices had been fixed. 
157 It might have been thought that in Germany the 
oil companies would have come to an arrangement among themselves 
to increase their profits on the German market. Yet the trends 
taken by consumer prices on that market was the work of all the 
economic factors involved in making up that portion of Germany's 
oil requirements not covered by refineries located in that country, 
in particular importing dealers, who,faced with the threat of 
shortage and in the absence of prices fixed by the Government, 
accepted the level set by international demand. 
Of course, the prices asked by importers and by the 
subsidiaries of the large oil companies in Germany were all gravitating 
towards this level. In a market where there is little variation 
between products and where prices move very swiftly, consumer prices 
may temporarily assume a variety of levels from one company or region 
to another, but different price levels for the same product cannot 
be expected to obtain permanently throughout the market. 
In any event, the Commission discovered no agreements 
between companies in connection with this aspect. 
It is its view, however, that as certain systems of 
disseminating international prices, such as Piatt's Oilgram, may 
have an effect on price levels in Germany or on any other free market, 
it must give attention to the operation and effects of these systems 
and, in particular, check whether the information system used by 
Piatt's Oilgram might not result in prices being published which 
do not correspond to the whole of the actual quotations. 
An attempt may be made to estimate the excess price 
paid by Germany between October 1973 and April 1974 as compared with 
countries where the authorities set maximum prices. The Commission 
estimates that for those six monthsjthe excess price might have 
been in the order of one thousand million dollars for a consumption 
158 of sixty-four million tonnes of oil products, i.e. an average 
of about fifteen dollars per tonne. This may seem a large sum, 
but this additional expenditure on Germany's part is more than 
offset by the advantages which it has traditionally derived 
from its position as an importer of refined products bought 
at cheaper prices on the world market, the periods of depression 
on that market having in the past been considerably longer than 
the periods of pressure. 
(4) Independent dealers and users 
During the crisis the independent companies 
experienced such difficulties that, in some cases, their very 
existence was threatened. This was particularly true where the 
level of maximum prices prevented the independents from buying 
freely and squeezed their margins to excess. 
Many small and medium-sized firms, engaged solely in 
distribution, have tried either to cover themselves against a 
recurrence of the same difficulties or to sell out. 
The second alternative led to the buying up of a 
certain number of medium-sized business by the big companies. 
Other firms concluded long-term supply contracts with the refiners 
which give them a large degree of security but deprive them at the 
same time of genuinely free access to the market. 
Nevertheless the total of such transactions was small 
in relation to the total of dealers in oil products in the common 
market, estimated at around 60,000 wholesalers and retailers. 
159 The crisis thus brought about structural changes 
in the oil business which are reflected;not in a noticeable reduction 
in the number of firms^but in the existence of new relationships 
between the oil companies and a certain number of wholesalers. 
Nevertheless the Commission discovered nothing in this development 
indicating abuse by the oil companies of their collective dominant 
position. 
On the other hand, the Commission has examined cases of 
presumed abuse of an individual dominant position by certain companies 
in respect of independent dealers who are their customers. 
The Commission takes the view that, during the crisis, 
all the large oil companies were in an individual dominant position, 
at least in respect of their traditional customers, who had no access 
to suppliers other than those with whom they had done busxness. 
A refusal to sell to such customers can constitute an abuse forbidden 
by Article 86 since it may affect trade between member states, which 
160 is certainly the case when a sizable purchaser/dealer is in 
danger of being squeezed out of the market, a development 
which would mean appreciable change in the pattern of supply 
for oil products in a substantial part of the common market. 
The question might even-be asked whether, in a 
crisis in which state intervention, in particular, produces a 
degree of fragmentation of the market, companies in a collective 
dominant position should not be obliged,according to their share 
of the market concerned, to supply in reasonable quantities and 
at reasonable prices to buyers who, before this fragmentation of 
the market, obtained their supplies from other sources. Such an 
obligation would have the effect of maintaining the competitive 
marketing structure which existed before the crisis. 
(5) Further investigations decided by the Commission 
Following a complaint of refusal to sell, the 
Commission is continuing its examination of a case which may 
involve an abuse of a dominant position under Article 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome. 
The Commission ascertained, in respect of certain 
products, the existence of specific market situations and price 
differences which justify closer investigation. 
This applies to kerosene and naphtha, on the markets 
for which there are oligopolies of both suppliers and buyers. 
The Commission has decided to carry out enquiries 
in the following sectors under Council Regulation No. I7 : 
(i) jet fuel (kerosene), with the airlines; 
(ii) naphtha, with the chemical industry; 
(iii) the use by oil companies of references to Piatt's Oilgram 
quotations; 
(iv) public supply contracts with electricity companies. 
161 It also emerges from this report that during the crisis 
the dissimilar actions by member states were aimed at the urgent 
introduction of measures and gave the impression of an "every man 
for himself" approach,which was scarcely in the Community spirit. 
During the same period, because of their international 
standing and experience, the oil companies made an important con-
tribution to alleviating for the countries of the Community, the 
serious repercussions on their supplies of the decisions taken by 
the oil producing countries. 
This same crisis served, in fact, to highlight how 
effective and indispensable their influence is, and to bring 
home to economic observers and to the general public the power 
wielded by these large companies and the limitations of any 
attempt at state intervention. 
This power flows from their historical and privileged 
links with the oil-producing countries, their ownership of tanker 
fleets as well as most of the refineries in the world, and the 
integrated character of all their activities. 
But the producing countries have progresively effected 
a transfer of power to their own advantage. The successive attempts 
to reduce concessions and gradually to take control of operations 
have seriously eroded the oil companies' position in the producing 
countries. 
162 Nevertheless they retain almost exclusive control of 
supply routes, refining and distribution facilities. 
In view of these developments,the consuming countries 
will require to pay more attention to both the economic and political 
terms attached to their oil supplies. 
It is therefore essential, in the light of present 
and foreseeable circumstances, to achieve a better balance 
between the roles of the public authorities and the oil companies 
respectively. The companies are complex agents whose economic 
value is unquestioned but whose role must be better defined. 
Against this background, most member states have 
already embarked on a systematic rationalization of their relations 
with the companies. This ranges from an organization on a legal basis 
of the French type to consultation machinery as set up in Germany. 
The differences between these systems are indicative of different 
economic approaches but also reflect specific situations. Regardless 
of the. procedure adopted, there is not a single country which has not 
expressed the desire to see more clearly into the particular aspects 
of the oil business which affect it and, if necessary, to exercise 
some influence. 
All the industrialised countries of the world have 
displayed similar concern. 
Forms of international cooperation have been introduced 
but they do not themselves provide an answer to the Community's wish 
for a policy of its own, capable, should the need arise, of affirming 
itself independently and of counterbalancing ar-y influence which might 
be contrary to its interests. 
Nor does it relieve the Community of its obligation to 
exercise some supervision of the oil market to ensure that the rules 
on competition and the free movement of goods are being observed. 
The oil crisis will have served to stress once more the 
vital ïecessity for the Community to develop a common oil policy. 
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